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Abstract 
An enforceable undertaking is one enforcement sanction a regulatory 
authority can use when a duty holder breaches their obligations under the 
Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995.  It is an option to prosecution for 
a serious incident in the workplace. Negotiated between the regulatory authority and 
the offending duty holder, an enforceable undertaking involves a contract between 
the two parties, with the duty holder agreeing to carry out a range of serious 
organisational work health and safety reforms that bring benefits to the workplace, 
tangible benefits to workers, industry and community. A failure to fulfil the 
obligations in the undertaking will result in court enforcement of the contract and 
additional penalties.  Little is known about the fairness of the process used to reach 
an agreement about the contents of the undertaking. Taking an organisational justice 
framework and applying three psycho-social constructs of distributive, procedural 
and interactional justice, this exploratory study examines the perceptions of fairness 
of the process to prepare the agreement and how it is implemented.  
In the context of the regulatory environment of Workplace Health and Safety 
Queensland, and its Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995, a cross sectional case 
study examines the fairness perceptions of three stakeholder groups, the regulatory 
body, the offending entities that have proposed an undertaking and the affected third 
parties, the subject of the undertaking. Documentary analysis and interviews with 
three regulatory officials from the regulatory body, five duty holders found to have 
breached the work health and safety legislation and two injured workers and a next 
of kin, were conducted. A thematic analysis was employed to analyse the data. 
The research found, depending on the stakeholder group being analysed, 
different fairness perceptions were evident. From the regulatory perspective, it has 
established a business model to maximise procedural and interactional justice 
elements to increase acceptance of a distributive unjust sanction. Duty holders accept 
the unfair nature of the sanction, compromising in the face of high procedural and 
interactional justice elements. Affected third parties fairness perceptions of voice 
opportunities were found to be marginalised. Limitations of the study and future 
research areas were identified. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Across Australia, annually, on average, 250 workers die from an injury sustained at 
work and it is estimated over 2000 workers die from a work related illness or injury 
(Safe Work Australia, 2012b).  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on the fairness of a regulatory enforcement sanction, an 
enforceable undertaking (EU), in the context of work health and safety (WH&S) and 
its application in the Australian state of Queensland. An EU is an Australian 
innovation introduced in 1993 into the consumer protection environment under the 
Trades Practices Act 1974 (Cth) as a regulatory tool for the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (ALRC, 2002; Johnstone & King, 2008). Since 
then, the sanction has become available across Australian federal and state regulatory 
agencies (Johnstone & King, 2008; Johnstone & Parker, 2010). The use of EUs in the 
WH&S context is a more recent phenomenon, with the Queensland regulator, 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (WHSQ) implementing the sanction in 
2003. WHSQ was the first WH&S regulator to have the powers to provide for an EU 
as an alternative to prosecution for a serious breach of the WH&S law (Johnstone, 
2009). In 2012, following harmonisation of WH&S across Australia, EUs were 
introduced into the model national work, health and safety legislation for individual 
jurisdictions to adopt (Safe Work Australia, Explanatory Memorandum, n.d.). There 
is a paucity of research into EUs, as an interventionist strategy, especially in the 
domain of WH&S (Safe Work Australia, 2013). In conducting this research, the 
purpose is to fill a gap in our understanding of the enforcement strategy to induce 
regulatees’ compliance when they breach the WH&S Act. The study will expand our 
knowledge on three stakeholder groups’ perceptions of fairness of a sanction that has 
been designed to protect the health and safety of workers, improve on workplace 
safety outcomes and bring benefits to industry and the community (DEIR, 2008). 
The study aims to make a theoretical and practical contribution on the fairness of an 
EU as perceived from the perspective of the regulator, regulated entities and affected 
third parties. 
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 This chapter will introduce background material related to WH&S and EUs. 
It will provide the context for the research together with the research question. The 
chapter then details the significance and scope of the research along with definitions 
to be applied in the study and closes with an overview of the thesis structure.  
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Workplace related illness, injury and fatalities place a significant cost burden 
on the Australian economy. In its report into The cost of work-related injury and 
illness for Australian employers, workers and the community, 2008-2009 Safe Work 
Australia (2012a) estimated the total economic cost for Australian work-related 
injury and illness in 2008-2009 financial year to be $60.6 billion. This figure 
represents 4.8 percent of GDP for the equivalent period (Safe Work Australia, 
2012a). At the same time, $6.5 billion in workers’ compensation premiums were paid 
by Australian employers. Collectively these costs are borne by the employer, the 
injured worker who suffers as a consequence of the incident, their families and 
society. For the community, the costs accrue through the medical treatment and 
health care associated with the rehabilitation of the injured party (Gahan, 
Sievewright, & Evans, 2014). Combined with the cost of work-related injury and 
illness and workers’ compensation, is the economic cost associated with a work-
related death, estimated at between $A11 million and $A19 million (Gahan et al., 
2014 citing Miller, Mulvey, & Norris, 1997). Significantly, a workplace incident, as 
a proportion of costs carried by each economic agent (employer, employee and 
community) has been found to be disproportionately distributed between the injured 
party and society. Safe Work Australia (2012a:27) estimates that 95 percent of the 
costs of a work-related incident are carried by the injured party and the community 
with the remaining five percent borne by the workplace and businesses. 
Protection of workers from harm, injury and death at worksites is a priority 
for governments. The Commonwealth, through its Australian Work Health and 
Safety Strategy 2012-2022 (Safe Work Australia, 2012b), promotes the vision of 
healthy, safe and productive working lives for everyone. Consistent with the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Australia’s WH&S legislation 
that establishes the foundation for the duty of care arrangements for all workers, the 
Strategy is underpinned by the philosophy that workers are accorded the highest 
level of protection against harm and injury arising from workplace hazards and risks. 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 
To maximise WH&S protections in the workplace, the Australian Strategy sets out 
four key outcomes to be reached by 2022. The first outcome is to reduce the 
incidence of work-related death, injury and illness. This is to be realised through the 
second and third outcomes of reduced exposure to hazards and risks and using 
improved hazard controls. The final outcome is an improved WH&S infrastructure to 
achieve these outcomes (Safe Work Australia, 2012b). The strategy will assist 
regulators, industry, unions, organisations and governments to directly influence the 
work environment and address WH&S at its coalface. An important infrastructure 
requirement is for regulators to have a responsive and effective regulatory framework 
reinforced by a robust evidence-base to successfully execute its responsibilities. 
Regulation is a form of government activity that addresses particular 
behaviours and conduct in the community. It plays a critical role in addressing 
shortcomings in society where ‘market failure’ may lead to adverse and 
unanticipated outcomes on the community (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:9; ALRC, 2002). 
A purposeful role for the state is to intervene in the economic and social activities of 
business entities for the benefit of everyone. This can be facilitated through a public 
regulator established under a statutory framework with powers to enforce regulatory 
standards (Yeung, 2004). The regulation of WH&S is a key area where societal 
expectations exist for the state to regulate entities’ behaviours in order to protect 
everyone from harm or injury (Braithwaite, 2011). In 2003, the Queensland WH&S 
regulator, WHSQ introduced an EU into its suite of sanctions to address breaches of 
WH&S laws by the regulated community. Following the WHSQ lead, other 
Australian WH&S regulators enacted powers for the use of the sanction. Under the 
policy arrangements for WHSQ, the sanction, an alternative to prosecution, is only 
available to businesses after an assessment of the objective gravity of the alleged 
offence is conducted. The incident generally involves a serious injury to a worker.  
Evidence-based data on the impact of WH&S enforcement sanctions used to 
intervene and address failures by the regulated community in fulfilling their WH&S 
responsibilities is inadequate. Safe Work Australia, the national independent 
statutory policy body for WH&S, in a comprehensive literature review, concluded 
there was limited information and data on the effectiveness of WH&S interventions 
in Australia (Safe Work Australia, 2013:9). Specifically related to EUs, there was an 
identified need to develop a better understanding of why the sanction might work and 
how regulators could use them more effectively. The review also called for more 
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studies focussing on the longer term outcomes for firms with an EU to inform 
prosecution policy in WH&S.   
Harmonisation of WH&S began in Australia in January 2012.  The national 
model for WH&S law enables an EU to be used in each jurisdiction. Safe Work 
Australia developed a National Compliance and Enforcement Policy with the EU 
sanction incorporated into the policy framework. In the absence of a strong body of 
evidence-based data on the sanction, and WHSQ having over a decade of 
administrative and operational experience implementing EUs, an examination of 
stakeholder perspectives of the EU is timely. This exploratory study will contribute 
evidence on the perceived fairness of an EU.  
1.3 CONTEXT 
An EU is an administrative sanction that has a number of distinguishing 
characteristics. Under the WHSQ an EU is defined as ‘a contract involving 
commitment by a person (called an obligation or duty holder) who is alleged to have 
breached their obligation under the [WH&S] Act to do something, which if not done, 
is enforceable in court’ (DEIR, 2008). An EU is legislative authorised and court 
enforceable if a regulated party fails to fulfil the obligations set out in the agreement 
signed off between them and the regulator (Parker, 2009). The agreement prepared 
by the regulated party through negotiations with the regulator, facilitates plausible 
solutions to breaches in the law that are generally outside the parameters of court-
imposed punishment or prosecution (Nehme, 2005; Parker, 2004). EUs, when 
developed, are targeted activities to address problem areas in the workplace that lead 
to the serious contravention of health and safety laws (Yeung, 2004; Parker, 2004). 
Implementation of the EU forces offending entities to undertake serious 
organisational WH&S reforms through effective WH&S management systems and 
various other activities that bring benefits to workers and by making contributions to 
industry and the community (DEIR, 2008). 
The regulated entity that proposes an EU to the regulator has no guarantee an 
application for the undertaking will be approved by the decision-maker (DEIR, 
2008). The process used in preparing an EU involves an exclusive bilateral 
relationship between the regulated entity and WHSQ regulatory officials. It replaces 
the formal legal evidentiary procedures and open scrutiny of court decision-making 
(Yeung, 2004). The EU process introduces a flexible administrative arrangement that 
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allows the two negotiating parties to work constructively together to try and resolve 
the problem in a timely and cost effective manner (Parker, 2003, 2004). Although the 
benefits of an EU have been acknowledged, questions of fair treatment, equitable 
outcomes and consistency in regulatory decision-making have been brought into 
question, especially where regulatory discretionary powers are involved in the 
private negotiations with the regulated community (ALRC, 2002; Yeung, 2004).      
In light of the small data available on EUs, this study is based on the first-hand 
lived experiences and perceptions of three key stakeholder groups impacted by an 
EU under the Queensland WH&S legislation. The study brings together the voices of 
the regulatory authority, WHSQ, businesses found to have allegedly breached 
WH&S legislation resulting in a serious injury to a person and affected third parties. 
An ‘affected third party’ refers to an injured employee (or another person such as a 
child or adult injured at a workplace). The definition also covers the next of kin of 
the injured person and other relevant stakeholders affected by the incident (Nehme, 
2009). Affected third parties are generally not an active participant in the drafting 
and negotiation of an EU (Nehme, 2009) although inclusion of affected third party 
stakeholders in the EU process has been called for over time (Johnstone & Parker, 
2010; Johnstone & King, 2008; Parker, 2003, 2004; Nehme, 2010a, 2010b, 2009; 
Hardy & Howe, 2013; Goodwin & Maconachie, 2012). Both the incident and the 
injured party are the subject of the EU and form the trigger for an offer of an EU to 
the regulator. The WHSQ process for offering an EU allows the affected third party 
the option to comment on the duty holder’s EU application to the WHSQ regulator. 
This study brings together the different perspectives of each party, their respective 
experiences of being involved in the EU process and how they perceive the fairness 
of the sanction.   
1.4 RESEARCH LITERATURE, PURPOSE AND QUESTION 
In conducting this research, the purpose of the study is threefold. Firstly the 
study sets out to contribute to the gap in our knowledge of an EU as an enforcement 
strategy in WH&S. Despite being introduced into Queensland WH&S legislation 
over a decade ago, research into the sanction in the WH&S space both nationally and 
jurisdictionally is scarce.  
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A key source of literature on WH&S has been conducted in a cross sectional 
study by Johnstone and King (2008). Johnstone and King (2008) provide preliminary 
data of the initial 18 months of the EU program by WHSQ from late 2006 when the 
first EU was published until mid-2007. Taking a qualitative approach, the scholars 
conducted a review of documentary artefacts (EUs and policy documents), held 
interviews with stakeholders including the regulator, regulated entities with EUs, 
incorporating rejected or withdrawn applications, auditors and lawyers with 
experience in the process. Johnstone and King’s (2008) research aims were firstly, to 
access the conceptual development of EUs in WHSQ, secondly to examine the 
implementation of EUs as an enforcement sanction, and thirdly to consider EUs 
effectiveness as an enforcement strategy. Findings from the study identified 
complexities associated with the EU program and policy guidelines. Insight was 
gained into the inequitable nature of the EU evaluated in financial terms against a 
prosecution. A court fine was found to be profoundly less than the value of an EU 
with the average value of the 31 EUs being $200,536.86 with the total of all EUs 
over $A6 million. The prosecution penalty for a rejected offer by the regulator was 
$25,100, reflecting an EU some eight times the total of fines paid (Johnstone & King, 
2008). Other areas of concern comprised publication of policy guidelines, 
weaknesses in monitoring and auditing of EUs by the regulator and absence of 
affected third parties, primarily injured workers, in the process. Despite areas of 
concern, Johnstone and King (2008) note the value of face to face negotiation 
between the regulatory administrators and the alleged offender as important in 
accepting the undertaking (Johnstone & Parker, 2010). A follow up study has never 
been undertaken.  
Other studies of EU application in a range of regulatory settings have been 
published. In an exploratory study, Goodwin and Maconachie (2012) investigated the 
Fair Work Ombudsman’s use of EUs as part of minimum labour standards by 
comparing the regulators approach with that of the ACCC. They used documentary 
analysis of published EUs. The relative newness of the FWO EU program was found 
to be too underdeveloped to draw conclusive findings and recommended more 
studies into scrutinising the negotiation process, the deterrent value of the sanction 
and victims or third party participation.  Hardy and Howe (2013) filled some of the 
gaps identified by Goodwin and Maconachie (2012) in their qualitative investigation 
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of the FWO using interviews with stakeholders, lawyers and practitioners in the 
employee relations field, documentary and content analysis of relevant EUs and 
associated workplace artefacts. Although a small sample of 26 EUs was used 
covering July 2008 until June 2012, Hardy and Howe (2013) report the sanction has 
merit as a compliance tool. However Hardy and Howe (2013) advise caution with the 
centralised decision-making process of the regulator, the high evidentiary 
requirements placed on parties, the private negotiations between the employer and 
the FWO and the exclusion of affected stakeholders, namely employees. The study 
omitted input from industry and employer representatives and affected third parties.   
In the realm of consumer, competition, corporation and financial regulatory 
environments, studies have been more established. Parker (2004) investigated 
business regulation and the ACCC use of EUs as a form of ‘restorative justice’. Her 
research considers the fulcrum of two different concerns emerging from regulator 
control of EUs. On one side, regulatory pressure in the negotiation process to 
produce undertaking terms that may be excessively disproportionate to the 
contravention and potentially unlawfully authorised, referred to as the ‘fairness 
critique’, while on the other side undertakings that are skewed towards business 
interest over public interest, considered the ‘bias critique’. Empirical evidence was 
drawn from analysis of five and a half years of ACCC EUs, audits, qualitative 
interviews with staff of the Commission and trades practices specialists. EUs, 
according to Parker (2004) are flexible, timely and are cooperative in nature. They 
act like a form of alternative dispute resolution, whereby parties (regulator and 
offending entity) seek to transform the legal issues in dispute into restorative justice 
for all stakeholders. As Parker (2004) points out, despite its restorative justice 
potential, it requires full and fair participation of all affected parties in the 
deliberation of how best to respond to the offence.  
In the financial and securities environment of the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC), Nehme (2010b) also considered the restorative 
capacity of EUs when she examined the legislative provisions for EUs against the 
three restorative justice principles developed by Van Ness (1997). Van Ness (1997) 
considers the reparation of the harm caused by the offence of the offender, 
stakeholder inclusion (victims of crime and others affected by the crime) to resolve 
the injustice through collective participation in designing the agreement to address 
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the contravention and thirdly the support of the community and government agencies 
to facilitate the restoration. Nehme (2010b) provides evidence of correcting injustices 
through restorative elements found in the EU and that the sanction overall is 
moderately restorative. She suggests that further data is necessary through 
stakeholder and third party consultation to inform ASIC on how to best provide for a 
fair system to protect the rights of the alleged victims. 
Taking the affected third party or victim of crime perspective, Nehme (2009) 
investigates the fairness of the EU where corporations, securities and futures 
industries are regulated through ASIC. Using case studies, ASIC legislation (ASIC 
Act 2001 (Cth)) providing for EUs (under sections 93A and 93AA), and case law, 
Nehme (2009) looks at how the legislation is able to ensure victims and other third 
parties affected by a contravention can be delivered fairness and justice through the 
EU with their rights protected. Key strategies for justice are through the regulator 
ensuring the EU terms provide compensation for losses without the affected parties 
taking costly private action and by promoting public disclosure as an educative 
function. The process can be educative for offending businesses and the community 
as the injustice that has occurred can be disclosed in the media for everyone to be 
warned and made aware of.       
In contrast to Nehme (2009) reviewing EUs and its fairness for the victims of 
crime under the ASIC legislation, Nehme (2010a) investigates the EU sanction’s 
fairness from the perspective of the alleged offender under the same Act. She 
considers the procedural fairness of the EU from the legal perspective of measuring it 
against administrative law criteria and the psycho-social theoretical criteria applied 
by Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) and Leventhal (1980).  She finds the EUs have 
a range of checks and balances in place to ensure offenders are protected against 
bias, inconsistency in treatment, there are adequate review processes available and 
mechanisms to provide a voice through notice and presentation of evidence. From 
the psycho-social perspective of representation, correctability, consistency and 
impartiality, procedural fairness is also upheld for the alleged wrongdoer.  
One study on EUs has brought together the perspectives of regulators and 
decision-makers, policy makers and academics covering a spectrum of regulatory 
settings including ACCC, ASIC, WHSQ, Environment Protection Victoria, 
Workplace Ombudsman and Australian Communications and Media Authority. The 
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study by Johnstone and Parker (2010) integrated the various legislative powers of the 
regulators and considered similarities and dissimilarities with the use of EUs across 
the different contexts and across Australian jurisdictions, federal and state and 
territory. The insights and experiences of practitioners, decision-makers and 
academics suggests EUs, while still evolving in Australia, were emerging as a solid 
and beneficial sanction to ensure compliance with the law and acting as a deterrent to 
rule breaking (Johnstone & Parker, 2010).  
 Secondly, this study seeks to develop our understanding of the perceptions of 
fairness of the sanction in protecting the health and safety of workers, improve on 
workplace safety outcomes and to bring benefits to industry and the community. In 
the literature previously reported, only a small number of studies have sought the 
perspectives of various stakeholders to an EU (Johnstone & Parker, 2010; Johnstone 
& King, 2008; Hardy & Howe, 2013; Nehme, 2010a, 2010b, 2009, Parker, 2004). 
Each of the studies documenting stakeholder perspectives has excluded the tripartite 
voices of the regulator, the offending entity and the affected third party. The 
intention of this study is to integrate the three stakeholder groups into a single 
research program and bring their respective stories, experiences and perceptions 
together, to report on the fairness of EUs under the WH&S Act delivered through the 
WHSQ EU process. 
Thirdly, the aim of this study is to make a theoretical and practical contribution 
to our understanding of EUs as a regulatory sanction in Australia. The study seeks to 
examine the fairness of the sanction by applying the theoretical framework of 
organisational justice (Greenberg, 1987). The framework brings the justice 
dimensions of distributive, procedural and interactional together and, through the 
three justice lens, examines stakeholder’ perceptions of the fairness of the EU. An 
organisational justice model has yet to be applied in the regulatory, management and 
public law arenas to investigate EUs. One study in the literature above (Nehme, 
2010a) considers a regulated entities’ perspective of the procedural fairness of an EU 
under ASIC legislation. She assessed the sanction by comparing the criteria for 
procedural fairness using administrative law principles of procedural fairness with 
the psycho-social criteria (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978) and Leventhal (1980) used 
to assess procedural fairness. The current research combines the three justice types, 
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their respective fairness rules along with the voices of the regulatory authority, 
regulated entities and affected third parties to review the sanction’s fairness.  
What is considered important in the study is to capture the experiences and 
perceptions of stakeholders. To do this a qualitative methodology using a multi-level 
case study has been selected as the most appropriate method. The study examines the 
voices of each stakeholder group collected through face to face interviews and 
analysed by combining their stories, documentary evidence and applying thematic 
analysis. 
This is an exploratory study in the regulatory environment on an enforcement 
sanction in the context of WH&S. The study will be confined to the WHSQ using the 
EU process administered by its Enforceable Undertakings Unit (EUU). The study 
participants are restricted to the regulatory representatives, successful applicants for 
an EU with first-hand experience of the EU process (preparation and 
implementation, monitoring and auditing) and affected third parties who contributed 
their views on the EU proposal their employer offered to the regulator. The question 
addressed in this research is: 
How do stakeholders to an EU in the work health and safety context 
perceive the fairness of the EU process?  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
The thesis focus is on exploring the experiences and perspectives of the three 
stakeholder groups involved in the EU process in the area of WH&S. The theoretical 
construct of organisational justice will be used as an evaluation tool to investigate the 
fairness of the sanction. Examining fairness perceptions of the EU sanction will 
involve a multi-stakeholder approach which will include the voices of affected third 
parties, regulatory officials and a cross section of regulated entities. This study will 
contribute new information and develop new knowledge in various ways. Firstly, 
through the stories of the stakeholders, the study will expand regulatory knowledge 
of the perceptions of fairness of the sanction and whether it has any influence on the 
regulatees’ behaviour and conduct towards health and safety in the workplace. 
Secondly, the study will make an important contribution to the knowledge of affected 
third parties’ experiences and how they perceive the fairness of the sanction and any 
reactions to it.  Thirdly, the study contributes to the knowledge and understanding of 
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duty holders’ attitudes and reactions to an undertaking and their respective 
perceptions of its fairness.   
The scope of this study is confined to the administration of an EU by the 
Queensland regulator, WHSQ. Queensland WH&S regulator was the first regulatory 
agency to enact WH&S legislation for EUs under its WH&S Act 1995 in 2003 
(Johnstone, 2009). The state regulator policy guidelines allow affected third parties a 
voice in the process (DEIR, 2008, Diagram 3.2). Research participants are limited to   
affected third parties and successful applicants of an EU whose published agreement 
was listed between mid-2006 and January 2013. The study parameters are controlled 
by the academic requirements set out for the QUT Master’s program, time and 
budgetary constraints. 
The organisational justice construct will form the theoretical framework for the 
study. Organisational justice relates to people’s perceptions of fairness in 
organisations (Greenberg, 1987:10; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:4) and covers 
three justice dimensions. The earliest and first form of justice to emerge in the 
literature was distributive justice. Within the organisational context, social scientists 
initially focussed on peoples’ evaluations of ‘the fairness of the outcomes (benefits 
or punishments) they receive’ (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:7) in an allocation 
decision. Arising out of research conducted on formal legal procedures in American 
court settings, scholars began to investigate the perceptions of fairness of the 
procedures used to determine outcomes (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:15; Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980). This second form of justice was referred to 
as procedural justice. The third form of justice to appear was interactional justice. 
This justice dimension was considered a social aspect of procedural justice 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:19) and refers to the quality of interpersonal 
treatment and communication that individual’s receive from a decision-maker during 
the enactment of organisational procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986:44). Together, the 
three justice types will be applied to the data collected for this study to evaluate the 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the fairness of the EU as a regulatory sanction in the 
Queensland WH&S environment.  
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
Having presented the introduction of the study above, the rest of the thesis is 
organised as follows. Chapter two provides a review of the relevant literature related 
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to the theoretical framework of organisational justice, introduces extant research into 
EUs and identifies the research gap in the literature on EUs. The research question is 
outlined. Chapter three covers the regulatory background in the Australian context 
and focusses specifically on Queensland’s adoption of EUs as part of its WH&S 
legislation. A general explanation of the EU process under the WHSQ is provided as 
a foundation to Chapter five and the analysis of the data. Chapter four describes the 
qualitative methodology applied for this research and coverage of the sampling 
procedure, data collection, data analysis and research limitations. Chapter five 
presents the thematic analysis of the data gathered from documentary evidence and 
the interviews conducted with the stakeholder groups. Chapter six discusses the 
findings from the thematic analysis and considers those findings in relation to the 
research question, presents the theoretical and practical implications of the study as 
well as its limitations and suggests areas for future investigation.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in the Introduction chapter, there is a paucity of studies that 
evaluate the fairness of an EU in the context of WH&S.  To address this research 
gap, the theoretical framework of organisational justice has been applied. The 
construct will examine how the stakeholders to an EU experience and perceive the 
fairness of the regulatory sanction as a mechanism to improve WH&S in the 
workplace. This chapter provides a brief overview of the three justice types that form 
the organisational justice construct. Distributive justice refers to the perceived 
fairness of the outcome (reward or punishment) one receives from an allocation 
decision (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:7) and, as the earliest justice type, is 
discussed first.  Procedural justice, which refers to the ‘perceived fairness of the 
procedures used to determine an outcome’ (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:15; 
Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Leventhal, 1980), is then considered. The third topic is 
interactional justice, a reference to the perceived fairness of the interpersonal 
treatment a person receives during the enactment of organisational procedures (Bies 
& Moag, 1986:44). The chapter will then consider the relevant literature on EUs. The 
research gap is identified with a research question posed. A conceptual framework 
for the study of EUs applying the organisational justice construct is presented in the 
concluding section of this chapter. 
2.2 JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 
As a concept, justice has been of philosophical interest since the early Greek 
times. Aristotle was among the first philosophers to examine what creates fairness 
when resources are distributed (Greenberg & Bies, 1992). Rawls (1971) believed 
justice to be the ‘first virtue of social institutions, as truth is systems of thought’.  
Justice is defined according to the disciplinary orientation being studied (Cohen, 
1986). For example, justice within an economic framework is concerned with income 
and welfare distributions (Hegtvedt, 2006). In business and management disciplines, 
organisational scientists draw on social-psychological theories of justice. Social 
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psychological models are concerned with the motivations of people for justice 
(Tyler, 2012). They examine people’s judgments about the principles they use to 
decide what they consider to be fair or unfair in social settings (Tyler, 2006).  
Adopting this approach, justice is defined phenomenologically where an act is ‘just’ 
if a person thinks it’s ‘just’. When a person judges an act to be fair or unfair, it will 
be perceived as such (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) on the basis of supporting 
empirical evidence (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Justice is subjective and 
socially constructed with its treatment descriptive in orientation (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). This approach contrasts with 
the philosophical - ethical definition of justice where an act is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ when 
it complies with or violates the normative rule system used to determine fairness. In a 
rule based system, justice is prescriptive, and determines what ought to be done to 
achieve justice (Greenberg & Bies, 1992: 433).  
A simple model of justice processes that captures an individual’s justice 
evaluation and their reaction has been developed by Hegtvedt (2006).  Represented 
by the justice process framework at Figure 2.1, the model depicts the interplay of 
elements that influence an individual’s evaluation of an incident across three types of 
justice: distributive, procedural and interactional.  
Figure 2.1 Basic model of the justice process 
 
 Source: Adapted from Hegtvedt, 2006:47 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 The justice analysis begins with a ‘perceiver’ or ‘recipient’ directly or 
indirectly, involved in an event or incident.  The event yields an assessment of the 
circumstances based on a particular justice dimension (distributive, procedural or 
interactional). Individuals bring personal idiosyncrasies to the event, their individual 
characteristics, beliefs and motivations. Combined with situational factors such as 
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where it happened, the parties involved, and the issue, a fairness perception about the 
distribution (or outcome), the procedure applied or the interaction between the 
decision-maker and the perceiver occurs. Perceptions experienced, whether fair or 
unfair, create personal reactions, which may be of a behavioural or emotional (or 
psychological) nature. 
2.3 JUSTICE RESEARCH IN ORGANISATIONS  
Organisational justice research, applying a social psychological perspective, 
emerged in America during the 1940s with American scholars dominating research 
in this field (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Cropanzano, 2001).  Early justice studies 
were grounded in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and shaped by the social 
upheaval and political issues emerging in America post World War II (Greenberg & 
Colquitt, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001; Tyler, 2009). The 
first type of justice studies examined the distribution of resources between employees 
and employers, with social scientists interested in peoples’ evaluations of ‘the 
fairness of the outcomes (benefits or punishments) they receive’ (Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1997:7) in an allocation decision and subsequently referred to as 
distributive justice (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997: 7; Deutsch, 1975; Adams, 
1963). Beginning in the mid-1970s, scholars began to investigate the ‘perception of 
fairness of the procedures used to determine outcomes’, referred to as procedural 
justice (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:15; Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975, 1978). In the mid-1980s, the importance of the quality of treatment 
that people received from a decision-maker during the implementation of a procedure 
was introduced as a third justice dimension and referred to as interactional justice 
(Bies & Moag, 1986:44; Greenberg, 1993b; Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001).  
Interactional justice was regarded as the social side of procedural justice 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:19). 
The three justice types, distributive, procedural and interactional, when 
combined became known as ‘organisational justice’, a term first used by French 
(1964) in relation to personnel management issues. The phrase gained greater 
prominence when Greenberg (1987) created and applied a taxonomy of 
organisational justice to explain workplace behaviours (Greenberg, 1987). 
Organisational justice describes ‘people’s perceptions of fairness in organisations’ 
(Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005:5; Cropanzano, 2001:5; Greenberg, 1987:10).  In 
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contemporary studies of organisational justice, scholars have focussed on bringing 
each justice type together in empirical and theoretical studies to form an ‘integrative 
phase of justice research’ (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005:6). Integrative studies can be 
categorised according to heuristic conceptualisations, group-value conceptualisations 
and counterfactual conceptualisations (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 
2005:35). This study will not canvass these divergent approaches to studying justice 
issues, however the author acknowledges the diversity of direction taken in 
organisational justice studies since the 1990s. The thesis concentrates on the 
integration of the distributive, procedural and interactional justice under the rubric of 
organisational justice to examine stakeholder experiences of a WH&S EU. This is 
because each justice component engenders its own distinct influence on how people 
respond to decision making in an organisation and how an authority considers these 
justice elements in its administrative and operational actions.   
Figure 2.2 below illustrates graphically the organisational justice framework 
and the three justice dimensions. Distributive justice focuses on the fairness of a 
decision (its outcome) made by a decision-maker; procedural justice focuses on the 
fairness of decision-making procedures and related ‘methods, mechanisms and 
processes’ (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998:26) used in reaching a decision by an 
organisation; and interactional justice focuses on the interpersonal treatment and 
communication a decision-recipient receives by a decision-maker during the 
enactment of an organizations procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986:44).   
Figure 2.2 Organisational justice and its justice dimensions 
 
 Source: Adapted from Greenberg, 1990:405 with diagram developed by the author 
 Two other forms of justice are considered in regulatory studies. Retributive 
justice, which is associated with an individual’s reactions to rule breaking (Tyler, 
2012) and, in contemporary studies of business regulation, restorative justice (refer, 
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for example, Parker, 2004; Nehme, 2010b; Johnstone & King, 2008). Restorative 
justice has a focus on reparation of the harm caused through an offence and brings 
together ‘all parties with a stake in the event’ (victims, offenders, legal authorities) to 
find a resolution to the dispute (Parker, 2004:220, citing Braithwaite, 2002). 
Retributive justice will not be canvassed in this exploratory study although some 
references to literature that includes restorative justice in the context of EUs will be 
discussed. This study will be confined to the original three factor model of justice 
perceptions that are psycho-social in nature and form Greenberg’s (1987) 
organisational justice construct.  
In summary, how we understand justice is based on the disciplinary 
background and setting applied to the study of justice. The social psychological 
approach to the study of justice was introduced and involves people making a 
subjective evaluation of an event based on how they perceive its fairness. A model to 
interpret how a justice evaluation occurs was presented.  When people evaluate 
justice, used interchangeably with fairness, their evaluations are based on three 
justice types: distributive, procedural and interactional. Combined together they form 
the organisational justice construct that refers to how people perceive the fairness of 
organisations and their consequent reactions and behaviour in such settings. From 
this foundation, the next section discusses each justice dimension.  
In the literature on organisational justice, scholars frequently consider each 
justice type with reference to a specific set of fairness ‘rules’ or ‘criteria’ (Greenberg 
& Colquitt, 2005).  This thesis will continue to adopt this approach.  In the 
discussion of each justice type, the ‘rules’ or ‘criteria’ that underlie each dimension 
are introduced. Summarised in Table 2.1 (see page 50) are the rules and relevant 
definitions. 
2.4 DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Distributive justice focuses on people’s perceptions or evaluations of the 
fairness of the outcomes (benefits or punishments) they receive (Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1997:7) from an allocation or distribution process. Outcomes involve an 
evaluation of an end state and can be considered as the ‘final payoff’ based on a 
process of decision-making following inputs by individuals. Outcomes can 
incorporate a consideration of the content and consequences of distributive decisions 
(Folger and Greenberg, 1985:143) and are concerned with whether or not people feel 
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they receive their ‘just share’ (Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007:37).  
Distributive justice evaluations of fairness can relate to economic or socio-emotional 
outcomes (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler &Schminke, 2001). Within a workplace 
context, economic outcomes relate to salary and workplace benefits (car), promotion 
or status in the organisation (Adams, 1963; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998) while socio-
emotional outcomes focus on the relationships formed through the workplace 
exchanges such as friendliness (Martin & Harder, 1994; Cropanzano et al., 2001).  A 
distribution is perceived as fair when it is consistent with an accepted allocation 
norm or rule.  
A number of distributive justice theories deal with people’s concerns about 
outcome fairness. In the early research on distributive justice by Homans (1961), he 
suggests in a two way exchange, one’s profits should be ‘proportional’ to one’s 
investments.  Adam’s (1963) formulated a similar outcomes-oriented approach to 
distributive justice in his equity theory. Adam’s (1963) equity theory was based on a 
mathematical representation that incorporated a number of relationship variables 
assumed to be relevant to fairness evaluations.  Adam’s proposed people look at the 
inputs or ‘contributions’ they make on the job, such as education, intelligence, 
experience and training and the outcomes or ‘rewards’ they receive like pay, benefits 
and job status  (Adams, 1963) and consider this ratio against the outcomes of a 
referent standard – referred to as a ‘comparison other’. Equity theory focusses on 
proportionality and people evaluate outcomes in terms of where their outcome falls 
relative to the outcome of others. Outcomes are judged as fair and satisfying when an 
individual’s outcome is equal to, rather than different from, the outcome of 
comparison others. 
 Evaluations of fair distribution are based on comparisons between 
individual’s outcomes and merit. When the comparisons are proportional and 
outcomes are equal it creates feelings of satisfaction (Greenberg, 1990). An equitable 
situation in a work setting creates positive work behaviours and improved 
productivity (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Where a perceived discrepancy 
occurs, a state of tension and emotion arises, and people experience a negative state 
creating perceptions of unfairness or inequity (Adams, 1963; Greenberg & Colquitt, 
2005).  Adam’s (1963) suggested when people feel inequitably over-rewarded, they 
will experience guilt, while feelings of anger will result from being under-benefitted 
or under-rewarded (Greenberg, 1990), therefore inequity will motivate individuals to 
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reduce the discrepancy to get what they roughly deserve. Restoring equilibrium 
involves individual’s adjusting their emotional feelings of anger and guilt (Weiss, 
Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), adopting behavioural strategies, such as removing 
oneself from the exchange relationship (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978; 
Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987), or psychologically reshaping their thinking 
about the situation, such as changing one’s referent or re-evaluating the other’s 
inputs and outcomes (Adams, 1963; Walster et al., 1978; Greenberg & Colquitt, 
2005; Fortin, 2008). 
Equity research in organisational studies has provided valuable insight into 
important workplace issues such as what influence inequity plays in workplace 
sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002); employee theft (Greenberg, 
1993a) and workplace status (Greenberg, 1988). Accordingly Cropanzano and 
Greenberg (1997) have noted inequity in the workplace can have costly 
consequences for organisations.  
Criticisms of equity  
Shortcomings of equity theory (Adams, 1963) were identified by scholars 
working in distributive justice research. Researchers like Cohen (1986) identified 
methodological limitations. Cohen was critical of the recruitment of undifferentiated 
university students for experimental studies and questioned their ability to reflect real 
world equitable and inequitable situations with their short-lived life experiences. He 
also highlighted difficulties in comparing individual contributions in a quantifiable 
and unbiased manner. The narrow definition applied to ‘inputs and outcomes’ and 
the absence of data on ‘the comparison other’ were concerns presented by Pritchard 
(1969), while Cropanzano and Greenberg (1997) criticised the reliance on static 
‘referents’ in cross sectional studies, rather than looking at the longitudinal nature of 
people’s relationships in work settings. 
Distributive justice work was expanded to accommodate a broader range of 
values and comparative justice principles that equity theory ignored.  Equity theory 
was based on a formula couched in terms of pecuniary interests (Pritchard, 1969), 
and assumptions of a society where economic outcomes were pervasive across social 
interactions (Deutsch, 1975). Other researchers argued that merit was not the only 
basis for evaluating distributive fairness and that distributive justice evaluations 
could be found in intimate social interactions like parent-child or teacher-student 
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relationships (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1980).  Deutsch (1975) and Leventhal 
(1980) introduced two rules alongside the equity-contribution rule that extended 
distributive fairness judgments: 
1. the needs rule, which refers to situations where the outcome is based on the 
relative needs of the individual (the parties most in need receive more 
outcomes) and  
2. the equality rule, where all individual’s, irrespective of their circumstances, 
receive equal outcomes.   
According to Deutsch (1975) each of the three principles promotes different 
social goals. Equity rule promotes economic productivity; the needs rule advances 
social wellbeing; and equality-based distribution supports social harmony. The 
application of the rules is influenced by the conditions under which the basis for 
justice is considered (Leventhal, 1980; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Both 
Deutsch (1975) and Leventhal (1980) acknowledged that compromise was necessary 
in an allocation process and that hybrids of the rules could be formed by combining 
them. 
Figure 2.3 outlines the key conceptual points related to distributive justice. A fair 
outcome is one where the outcome is consistent with the norms for the allocation, 
based on equity, needs or equality (Colquitt, 2001).  When a violation from the 
principles used to determine the distributive fairness occurs, it may provoke a 
response, be it emotional, psychological or behavioural (Adams, 1963; Weiss et al., 
1999). 
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Figure 2.3 Organisational justice and distributive justice  
 
Source: Diagram developed by the author  
In summary, distributive justice was the earliest justice type to be researched 
by scholars. When applied to organisations, distributive justice focuses on an 
individual’s evaluation of the fairness of the outcome they receive in the exchange 
relationship. An important distributive justice principle is equity. Equity implies that 
an individual will judge the fairness of the situation by the outcome they receive, 
whether it be a punishment or reward, by a comparison with a ‘referent other’ or 
standard.  Evaluating an outcome can also include the content of the outcome and 
any consequences resulting from the outcome.  
While distributive justice dominated American justice studies in the 1950s 
and 1960s, research emerging in the early 1970s extended the literature to 
incorporate another dimension. Considered in the next section is procedural justice. 
2.5 PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Outcomes are neither created in a vacuum nor simply appear, but are shaped 
by a specific set of processes or procedures implemented by an organisation.  
Procedural justice examines peoples’ ‘perceptions of fairness of the 
procedures used to determine allocations’ (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997:5). A 
wider definition of procedural justice, provided by Folger and Cropanzano 
(1998:26), incorporates ‘the fairness issues concerning the methods, mechanisms and 
processes used to determine outcomes’. Both definitions of procedural justice will be 
applied in this thesis to take account of the perceptions of the procedures (EU 
process) used to determine an outcome (the EU) but also the institutional structure, 
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and its operational and administrative activities and documents developed by the 
regulator, WHSQ, to carry out its functions related to EU enforcement and 
compliance.  
Thibaut and Walker – Theory of a Procedure 
Initial research into procedural justice was influenced by investigations into 
the formal legal procedures of the American legal system. Notable social-
psychological scholars Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) were important contributors 
to procedural justice studies. Thibaut and Walker (1975) presented empirical 
research on dispute resolution approaches in the Anglo-American adversarial legal 
system and the inquisitorial system of continental Europe (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 
Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001). Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) contrasted the two systems and the respective legal procedures they used to 
reach objective, fair decisions. Under the adversarial system of Britain and America, 
a neutral, disinterested third party, usually a judge, controls the decision. Disputants 
to the conflict have control over the presentation of evidence that leads to the verdict 
(decision). In the inquisitorial system, a judge controls the outcome (or verdict) and 
the procedures (including the collection of evidence) to form a decision (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). Research revealed that procedures 
under adversarial systems were perceived to be fairer than those under an 
inquisitorial system (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Cohen, 
1986).  These studies reveal perceptions of procedural fairness impacted on a 
defendant’s satisfaction with the verdict, even if a guilty verdict or intolerable 
outcome was received.  
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) explanation for the preference for adversarial 
procedures related to the degree of ‘control’ that a disputant had over the process. 
Thibaut and Walker contend that procedures limiting third party control (i.e. the 
judge) and ‘allocating the preponderance of control to the disputants, constitutes a 
just procedure’ (Thibaut & Walker, 1975:118). In subsequent research, Thibaut and 
Walker (1978) distinguished between two types of control: process control – a 
reference to the ‘control over the development, selection and presentation of 
evidence that will be used to resolve a dispute’ (Thibaut & Walker, 1978:546), and 
decision control – a reference to the ‘right of any of the participants to the dispute to 
decide its outcome’ (Thibaut & Walker, 1978:546). Procedures were perceived most 
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fair when a dispute resolution model allowed people ‘process control’, or the 
opportunity to participate in developing the options that will be considered for a 
dispute outcome (Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Beugre, 2007; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001), and ‘decision control’, the ability to influence or choose the 
actual outcome itself (Colquitt, 2001; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). Research suggests 
that disputants were willing to forgo decision control as long as they retained process 
control (Thibaut & Walker, 1978).  
Control was seen to play a pivotal role in understanding individuals’ 
perception of procedural fairness. Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) research examined 
procedures that were designed to achieve an equitable outcome in the legal system. 
They argued that the best approach to obtain a distributively just outcome (verdict) 
was by giving people ‘process control’. Thibaut and Walker reasoned there were two 
benefits for ‘control’ being held by the disputants. Firstly, the individual is the best 
placed to provide the relevant details, knowledge and information about the 
circumstances of the dispute or conflict to the decision-maker. Allowing the 
disputants to present information, Thibaut and Walker (1978) contend the decision-
maker, who lacks this level of detail, will avoid resorting to personal expectations 
and applying their own contextual history and experiences when they make the 
ultimate decision. Secondly, Thibaut and Walker (1978) argue that decision-makers 
often interpret disputant behaviour differently to the disputant, leading to differences 
of opinion as to the causality in their actions. To avoid bias in a decision-maker’s 
assessment of a dispute, disputants given ‘control’ over the presentation of evidence 
are able to present the strongest claims from ‘their’ perspective. The approach 
accommodates the disputant’s set of complexities and particularities of their situation 
and contextual requirements they need to function in. Lastly, while ‘control’ offers 
the disputants greater involvement in contributing to the decision outcome, actual 
decision control was found to be better if the final decision was left to the decision-
maker who would apply normative standards to make a decision. Together, process 
control and decision control were found to produce both a fair procedure and justice. 
The use of ‘process control’ is associated with ‘voice’ and having a form of 
participation in decision-making (Folger, 1977; Cohen, 1985). Voice was first 
examined by Folger (1977), when he manipulated outcomes (equitable and 
inequitable) and procedures in a simulated office task, and found support for the 
‘voice effect’. In the procedures, Folger (1977) gave some participants voice 
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opportunities (by asking for their opinions) while others had mute arrangements (no 
voice or input). Folger (1977) reveals that when one is denied voice, the procedure 
was perceived to be less fair than when voice arrangements were available.  In a 
subsequent experimental study by Folger, Rosenfield, Grove and Corkan  (1979), the 
investigators coined the term ‘fair process effect’, a reference to the process control 
finding by Thibaut and Walker (1978), and confirmed that where ‘voice’ is present in 
a decision-making process, it will influence one’s perception of, and satisfaction 
with, their outcomes.  Fair procedures incorporating ‘voice’ were seen to enhance 
acceptance of the outcome (Greenberg, 2000), even if the outcome was unfavourable 
(Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler, 1987; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Cockran, 
1979). 
Resulting from Folger’s (1977) and Folger et al.’s (1979) research, 
procedural justice studies moved outside the legal procedures of Thibaut and Walker 
(1975, 1978) and the simulated court and legal settings, to be applied to procedures 
in organisations in general. Research began to emerge to reflect a wider spectrum of 
contexts and applications. Studies were conducted into procedures that applied 
organisational participatory practices (Folger & Greenberg, 1985); examined real 
world issues such as the American government’s use of workplace policies and 
practices (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987); and others like Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and 
de Vera Park (1993) examined how the voice effect impacted on individual and 
corporate dispute resolution processes. 
Voice research and procedural fairness have important implications for 
authorities and leaders, especially where they have power to influence decisions and 
are seeking to secure backing and support for their decisions. If people are affected 
by the decisions made by third parties (whether an independent body, like the 
judiciary, or by an organisation with statutory powers to make decisions), the 
literature highlights that the decisions will be viewed more favourably if individuals 
have an opportunity to present their case before the decision is made (Tyler, 1987). 
Furthermore, authority figures and institutions with decision-making powers are best 
placed to gain acceptance and support by implementing decision-structures and 
policies that incorporate voice procedures by including an opportunity to present 
information or participate in some way to influence the decision.   
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Why does voice in procedures matter? 
  To understand why voice has a significant influence on people’s perceptions 
of procedural fairness and their reactions to the outcomes, three different theoretical 
reasons have been posited to explain the justice phenomena. The first explanation for 
why voice matters relates to instrumental motives (Cropanzano et al., 2001, Lind & 
Tyler, 1988, Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Instrumental or self-interest purposes 
relates to concrete economic and quasi economic gains and losses (Cropanzano et al., 
2001: 11) and are associated with the procedural justice framework of Thibaut and 
Walker (1975, 1978) and Leventhal (1980) (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The theories of 
Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) and Leventhal (1980) grew from the historical 
traditions of social exchange (Blau, 1964) where people were assumed to be driven 
to maximise their own interest in their interaction with others (Cropanzano et al., 
2001). The decision-making procedures were frequently associated with one-off or 
limited transactions between the parties (i.e. as in the legal system). Procedures offer 
a disputant a degree of ‘process’ control over the type of information and evidence 
they present to a decision-maker. This information may, indirectly, persuade a 
decision-maker, to reach a positive or equitable outcome that personally favours 
them (Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 1987). Procedures are instrumental because they act as ‘a 
means to an end’ (Tyler, 1987). The instrumental self-interest model views 
procedures as a mechanism for making hard decisions, while simultaneously involve 
individuals making self-interested compromises for some longer term benefit, often 
related to personal economic gains (Cropanzano, et al., 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Lind and Tyler (1988) contend that a system that accommodates voice procedures 
reassures an individual their self-interest is ‘protected’, and in turn enhances an 
individual’s perception of the institution’s fairness. 
A second explanation, in contrast to the instrumental self-interest model 
presented above, offers a non-instrumental motive for the value of voice. Scholars 
Lind and Tyler (1988) view procedures as elements that regulate the relationships 
between groups in organisations: ‘procedures specify authority relations’ (p. 231). 
Lind and Tyler’s (1988) and later Tyler and Lind’s (1992) theories drew from the 
traditions of social identity theory and the influence of relationships, self-expression 
and group identity (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Taking the original group-value 
framework of procedural justice in 1988, Lind and Tyler expanded and developed it 
into a relational model of authority in groups (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the later 
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model what is important is the relationship among the parties that are subject to the 
procedures. They theorise that the preservation of a relationship within a group over 
time is more critical than having one-off encounters with an institution or authority 
figure (Tyler, 1989). For Tyler and Lind (1992), seeking to win a dispute at any cost 
has little merit if it leads to a permanent breakdown in the relationship. They argue it 
is more important to create a perception all group members’ interests will be served 
over time. In this study, the main focus is on the latter relational model (Tyler & 
Lind, 1992).  
The relational model suggests that where an organisational culture of voice 
through procedures is available, the authority is signalling to individuals they are 
valued, fully-fledged members of a ‘group’, whose views can be expressed and are 
worth being heard (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987, 1989). By being part of a 
‘group’, the individual is bestowed with a social status and self-esteem (Tyler & 
Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1987, 1989). A reference to a ‘group’ relates to a collective of 
people whom one may identify with and belong to (Tyler, 1989:831). The ‘group’ 
may comprise either a small number or a large number of people, for example a 
family, work team, political or legal institution and its members. 
According to the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), when an 
individual has an interaction with an authority and its representatives to resolve an 
issue, they evaluate their relationship in terms of their social status and self-worth. 
Three relational aspects of neutrality, trust and standing are taken into account 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1989), and influence 
their assessment of the authorities’ procedural fairness.  Neutrality has two elements. 
Firstly, people want evidence an authority applies fair procedures for making 
decisions in a neutral manner, that is, the organisation has a level playing field. 
Secondly, people want a decision-maker to act in a neutral way, to be honest and free 
from bias and use factual information to make a decision. Trust emerges when 
people believe the decision-maker’s intentions are genuine and that everyone will be 
treated in a fair and equitable manner. People want to count on decision-makers and 
the authority to be trustworthy when they have discretionary powers. Perceptions of a 
fair and equitable authority foster a longer term commitment by the group towards 
the institution. Standing conveys information to the group about how an authority 
and its decision-makers treat people during the interaction.  
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A third explanation for the benefit of voice opportunity through procedures is 
based on Folger’s (2001) deonance model of justice.  Folger (2001) takes a ‘moral 
virtues’ perspective with perceptions of fairness being regarded as a moral 
obligation. The theory suggests that people care not only for themselves but for 
others as fellow human beings. People have a commitment to an ethical standard that 
is attached to beliefs about how people should be treated. Acting fairly towards 
another human being is seen as ‘the right thing to do’. Fairness is important 
regardless of instrumental, material or self-interest reasons or for group affiliation 
and relational benefits (Folger, 2001; Beugre, 2007). 
Limits to the voice effect  
While ‘voice’ has been found to have a positive influence on an individual’s 
perception of procedures, other research has found contrary and conflicting 
conclusions as to the value of voice in procedures. Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke 
(1996) report that participants who expected no voice arrangements, but were 
provided voice, had low perceptions of procedural fairness. Van den Bos, Vermunt, 
and Wilke’s (1997) study reveals that an individual’s perception of the fairness of the 
outcome is affected more by the order in which information is received. The first 
information received by an individual has a greater impact on one’s perceptions of 
fairness of the outcome than subsequent information.  
Folger (1977) and Folger et al. (1979) reveal evidence of negative effects 
from procedures having voice that leads to a frustration effect. The frustration effect 
suggests that an individual will react adversely to a voice opportunity when they 
have reason to believe, despite their opinion being sought, it was not going to be 
considered by, nor have any impact on, the decision-maker. Cropanzano et al. (2001) 
suggest individuals can be more upset from being asked for their opinion than if they 
hadn’t been consulted. Lind and Tyler (1988) argue that the frustration effect seldom 
occurs, but when it does, is usually associated with biased procedures. They propose 
that the frustration effect occurs when an individual receiving the negative outcome 
has social validation that the outcome was inequitable (Folger et al., 1979). Cohen 
(1985) offers a different scenario, proposing that the frustration effect is more 
aligned with commercial business procedures, as distinct from dispute resolution 
procedures found in legal contexts. In business settings, recipients of an allocation 
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believe if their voice is solicited by management, it is done so in order to entice them 
into accepting the decision-maker’s self-serving decision.  
In other research, the existence of a ‘sham procedure’ (Potter, 2006a, 2006b; 
Lind & Tyler, 1988) has been found to create negative voice experiences. A sham 
procedure is one that appears to provide the opportunity for voice before a decision is 
made, but the voice preference and values are not considered (Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Sham procedures involve perceived violations of procedural justice rules and occur 
before one learns the outcome of a decision. Individual’s perceptions of a sham 
procedure differ from the frustration effect, in that individuals tend to be suspicious 
of the decision-maker’s motives for their input and are curious as to the extent to 
which the input will be used in the final decision (Potter, 2006b).  In contrast, the 
frustration effect for an individual occurs after the decision is known (Potter, 2006b). 
The literature on sham procedures is underdeveloped and limited (Potter, 
2006a, 2006b; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Addressing this shortcoming, Potter (2006b) 
conducted a qualitative exploratory study, incorporating critical incident technique 
and narrative analysis of 13 in-depth interviews, to examine the presence of ‘sham’ 
procedures in organisations. She refined the definition of sham procedures to 
‘suspicion that a decision maker’s stated reasons for soliciting voice are not accurate’ 
(Potter, 2006b:51-52). In her tentative studies, Potter (2006b) suggests that the 
decision-making stage influences a participant’s reaction to soliciting of input as 
does the timing of the request. Both elements shape an individual’s perceptions about 
decision-makers’ behaviour. Other factors to affect sham perceptions are previous 
experience with the decision-maker and information available to the individual.  
When an authority creates an expectation, by seeking to solicit an individual’s 
opinion by participatory decision-making procedures, they believe their views are 
wanted and will be reproduced in the outcome. Studies have found when an authority 
asks people for their view, people assume their views will be considered by the 
decision-maker. They anticipate the outcome will contain their input (Shapiro & 
Brett, 2005; Barry & Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro, 1993; Tyler, 1987) and on that basis 
report a greater perception of procedural fairness by the authority (Tyler, 1987:342-
343). In an experimental manipulation of voice instrumentality, voice behaviour and 
voice opportunity, using undergraduates and a simulated task to provide feedback to 
university management, Avery and Quinones’ (2002) study shows people are 
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unlikely to have strong fairness perceptions if they discover none of their ideas 
appear in the final decision. They caution, “If individual’s see that their voice has no 
impact on the outcome, they may deem the situation to be procedurally unfair” and 
speculate on decision-makers’ need to request input given there is no perceived 
intention to act on it (Avery & Quinones, 2002: 82). Shapiro and Brett (2005) believe 
organisations asking for ‘voice’ but giving no attention to the feedback may be 
viewed as “untrustworthy”. Organisations may lose citizens’ support because they 
feel ignored, increasing their perceptions of procedural unfairness (Avery & 
Quinones, 2002; Tyler, 1987).  Conversely a citizen may respond favourably, 
irrespective of the input impacting on the outcome (Tyler, 1987). In such a case, the 
value of voice is not linked to the outcome (Tyler, 1987 citing Tyler, Rasinski, & 
Spodick, 1985).  
Leventhal’s evaluation criteria of a fair procedure 
A conceptual paper by Leventhal (1980) broadened the scope of Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975, 1978) process oriented focus on a fair procedure and ‘voice’ 
opportunities with the introduction of the justice judgment model. This model 
provided specific structural determinants to be found in a procedure that people may 
expect to lead to a fair outcome (Greenberg, 1993b). Leventhal (1980) refers to these 
as ‘six justice rules’ that would enable individuals to evaluate the fairness of 
procedures.  A justice rule, which he used interchangeably with the term ‘procedural 
rule’, was a belief that the procedures used by an organisation to reach a decision or 
outcome would be considered fair when they satisfy certain criteria (Leventhal, 
1980). A procedural fairness judgment was formed when evidence of the six rules 
was found in a procedure (Leventhal, 1980): 
1. Consistency rule – here the procedure should be consistent temporally and 
across people. The rule refers to procedures remaining uniform over time and 
being administered the same by any person. Anyone who uses the procedure 
can expect the rules and protocols to remain the same, irrespective of the 
different people that apply the procedure. All people should be treated 
equally, with no-one given special advantage or reward. Inconsistency may 
result in violations of procedural fairness.  
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2. Bias suppression rule – procedures should not be influenced or affected by a 
third party (decision-maker) with vested self-interest, personal allegiance to 
narrow pre-conceptions or outcomes during a decision-making process. 
3. Accuracy rule – calls for procedures used to make a decision to be based on 
accurate and current information which is provided by the disputants (or other 
relevant party) in order that the final decision is well informed with minimal 
errors. 
4. Correctability rule – procedures provide for some opportunity to modify or 
change decisions by including a mechanism for grievance or appeals. 
5. The ethicality rule – allocative procedures must be consistently administered 
according to standards of moral values and ethical conduct. Administrators 
should avoid deception and the invasion of privacy of individuals. 
6. Representativeness rule – meaning procedures allow for the concerns, values 
and outlook of individual’s affected by the allocation process to participate in 
the decision process. The rule has implications for agents in authority with 
decision-making responsibility to offer representativeness in participatory 
decision-making processes.  A failure to provide for representativeness in a 
procedure, Leventhal (1980) contended, amounted to a form of censorship by 
the decision-maker. The representative rule coincides with Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975, 1978) notion of giving disputants process control or voice 
(Tyler, 1988). 
Leventhal’s (1980) empirical study was silent on the specifics or the guidelines 
on applying his rule-based criteria of a fair procedure. While Cropanzano and 
Greenberg (1997) regarded the criteria to be highly abstract and general in nature, 
Leventhal (1980) proposed that individuals will apply procedural rules in a selective 
way and use different rules at different times, with the weight of a rule influenced by 
the circumstances in which the procedure is used. Cropanzano and Greenberg (1997) 
concurred with this perspective, suggesting the procedural fairness and the relative 
weights and specific forms of procedural criteria will be shaped by the contextual 
requirements in which they operate.   
A wide range of studies have tested the application of Leventhal’s (1980) 
criteria, across contexts using different criteria matched to various situations. Using a 
telephone survey of 652 Chicago residents Tyler (1988) examined citizens’ 
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experiences with police and the courts. He applied Leventhal’s six criteria of a fair 
procedure with Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) ‘process’ and ‘decision’ control. 
His study reveals that citizens are concerned with an authority’s motives, a decision-
maker’s honesty and ethical behaviour, having opportunities for representation, 
getting quality decisions and the option to correct errors and deal with biased conduct 
of the authority. He also found officials behaving ethically linked with honesty and 
making an effort to be fair rather than consistency with other outcomes, as key 
principles of procedural fairness. In a study examining the implementation of a 
workplace drug screening program, Konovsky and Cropanzano (1991) drew on 
Leventhal’s (1980) criteria. They identified accurate, correctable, voice-based 
procedures that were administered with advance notice, contributed to perceptions of 
procedural fairness and acceptance of the drug policy.  A quantitative study to test 
the importance of Leventhal’s (1980) criteria against 16 allocation decisions was 
undertaken in a series of scenarios depicting different allocation problems to 
undergraduate psychology students by Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986). Their 
results confirmed procedural justice was important to individuals in an allocation 
decision process and was more important than non-fairness factors like expediency, 
disruption to daily activities and animosity (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986). The 
laboratory experiment was restricted to role-plays using undergraduates whose 
involvement in the study fulfilled partial credit for their academic studies. 
As a consequence of the studies applying Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) 
and Leventhal’s (1980) rules to evaluate people’s experiences of fair procedures, 
new rule conceptualisations appeared. This was notable in literature on managerial 
decision-making roles. For example, Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) administered a 
questionnaire to 44 MBA executives to examine managerial activities they 
considered to be fair or unfair. The responses were content coded against Leventhal’s 
(1980) six criteria with 16 rules identified as indicators of managerial fairness. The 
rules were collapsed to form six clusters of fairness concerns. One area of managerial 
responsibility focussed on decision-making rules. Decision-making rules matched 
Leventhal’s criteria of bias suppression, representativeness and correctability, 
however the study introduced an additional three fresh rules. Firstly an ‘information 
rule’, defined as ensuring the necessary information is available to perform the task. 
Secondly, a ‘resource rule’ which looks at the availability of human resources with 
appropriate expertise, who are accessible and give accurate and timely information 
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(feedback) to make a decision. And thirdly, a ‘timeliness’ rule, to ensure a person 
takes timely action and provides adequate lead time for implementing a decision to 
address a problem.  
In the broader context of a multi-national corporation wanting to secure 
dispersed senior managers’ compliance with the company’s global strategy, Kim and 
Mauborgne (1991, 1993, 1995) applied Leventhal’s (1980) six criteria to investigate 
employee commitment to the plan. The study identified the impact of geographical 
variances, two-way communication, offering opportunities to challenge the decision-
makers’ views and providing access to the reasons for strategic decisions to staff 
contributed to criteria to enhance perceptions of procedural fairness. 
In summary, the second justice dimension within the organisational justice 
construct, procedural justice, widened the scope of investigation in justice studies. 
Procedural justice relates to the fairness of the procedures used by an authority in 
making its decisions. It is distinguished from distributive justice with its focus on the 
outcome of a decision and its rules of equity, equality or needs. Originally, 
procedural justice research examined the formal procedures found in legal settings 
with an impartial third party decision-maker, like a judge, having responsibility for 
the final decision. In the process of the decision-making, an individual was offered 
the opportunity to present relevant evidence to the decision-maker. Offering ‘voice’ 
through participation in the decision-making process with other structural elements 
in the procedure like being impartial and unbiased, can be corrected, abides by 
ethical conduct, incorporates representativeness of relevant people, will contribute to 
greater perceptions of procedural fairness for the decision-recipient. 
Fairness criteria were then applied more generally to all types of 
organisational procedures across a broad range of settings. This resulted in a wide 
variety of criteria found to promote fair procedures and to ensure decision-recipients’ 
perceptions of fairness of the procedure are enhanced. Figure 2.4 illustrates the main 
procedural justice antecedents found to foster principles of fairness. These include 
opportunities for individuals to express their views through ‘control’ (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1978) and voice (Folger, 1977) and the six criteria applied by Leventhal 
(1980) to measure the fairness of a procedure in a decision-making process. 
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Figure 2.4 Organisational justice and procedural justice  
 
Source: Model developed by the author 
 
Procedural justice signals important information to individuals about an 
organisation as a decision-maker. Individuals affected by the decisions of an 
authority evaluate the process more favourably, if they have an opportunity to state 
their case before the decision is made. When an individual feels a decision-maker is 
misleading them, it creates negative reactions towards the organisation and reduces 
perceptions of fairness. This may cause a frustration effect or the procedure is 
perceived as a sham. Other negative voice effects can result with voice opportunities 
if it is shown the organisation’s soliciting voice has no intention of using the 
advocated input of a party. Fair procedures have instrumental or self-interest value, 
relational and group affiliation benefits and signals the moral standard of the 
organisation. A shortcoming in reviewing procedures was the omission of a decision-
maker’s interpersonal relationship with the decision-recipient and how this dynamic 
impacts on people’s fairness perceptions of a procedure. The next section addresses 
this aspect, referred to as interactional justice. 
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2.6 INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE 
Interest in the structural characteristics of a procedure shifted in the mid-
1980s as research revealed that people react to the quality of the interpersonal 
treatment they receive from a decision-maker.  Augmenting the work of early 
procedural justice scholars, Bies and Moag (1986), Bies (1985), and Greenberg 
(1993b), examined the social determinants of a procedure (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 
1997; Greenberg, 1993b). The social aspects of a procedure take account of the 
treatment individuals receive during and after a decision-making process 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997: 19). Bies and Moag (1986:44) introduced the term 
‘interactional justice’, denoting individual’s sensitivity to the ‘quality of 
interpersonal treatment they receive during the enactment of organizational 
procedures’. They suggested that interactional concerns were separate from the 
procedure itself and contended that at each stage of the implementation of a 
procedure, a process of interaction takes place, in which individuals make fairness 
assessments (Bies & Moag, 1986). Drawing on research by Bies (1985), and his 
studies of MBA students interviewed about their reactions to corporate recruiting 
practices, Bies and Moag (1986) analysed the respondents’ experiences and 
formulated four characteristics that influence a person’s perception of fairness. 
Defined below, the first three attributes emphasise the communication component of 
the interaction relationship between a decision-maker and decision-recipient. The 
fourth attribute (justification) focuses on managing the dissatisfaction an individual 
experiences with an unfair procedure from a decision-maker or organisation. The 
qualities of the communication are: 
1. Truthfulness. Truthfulness in communication comprises two aspects: 
deception and candidness. Individuals do not care to be lied to or deceived. 
They expect to be treated in an open, transparent and frank manner.  To foster 
interactional fairness, organisations should ensure parties to a decision-
making procedure (whether an employee or independent party) are given 
accurate information and provided realistic expectations about the situation. 
2. Respect. Respect in communication relates to an individual’s expectation 
they will be treated politely and with courtesy, free of rudeness and attacking 
behaviours. The latter behaviours are unacceptable. 
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3. Propriety. Propriety refers to questions asked of individuals. It has two 
elements. Decision-makers should avoid asking improper questions of people 
and the use of prejudicial statements. Impropriety may create an impression 
of a bias procedure. 
4. Justification.  Justification relates to post decision and is associated with an 
individual having a negative experience or receiving unfair treatment by the 
authority figure. Providing an explanation or justification for a decision or 
treatment helps people understand the reasoning behind an action taken. 
 More recently Greenberg (1993b) proposed the separation of interactional justice 
measures into two constructs – informational justice which encompasses the 
justification and truthfulness elements of Bies and Moag’s (1986) work and 
interpersonal justice that comprises the respect and propriety aspects. While 
contemporary research tends to focus on Greenberg’s (1993b) division of the 
constructs, (for example Colquitt, 2001) his approach will not be considered. The 
purpose of this thesis is to apply Greenberg’s (1987) original organisational justice 
construct, which included Bies and Moag’s (1986) treatment criteria used by a 
decision-maker together with distributive justice (Adams, 1963; Deustch, 1975) and 
procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Leventhal, 1980) and is consistent with 
the social-psychological framework. 
Figure 2.5 incorporates the four elements of interactional justice found in Bies 
and Moag’s (1986) empirical study.  
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Figure 2.5   Organisational justice construct and its justice components 
 
Source: Original model designed by the author 
 
In summary, interactional justice emerged in the mid-1980s and refers to how 
an authority figure treats individuals during and after the implementation of a 
procedure. Interactional justice emphasises one on one transactions, frequently 
associated with the dyadic workplace relationships involving employees and 
employer. An interactional just procedure is one where an individual is treated with 
respect, politeness, given honest and truthful information and provided an 
explanation for an outcome received following a decision-making process.   
In the following section, the effects of each justice type on decision recipients 
are considered with a brief comment on the costs of violating a justice dimension. 
2.7 EFFECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL JUSTICE CONSTRUCTS  
Justice perceptions have differing effects on an individual’s attitude toward 
institutions, authority figures representing an institution and the outcomes received 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 37 
by an individual in a given context. The distinction between distributive and 
procedural justice was empirically established in early studies on organisations 
(Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Folger & Konovsky, 1989), and in court and 
political settings (Lind & Tyler, 1988).  The relationship between distributive and 
procedural justice judgments and organisational attitudes was considered by 
Alexander and Ruderman (1987) in their survey of over 2000 American government 
employees. Using multiple regression analysis, the scholars identified distinctive 
contributions of procedural and distributive justice to fairness attitudes. Procedural 
justice was found to have substantial unique effects on issues like evaluation of 
supervisors, trust in management, reporting of conflict-harmony while turnover 
intention, pay satisfaction, organisational commitment and withdrawal was 
associated with distributive justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Nowakowski & Conlon, 2005).  The impact of the 
differential effects of justice judgments was summarised by Lind and Tyler 
(1988:179): ‘Procedural justice is a remarkably potent determinant of affective 
reactions to decision-making and that procedural justice has especially strong effects 
on attitudes about institutions and authorities, as opposed to attitudes about specific 
outcomes’. Contemporary scholars, including Ambrose and Arnaud (2005), 
Ambrose, Hess, and Ganesan (2007), Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001), Colquitt et 
al. (2001), Cropanzano and Greenberg (1997), and Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) 
have given support to the distinctions between the justice types and their respective 
effects on individual attitudes. 
Individual reactions have also been documented in relation to the justice 
dimensions, particularly when a violation of a fairness rule occurs.  Reactions to 
violations of distributive, procedural and interactional justice can be classified into 
behavioural reactions which focus on the actions of individuals, for example: co-
operation with authority figures (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Lind & Tyler, 1988); 
compliance and obedience with the law (Tyler, 1990); workplace theft (Greenberg, 
1993a); workplace performance (Greenberg, 1990); organisational retaliatory 
behaviours (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997); and organisational sabotage (Ambrose et al., 
2002); emotional responses such as anger, guilt or happiness (Weiss et al., 1999; 
Adams, 1963); and psychological reactions (Adam, 1963), including individuals 
adjusting their thinking about the situation, changing their views about their own or 
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the other referent’s input /outcomes, or rethinking the ‘comparison other’ when a 
violation of fairness is perceived.   
Displayed in Figure 2.6 are the main components of the organisational justice 
construct covering the three dimensions of justice and their respective antecedents. 
The diagram illustrates the linkage between the effects of decision-recipient attitudes 
to each justice type. Attitudes towards outcomes impact on distributive justice 
perceptions. Attitudes towards the authority and the decision-maker are based on a 
decision-recipient’s fairness perceptions of the procedures and the interactional 
treatment received in a decision-making process.  Lastly the diagram highlights 
where a violation may occur against one of the justice types, a decision recipient may 
exhibit a range of reactions. Earlier these were identified as behavioural, emotional 
or psychological responses to a justice rule violation. 
Figure 2.6 Decision-recipient attitudes and reactions to organisational justice 
 
Source: Original model designed by author, 2015 
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 The next section examines the relevant regulatory literature on WH&S and 
EUs. The EU research gap is identified. The section considers the organisational 
justice construct as a theoretical framework to examine and evaluate the fairness of 
an EU in the context of Queensland WH&S. 
2.8 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN WH&S 
Regulation is pursued by governments because it is believed the market place 
is likely to behave in certain ways or achieve particular end results that may not be in 
the public interest (Baldwin & Cave, 1999).  Public interest theory of regulation 
focusses on the need to institute regulation in support of public-related objectives as 
distinct from private or self-interested goals (Baldwin & Cave, 1999).  One critical 
area in which the community expects the government to intervene in business 
activities is the protection of workers and others from injury, harm or death at 
worksites. Regulation of WH&S strengthens societal expectations for having safe 
workplaces while discouraging unintended adverse effects of business activity 
(Braithwaite, 2011).  
Regulation is administered by purposely established agencies with powers to 
intervene in the relationships between different parties in order to manage and 
control industrial or social behaviour (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Regulators have an 
influential role in the functioning of the regulated community. In Queensland, 
WH&S is regulated by WHSQ. The authority has available various strategies for 
enforcing compliance with the WH&S legislation. These options vary from the use 
of educational and information material through to infringement notices, injunctions, 
litigation and prosecution (WHSQ, website). A sanction available in place of court 
proceedings, in the event of a serious workplace incident, is an EU. 
As an administrative sanction, the EU has a number of identifiable features. 
An EU is legislatively authorised and court enforceable if a regulatee fails to 
implement the activities written in the undertaking (Parker, 2009). Because it is a 
regulatory sanction, it enables the regulator to reach plausible solutions to breaches 
of the law directly with the offending entity that are unattainable through court orders 
(Nehme, 2005), or a prosecution.      
An EU, as a sanction in the WH&S context, was introduced in Queensland in 
2003 as part of amendments to the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld).  At 
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the time it was an innovative step in the WH&S field (Johnstone, 2009). WHSQ 
defines an EU as, ‘a contract involving commitment by a person (obligation holder) 
who is alleged to have breached their obligations under the [WH&S] Act to do 
something, which if not done, is enforceable in court’ (DEIR, 2008). The aim of the 
WH&S EU is ‘to promote occupational health and safety’ (DEIR, 2008:2) and for 
the offending entity to ‘undertake serious organisational reform to implement 
effective management systems and to deliver tangible benefits to workers, industry 
and the community’ (DEIR, 2008:2). 
Considered to be a medium level sanction among a range of enforcement 
sanctions available to WHSQ (DEIR, 2008), it operates as an alternative to 
prosecution and court imposed punishment.  Opting for an EU in place of a 
prosecution exempts the harm-doer from recording a conviction or a finding of guilt 
against a person (OFSWQ, 2015). 
In the event of a serious breach of the Queensland WH&S laws, an EU 
requires the offending entity to fulfil a range of obligations as the penalty for its 
wrongdoing. These include performing specific activities to increase worker health 
and safety and to contribute some form of benefit to industry and the wider 
community (DEIR, 2008). 
The duty holder proposes the EU to the regulator (DEIR, 2008) on the 
understanding there is no guarantee their application will be accepted (DEIR, 2008). 
The preparation of an EU involves the drafting and negotiation of its content and is 
the result of consultation between regulatory officials and the duty holder. The 
bilateral arrangement between the two parties replaces the formal evidentiary 
procedures of court with flexible administrative procedures to prepare the agreement 
and during the EU’s implementation. 
The literature on EUs identifies diverse benefits if the sanction is used. These 
benefits include regulators’ ability to directly engage with the wrong doing entity in a 
constructive manner to ‘try and fix the problem’ (Parker, 2003:7).  The undertaking 
is regarded as a flexible penalty that can be dealt with in a timely and cost-effective 
manner when compared with legal proceedings (Parker, 2003). The offending entity 
can tailor an EU according to the requirements of the business, targeting problematic 
issues that are characteristic of the business type while addressing the particular 
context in which the legal breach occurred (Yeung, 2004). EUs are suggested where 
corporate responsiveness to legal and social responsibility is desired, and as a way to 
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institutionalise a strong safety culture (Parker, 2002). For society and taxpayers, the 
cost burden of the EU is shifted to the offending entity rather than expending the 
resources of the regulator and the judiciary (Nehme, 2005). Lastly, EUs can promote 
creative, innovative compliance solutions (Parker, 2003). 
Negotiating the terms of the EU requires consensual agreement between the 
regulated and the regulator. As the EU process involves a disparity in bargaining 
power between the two parties, the bargaining relationship between them has been 
the subject of concern, especially as the regulator has discretionary decision-making 
powers over the regulated party (ALRC, 2002; Yeung, 2004). With statutory powers 
to impose sanctions on those who violate regulatory standards, perceived fairness of 
regulatory processes by the regulated is critical. The ALRC (2002) noted in its 
inquiry into Principled Regulation, if regulators fail to incorporate fairness into their 
regulatory arrangements, for example their procedures and processes, or there is a 
perception the arrangements are unfair, they will undermine regulatory compliance. 
Regulated parties and society will lose confidence in and support for a regulatory 
system that is unable to achieve its stated objectives (Yeung, 2004).   
EUs involve discretion in decision-making by the regulator to the exclusion 
of the court. Although the negotiation process for the EU is regulated under 
administrative law requirements (Yeung, 2004), the bilateral arrangement between 
the parties places the regulated in a vulnerable position to be ‘coerced’ (Yeung, 
2004) ‘arm twisted’ and ‘bullied’ (Parker, 2003) into contents that may be 
excessively unfair to the regulated firm and disproportionate to both the breach and 
the conduct (Yeung, 2004; Parker, 2003). It also opens the enforcement authority to 
accusations of being unfairly discriminatory and unaccountable in how it conducts its 
negotiations. Allegations of unfair treatment by a regulator remain untested in EUs, 
and Yeung (2004) suggests this is because the nature of an EU is to avoid formal 
legal processes and prosecution. 
The regulated entities right to fair treatment has been supported in 
‘constitutional principles’ of accountability, proportionality and procedural fairness 
(Yeung, 2004; ALRC, 2002). Although the EU process provides for flexibility to 
individualise the content of the agreement to address the circumstances of the breach, 
it has the potential to subject the regulated to unfair treatment and inconsistency in 
regulatory decision-making. Questions of fairness, accountability, proportionality 
and transparency in discretionary decision-making powers of regulators to reach 
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equitable outcomes with regulated entities were acknowledged by the ALRC (2002). 
The Commission (2002) emphasised in its recommendation at 16.2 three important 
actions for regulators. Firstly, any EU formulated by a regulator should have a direct 
or clear relationship with the alleged breach; secondly the EU should be 
proportionate to the breach; and thirdly, regulators should restrict payment of monies 
by regulatees to the regulator to those costs recoverable in law. Moreover the ALRC 
(2002) supported the broader involvement of third parties affected by the conduct 
and behaviour of the alleged offender to ensure the undertakings take account of their 
interests (ALRC, 2002). 
In summary, an EU is seen as a responsive enforcement sanction to secure the 
regulated communities’ compliance with the law. The EU can be individually 
tailored to target the wrongdoing and conduct of the regulated. However the 
decision-making process involving the bilateral arrangements between the regulator 
and the regulated entity can reduce openness and transparency in how the EU 
decisions are reached. The two-way relationship can influence the consensual nature 
of the process and the reasonableness of the content agreed to by the regulated entity. 
Providing a process that is perceived as fair and just in its treatment of the regulated 
is important to ensure the regulated community complies with the law and completes 
the terms of the sanction.   
EU Research gap  
There is a paucity of empirical research on the fairness of EUs as an 
intervention strategy, with limited research in the WH&S environment. Early 
research was situated in the consumer protection arena under the Trades Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (refer s87B) administered through the ACCC and the financial 
services, securities and futures industries regulated by ASIC under the ASIC Act 
1998 (Cth) (refer ss 93A, 93AA). The ACCC was the first regulator to be given the 
powers to accept EUs in 1993 followed by ASIC in 1998 (Parker, 2003). 
Consequently EU literature has been dominated by these two regulatory 
environments and has primarily adopted regulatory and public law theoretical 
frameworks. 
Parker (2004) examined EU’s application within the context of business 
regulation under the ACCC. Her study was based on empirical research including 
analysis of all the terms of ACCC EUs entered into between 1 January 1997 and 30 
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June 2002, a review of 14 audit files (from Canberra ACCC office), interviews with 
ACCC staff and 20 trade practices lawyers and advisors. Drawing on the collective 
data gathered from the ACCC and respondents, Parker (2004) argued if an EU was 
implemented correctly, it would provide a valuable ‘restorative justice’ option to 
traditional enforcement tools that incorporated ‘fairness’ but didn’t excessively 
favour the business entity at the expense of public interest goals. The merit of 
restorative justice is found in its emphasis on full and fair participation of ‘all parties 
with a stake in the specific offence’ (Nehme, 2010b citing Marshall, 1999:5). This 
would involve affected third parties harmed by the behaviour of the wrongdoer, 
coming together to deliberate on an appropriate response to the EU. The approach 
encourages representativeness of the parties while accommodating ‘toughness’ and 
‘fairness’ in handling rule breakers (Parker, 2004).  
Findings from the Parker study (2004) were presented to the Australian 
Compliance Institute in May 2003. Parker (2003) promoted EUs as an enforcement 
tool as they were uniquely suited to promoting compliance compared with other 
enforcement options. She compared details of how ACCC and ASIC aim to use EUs 
and the respective policy guidelines to accept an EU. Key benefits of the sanction 
included having the authority to accept EUs, they are cheaper than litigation, more 
expedient and predictable, enforceable and disclosed to the public. Importantly, she 
noted EUs were well-suited to motivating the regulated to improve compliance 
within the firm and found EUs attract top level management support. Because of the 
threat of enforcement action, management commits to do something to resolve the 
issues and prevent a reoccurrence (Parker, 2003).    
The benefit of restorative justice in EUs was also examined by Nehme  
(2010b) in her consideration of whether an EU with its specific aims under the ASIC 
Act had restorative qualities. In her methodology, Nehme (2010b) adopts Van Ness’ 
(1997) principles of restorative justice incorporating reparation of harm, involvement 
of relevant stakeholders including victims, offenders and the community in the 
justice process and community-state cooperation. She considers how each element, 
applied across the EU process as it operates under the ASIC legislation, can act to 
restore the adverse effect of the wrong doing on the stakeholders. Nehme’s (2010b) 
evaluation concludes that an EU is ‘moderately restorative’ and suggests more 
consultation with affected third party (victims) is necessary to enhance the fairness of 
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the EU system. She promotes third party input to ASIC to show how the breach has 
impacted on people so the regulator can better protect victims’ rights. 
Other studies have examined EUs through a variety of lenses. Two studies 
have focused on the use of EUs in relation to industrial relations both applying 
scholarly analysis from the regulatory and public law theory. The first study 
examined EUs in the context of minimum labour standards. Goodwin and 
Maconachie (2012) conducted an exploratory study into the comparative use of EUs 
by the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) and the ACCC to assess the EU effectiveness 
of employers’ non-compliance with minimum labour standards. Documentary 
evidence (policy documents, guidelines and published EUs) collected from the two 
regulators provided the basis for comparing how both organisations implemented the 
EU process. Findings suggest EUs as a new enforcement tool for the FWO were too 
undeveloped to draw any firm conclusions. They recommended more research was 
necessary before the EUs effectiveness could be evaluated. This included scrutinising 
the negotiation process, evaluating the merits of the EU against voluntary 
rectification, the deterrence value of the EU and victims/third party participation in 
the process.      
In the same context of workplace relations and FWO, Hardy and Howe 
(2013) partially contributed to the data gap identified by Goodwin and Maconachie 
(2012) in their critical analysis of the FWO EU process. Taking a cross sectional 
approach, the authors investigated the decision-making process, content, monitoring 
and enforcement of EUs by the employment standards enforcement agency. Data 
were collected through a series of semi structured qualitative interviews involving 
FWO personnel and related practitioners, a content analysis of EUs between 1 July 
2008 and 20 June 2012 and documentary analysis related to the FWO guidance 
material. Like Goodwin and Maconachie (2012), the study findings were limited but 
Hardy and Howe (2013) conclude that, despite only 26 undertakings approved during 
the review period, FWOs’ use of the sanction showed it had promise as a compliance 
tool. They cautioned that the private negotiation process to the exclusion of 
interested/affected third parties raised the accountability concerns of the regulator. 
The scholars also highlighted the high level of evidentiary thresholds required of the 
regulated entity for the regulator to form a reasonable belief a breach had occurred, 
placed constraints on the ‘utility of the EU as a regulatory mechanism’ (Hardy & 
Howe, 2013:17). Evidentiary restrictions have implications for the EUs 
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enforceability and its credibility while the threshold requirements are suggested as a 
reason for the low uptake of the sanction. The study recognised lengthy time delays 
in negotiation timeframes was an issue for the FWO. This was attributed to the 
evidentiary requirements and the centralised decision-making of regulator. Shrinking 
funding to the regulator was observed as influencing the future of the sanction, 
impacting on activities like vigilance in EU monitoring, its ability to secure 
management compliance and as an alternative to court. The study omitted responses 
from employers and industry representatives and affected employees. 
Two papers examining the procedural fairness of an EU were undertaken by 
Nehme (2009, 2010b). Her papers addressed two different stakeholders. In her first 
paper (Nehme, 2009) considers ASIC use of the sanction to bring about justice for 
the affected parties or ‘outsiders’ to the EU process (Nehme 2009 discusses ‘affected 
parties’ as victims of the alleged breach). ASIC’s aims of an EU are to protect the 
public, prevent future breaches and take corrective action through compensation (to 
the affected parties) and disclosure via advertising the contravention.  Analyzing 
ASIC EU legislative provisions, regulatory literature, case law, an interview with a 
former senior manager from ASIC and ASIC documentary evidence (published 
register of EUs, policy guideline), Nehme (2009) suggests ASIC application of the 
EU can protect the rights of affected parties and provide procedural justice. The EU 
process may deliver a remedy superior to one obtained through the legal system as 
the victim can be compensated (through the EU clauses) without having to 
personally recover losses from initiating private proceedings. Secondly ASICs’ 
disclosure provisions of the undertaking allow the victims of an offence to determine 
if they may pursue further private action in the court. The option to apply community 
service orders that include educational strategies to increase community awareness 
informs them of their rights under law while acting as a deterrence to business by 
warning them of possible contraventions in law.   
The second study by Nehme (2010b) investigates the EU procedure used by 
ASIC and how it may be perceived by the alleged offender. Taking two theoretical 
approaches she reviews the EU procedure and its fairness from an administrative law 
perspective, applying justice criteria of the right to be heard, hearing principle, notice 
of the allegation and bias rule and considers these elements against the psychosocial 
theory of procedural justice. The criteria for procedural fairness are based on an 
individual’s perception of the outcome using the rules proposed by Thibaut and 
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Walker (1975, 1978) and Leventhal (1980).  Nehme (2010b) overlaps four criteria: 1. 
consistency, 2. bias rule, 3. correctability and 4. representation with the 
administrative law justice principles. From both an administrative law perspective 
and the psychological perspective, the ASIC process of an EU was found to comply 
with procedural fairness principles. Accordingly, a regulated entity should perceive 
the ASIC EU negotiation process as fair and secure the offenders’ commitment to 
complying with the EU obligations as sufficient checks and balances were evident to 
support fairness (Nehme, 2010b). However, she suggested the study would benefit 
from more research including stakeholder interviews and their reactions to the 
process to support the analysis.  
A discussion on the respective legislative provisions giving regulators 
statutory authorisation to offer EUs across various federal and state based regulatory 
agencies was conducted in a comparative analysis by Nehme (2005). She reviewed 
regulators with EU powers including ACCC, ASIC, the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) (Cth), Comcare and NSW Department of Fair Trading, and 
WHSQ. Nehme (2005) reported on how the provisions varied across regulator 
environments and investigated international arrangements for a similar penalty.   
The findings of a roundtable forum of Australians involving regulators, 
regulatory scholars and policy makers on the operation of EUs, across different 
regulatory environments including ACCC, ASIC, WHSQ, Environmental Protection 
(Victoria), and the Workplace Ombudsman was reported in a working paper by 
Johnstone and Parker (2010). The paper consolidated empirical data from regulatory 
studies and analysis of the Australian legal framework and the usage of EUs by 
various federal and state regulatory agencies. The paper concluded with coverage of 
the issues associated with EUs and the discussions from the roundtable that took 
account of policy makers’, academics’ and regulators’ insight and experiences in the 
use of EUs. Issues canvassed negotiation of the EU, its content, accountability, 
transparency of the process and inclusivity of third party stakeholders in the process 
and effectiveness evaluations of the sanction. Regulatory policies and practices were 
diverse, reflecting the range of regulatory environments, resulting in expansive 
perspectives and commentary on the sanction.   
A cross sectional empirical study between late 2006 and mid 2007 by 
Johnstone and King (2008) examined EUs compliance for breaches of occupational 
health and safety (OH&S) in Queensland. Following a documentary analysis (EUs, 
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policy guidelines), participant observation and interviews with over 40 stakeholders 
(duty holders, auditors, lawyers), the preliminary findings of the study were the first 
to document in detail the EU process of the Workplace Health and Safety regulator. 
The study identified the complexities associated with EUs in the Queensland OH&S 
space under the policy guidelines of the DEIR. Some significant aspects of the 
research were the scholar’s effectiveness evaluation of the program. Johnstone and 
King (2008) applied monetary values as the basis for the effectiveness evaluation of 
31 EUs accepted by DEIR. The study revealed profound differences between a court 
fine and an accepted EU. The total average value of the activities in the 31 EUs came 
to $200,536.86 per undertaking totalling $6,216,643.75. In contrast the prosecution 
penalty for rejected EUs was $25,100. The value of an undertaking was found to be 
over eight times the total value of the fines paid when combining rejected and 
withdrawn matters from WHSQ (Johnstone & King, 2008:30). EU money is invested 
at the coalface to improve the health and safety of workers, into industry and the 
community to realise tangible benefits. The study also identified monitoring the 
compliance of duty holders with the EU terms was a weakness in the EU process. 
Areas where regulatory discretion operate should be open to public scrutiny 
including publication of policy guidelines and accepted EUs to ensure formal 
accountability mechanisms are transparent and consistent. The paper encourages 
affected third parties, including the injured workers, employer associations and 
unions to an informal deliberative role in the decision to accept an EU. The paper 
noted EUs are an important enforcement tool that acts as a motivating factor to 
promote organisational OHS reforms. The significant costs act to deter future 
behaviour, with monitoring and public scrutiny of the EU contents being shortfalls in 
the EU process.  
Across the limited research into EUs, Johnstone and King’s (2008) study was 
the only empirical work directly focussed on the WH&S environment and the 
WHSQ regulator. Their study used documentary analysis and interviews with 
stakeholders, however, it overlooked theoretical justice frameworks. The focus of the 
study draws from literature in regulatory studies and public law. The voices of 
affected third party stakeholders were excluded in the stakeholder interviews.  
While a number of the EUs in the aforementioned literature review apply 
some form of justice principle, the main emphasis is on legal doctrine, case law, 
administrative law and the specific legislation associated with the regulators, for 
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example ASIC and ACCC, in assessing an EU. One study combines the 
psychological theoretical framework of procedural fairness based on four of the six 
rules of Leventhal’s (1980) criteria and overlap the fairness criteria with the 
administrative law fairness criteria (Nehme, 2010b). The study looks at the fairness 
of the EUs process in the financial industries sector (ASIC) and is focussed on one 
stakeholder, the alleged offender. Neither distributive nor interactional justice were 
canvassed in the study. 
Two gaps have been identified in the literature. Firstly, the organisational 
justice construct has yet to be used to examine the perceived fairness of the EU. 
Secondly, the studies identified in the literature have yet to incorporate the voice of 
the regulator, the regulated entity and affected third parties into a study into EUs and 
examine its fairness from the multiple perspectives.    
Integrative conceptual model and justice rules  
To date the study of organisational justice has yet to be the subject of 
systematic inquiry in the regulatory literature and has yet to be used to evaluate an 
EU. A study examining the fairness of an EU, which takes multiple stakeholders’ 
perspectives into account, and uses the broader lens of organisational justice, 
provides an opportunity to bridge a gap in theoretical knowledge.   
This study will apply the framework of organisational justice to examine the 
experiences and perceptions of the tripartite voices of the regulatory authority, 
business entities and affected third parties. Figure 2.5, presented earlier in this 
chapter (and reproduced below), provides a framework for integration of each justice 
type under the organisational justice umbrella. The framework will form the 
foundation for evaluating and assessing the perceptions of fairness of each 
stakeholder group involved in the EU process. The framework applies the procedural 
justice component involving the perceptions of fairness of the mechanisms, methods 
and processes (or structures, procedures, policies and processes) used by WHSQ; the 
interpersonal treatment by the WHSQ officials working with those that have 
breached the WH&S law and the affected third party; and the fairness of the 
negotiated EU (distributive justice). 
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Figure 2.5   Organisational justice construct and its justice components 
 
Source: Original model designed by the author, 2015. 
 
These three rule types are the basis from which an individual subjectively 
evaluates the fairness or unfairness of an organisation’s procedures, decision-making, 
interpersonal treatment and decision outcome. 
As highlighted in the discussion on the three justice literatures, each justice 
type applies specific rules when evaluating the fairness of a situation. The rules 
applying to each justice dimension under the rubric of organisational justice are 
incorporated into the integrative conceptual framework. Rule explanations are 
reproduced in Table 2.1 and reflect the definitions referenced in the literature review.   
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Table 2.1   Rules referenced in justice types 
Justice type Rule name Rule explanation Source 
  Outcomes:  
Distributive  Equity Outcomes should be distributed in proportion 
to individuals’ inputs against a ‘referent 
other’ 
Adams (1963) 
 Equality Outcomes are distributed equally across all 
parties 
Deustch  (1975) 
 Needs Outcomes are distributed according to need  
  Procedures should:  
Procedural  Process control Offer opportunities to express views Thibaut & Walker 
(1975, 1978) 
 Decision control Offer opportunities to influence outcomes Thibaut & Walker 
(1975, 1978) 
 Consistency Be consistent across people and time Leventhal (1980) 
 Bias suppression Be neutral and free of bias  
 Accuracy Be based on accurate information  
 Correctability Include mechanisms for appeals  
 Representativeness Provide for concerns of all individuals  or 
groups influenced by the decision to be heard 
 
 Ethicality Uphold ethical and moral standards  
  Implementation of procedures should:  
Interactional  Respect Use respectful communication Bies & Moag (1986) 
 Propriety Refrain from improper comments  
 Justification Include adequate explanations  
 Truthfulness Be truthful and candid  
 
Source: Adapted from Colquitt and Shaw, 2005, 119 
 
In the following chapters, these rule definitions will be used when discussing 
the different areas of the study. 
This is an exploratory study being conducted in the regulatory environment 
with specific focus on the enforcement sanction, an EU. The context of the study will 
be the WH&S legislation administered through WHSQ.  The study has been 
designed to address the research question. 
1. How do stakeholders to an enforceable undertaking in the work health 
and safety context perceive the fairness of the process? 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
The current research has a focus on examining the fairness of an enforcement 
sanction, an EU as it is administered under the Queensland WH&S regulator, 
WHSQ.  The study will take a multi-stakeholder perspective involving the regulatory 
agency, businesses with approved EU to WHSQ and affected third parties that have 
participated in the process. Using the organisational justice construct to examine 
each stakeholder groups’ perceptions of fairness of the sanction, this study will offer 
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a deeper and richer insight into EUs as an intervention strategy to enforce the 
regulated to comply with WH&S law.  
The next chapter presents a brief discussion of the Australia regulatory 
environment. This will be followed with an overview of the EU process operating 
under the WH&S Act 1995 administered by WHSQ. 
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Chapter 3: Background on EUs and the 
Queensland model 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the context in 
which Australian WH&S regulatory bodies operate and their use of enforcement 
sanctions to address breaches of WH&S laws. The chapter will then examine the 
Queensland model of WH&S regulation with particular reference to the 
administration of an EU. Discussion of the EU process will provide background 
information to the research design, data analysis and discussion sections of this 
thesis. Predominantly, the contents of the chapter are descriptive in nature. 
3.2 WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Constitution has no provision for the Commonwealth 
parliament to have a general power to regulate WH&S.  Consequently the regulatory 
system for WH&S rests with each jurisdiction. Australia has six state Acts, two 
territory Acts and a Commonwealth Act (to cover federal government employees) to 
regulate WH&S (Bluff & Gunningham, 2012). In a number of jurisdictions WH&S 
legislation in areas like mining, transport and petroleum exploration are dealt with 
under separate statutes (Dunn & Chennell, 2012; Bohle & Quinlan, 2000: 266; Bluff 
& Gunningham, 2012; Johnstone, 2008). The administration and enforcement of 
breaches of WH&S legislation remain separately regulated in each jurisdiction 
through nine regulators and nine court systems. Each regulator has its own policies 
and practices (Dunn & Chennell, 2012:163). 
Since the 1980s, the Australian WH&S system has been modelled on British 
arrangements developed by Lord Robens (Robens Report, 1972) with Robens’ 
influence reflected across Australian jurisdiction (Johnstone, 2008).  Workplace 
health and safety laws involve a principal statute under which all persons including 
employers, employees and others at the workplace have responsibility for 
occupational health and safety. The latter reference to ‘others’ includes those who 
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design, manufacture, import, supply or install plant, equipment or materials used in 
the workplace (Industry Commission, 1995). The core statute is supported by 
regulations to cover specific areas of responsibility to mandate minimum health and 
safety standards. Voluntary standards and codes of practice provide the practical 
means to implement the legal requirements at the workplace (Industry Commission, 
1995). 
The differences in WH&S legislation, regulations and codes of practice 
across Australia were problematic for workers, employers, industry and governments 
alike (Johnstone, 2008; Bluff & Gunningham, 2012). Disparities existed for workers 
across jurisdictions facing similar workplace risks but subject to varying legal 
protections. Businesses operating across multiple jurisdictions met inconsistency in 
standards and enforcement approaches. Governments competed to attract businesses 
with incentives and differences in regulatory costs. The combined factors created an 
unfavourable regulatory environment for WH&S Australia-wide (Johnstone, 2008; 
Industry Commission, 1995). In July 2008, the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) committed to harmonising WH&S regulation nationally (COAG, 2008a). 
Key motivations for the reform of WH&S were to create equitable standards to 
protect Australian workers; reduce the business regulatory burden when operating in 
multiple jurisdictions; and to facilitate efficiencies for each government regulating 
WH&S (Bluff & Gunningham, 2012). A primary goal was to realise significant and 
ongoing reductions in work-related deaths, injuries and disease (COAG, 2008a). 
Changes to WH&S laws would contribute towards the National Partnership 
Agreement. This Agreement formed a broader tranche of reforms focused on 
building a seamless national economy where WH&S was part of 36 reforms to make 
Australia a competitive economy (COAG, 2008b; Productivity Commission, 2010; 
2012). 
To facilitate harmonisation of WH&S across all nine jurisdictions, each 
government signed up through the Inter-Governmental Agreement (COAG, 2008a) 
to adopt a legislative framework consisting of a national model Act, regulations and 
codes of practice along with harmonised administration and enforcement 
requirements to support the legislation.  Safe Work Australia, the national 
independent statutory body for policy development in WH&S, developed the 
legislative framework, national model Work Health and Safety Act and the National 
Compliance and Enforcement Policy (Safe Work Australia, 2012c). While the 
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Australian state governments agreed to adopt the national model Act, each 
government had some discretion over variations in the Act’s provisions, its 
regulations and codes of practice and the arrangements associated with 
administration and enforcement strategies (Bluff & Gunningham, 2012). 
On 1 January 2012 harmonisation of the national model laws came into effect 
with the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, Australian Capital 
Territory and Northern Territory adopting the legislation at the time (Bluff & 
Gunningham, 2012).   
Regulatory enforcement strategies 
The National Compliance and Enforcement Policy complements the national 
model laws and regulations for WH&S and sets out the principles regulators will 
follow to monitor and enforce compliance with these laws and regulations (Safe 
Work Australia, 2012c). The policy guidelines incorporate a range of ‘interventions’ 
to remedy contraventions by a regulatee in an enforcement pyramid (refer Figure 
3.1). Informed by the responsive regulation pyramid theory of enforcement strategies 
advanced by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992:30), the structure conceives a regulator 
using the most appropriate intervention tool to respond to ‘the seriousness of the 
breach of legislation’ (Safe Work Australia, 2012c; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  The 
strategies at the base of the pyramid are directed at self-regulation to encourage 
compliance through persuasion. A failure by an entity to comply with the informal 
interventionist tactics will see the regulator escalate their action up the pyramid. 
Breaches of increasing seriousness lead to the imposition of other regulatory 
sanctions to reflect the severity of non-compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Last 
resort sanctions can be either regulator-directed (infringement notices or civil 
proceedings) or court imposed such as criminal prosecutions and injunctions.  
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Figure 3.1:  Enforcement Pyramid 
 
Source: Safe Work Australia (2012c) in National Compliance and Enforcement Policy 
The current policy framework provides for regulators in all Australian 
jurisdictions to accept an EU as an option for non-compliance with WH&S laws. 
Under the policy directive an EU is defined as a ‘legally binding agreement entered 
into as an alternative to having the matter decided through legal proceeding for a 
contravention of the Act. An EU provides an opportunity for significant work health 
and safety reform to be undertaken’ [by the regulated entity] [author emphasis] (Safe 
Work Australia, 2012c).  
 This thesis considers Queensland WH&S legislation before the introduction 
of harmonisation in 2012 and the national compliance and enforcement policy that 
includes EUs across all jurisdictions.  
3.3 WORK, HEALTH AND SAFETY IN QUEENSLAND 
Health and safety legislation has existed in Queensland since 1896, but an 
integrated legislative and regulatory framework only emerged with the introduction 
of Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989 (Qld). Prior to 1989, Queensland had a 
fragmented system of occupational health and safety legislation with various rules 
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related to industry sectors (Johnstone, 2009:104). The introduction of the Act 
consolidated a raft of legislation into a single statute that covered all industries, 
excluding coal mining, land associated with the Petroleum Act 1923 and rural 
industry (Johnstone, 2009: 104). 
In 1999, the Division of Workplace Health and Safety within the Department 
of Employment and Industrial Relations established an Enforcement Framework to 
shift towards enforcement strategies that increased legislative compliance with the 
WH&S legislation. Consideration to improve the framework to foster greater WH&S 
compliance through different penalties and prosecution was envisaged. The WH&S 
Act underwent review (Stockill, 2002) and an issues paper was released canvassing 
enforcement options to secure compliance and appropriate penalties for breaches of 
the WH&S Act suggested EUs as an option available to duty holders in lieu of 
prosecution (Crittall, 2001 ).   
Various benefits for having EUs were considered. An EU was promoted as a 
relatively cost-neutral strategy to implement (costs and resourcing shifted to the duty 
holder); the breach and EU would be disclosed in newspapers to deter other 
obligation holders from committing similar breaches; and the outcome (the EU) was 
seen as more practical and broader in range than the penalties imposed through 
legislation and the courts. Duty holders would be required to implement a workplace 
health and safety management system, conduct external audits of the safety 
management system and participate in special projects like WHS training programs 
targeted to meet the needs of the workplace. Lastly the duty holder would contribute 
to the broader community through funding activities or conduct WH&S research into 
issues relevant to their industry (Critall, 2001).  
In 2003, the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) was amended to 
accommodate the recommendations from the Issues Paper (Crittall, 2001) making 
Queensland one of the first Australian jurisdictions to introduce an EU to address 
serious breaches of the WH&S legislation (Johnstone, 2009).   
In the previous section, the Australian context for WH&S and its regulatory 
framework was presented and the Queensland context introduced. In the next part, 
the WHSQ EU process is outlined.  
3.4 THE ENFORCEABLE UNDERTAKINGS PROCESS 
This segment of the chapter describes the EU process used by WHSQ. The 
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section draws from the policy guidelines published by WHSQ ‘Enforceable 
Undertakings under the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 and the Electrical 
Safety Act 2002 Information for Applicants’ (DEIR, 2008).  A copy of the document 
is found at Appendix 7. The document provides information for duty holders on the 
process of making an application for an EU and explains how the decision-maker 
assesses the offer. This document relates to the study respondents. The document was 
publically available on the website to stakeholders including lawyers, insurance 
companies, injured employees and the public as a resource on EUs. In 2012, the 
document was replaced by another policy guideline to accommodate harmonisation 
of WH&S.   
The publication of policy guidelines and information on EUs is consistent 
with the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) report Principled Regulation: 
A review of federal civil and administrative penalties in Australia, whereby 
regulators with powers to accept EUs are encouraged to make available to the public 
information and guidelines on how they intend to use the sanction (ALRC, 2002; 
Johnstone & Parker, 2010).  
When WHSQ makes an allegation of a breach of the WH&S law, the duty 
holder may consider offering an EU as an alternative to prosecution.  The document 
states an EU is a medium level sanction ‘used to promote occupational health and 
safety’ and provide ‘an opportunity for obligation holders to undertake serious 
organisational reform to implement effective management systems and to deliver 
tangible benefits to workers, industry and the community’ (DEIR, 2008:2). Activities 
related to EUs are expected to be ‘substantial’ (DEIR, 2008:2) and go ‘beyond mere 
compliance’ (DEIR, 2008:4). The activities should include specific health and safety 
initiatives that bring benefits to the workers, industry and the broader community 
(DEIR, 2008:2). 
Trigger for an enforceable undertaking 
The trigger for an EU is substantiating evidence of an alleged contravention 
of a duty holder’s obligations under the WHS Act 1995. The incident has resulted in 
grievous bodily harm to a party or a serious event involving a significant hazard in 
the workplace.  
Once 12 months pass after the WHSQ investigation into the alleged breach, 
the regulator will proceed to prosecute the wrongdoer. WHSQ serves a complaint and 
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summons on the duty holder giving the party 90 days to decide the action it will take.  
Enforceable undertakings application process 
If the alleged duty holder considers proposing an EU it must be a written 
application to the Director-General of the DEIR (Workplace Health and Safety 
Regulation 1997, s229A). WHSQ promotes a collaborative arrangement with 
potential applicants as can be seen in Figure 3.2.  An initial face to face meeting is 
set up between Enforceable Undertakings Unit (EUU) staff and representatives from 
the offending entity. The DEIR guidelines encourage duty holder decision-makers to 
attend the meeting including senior management, for example, the Chief Executive 
Officer or Managing Director, the officer functionally responsible for WH&S and the 
entity’s legal representative. 
Following the first meeting, the EUU provides ongoing support to duty 
holders during the preparation phase and before submission of the proposal to the 
regulator. This promotes consistency with legislative requirements and the 
administrative policy guidelines. Sole responsibility for the content of the proposal 
rests with the applicant (DEIR, 2008).  DEIR provides an EU template to construct 
the agreement and is found at Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.2 – Flowchart of the WHSQ EU process 
 
 
Source: WHSQ, Department of Justice and Attorney-General Guide – Enforceable Undertakings: An Overview. 
December 2011 
Involvement of injured workers and other information 
The EU process considers the injured persons perspective and if appropriate 
the next of kin’s opinions. The regulator is interested in understanding how the 
incident has impacted on the injured party and other relevant stakeholders like 
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immediate family members. WHSQ contacts the injured person via letter and advises 
them of the proposed EU. The letter invites the injured person to provide input 
(Appendix 2).  
 Additionally, the regulator looks at the rehabilitation provided to the injured 
party, whether the party has returned to work, and any other concern or safety 
matters raised by the injured party.  Matters associated with workers’ compensation, 
rehabilitation or civil actions involving the injured party resulting from the incident, 
are excluded from the regulators’ decision-making process. 
Decision-making process – the Evaluation Panel 
Prior to finalising a decision the application is reviewed by an Evaluation 
Panel who makes a recommendation to the regulator. The Evaluation Panel 
comprises two industry experts and a senior management employee of DEIR, 
generally the Executive Director of WHSQ.  
The Evaluation Panel assesses all the facts and material evidence of the case 
together with the terms of the EU. The panel submits a joint recommendation to the 
Chief Executive. The regulator reviews the panel’s recommendation/s and then 
makes a final decision on the EU.  
Decision of the Regulator 
The Chief Executive takes into account each of the issues presented by the 
department, the offer and content of the EU, the affected third parties’ input and the 
Evaluation Panel recommendation in forming a decision. The regulated entity is 
advised by letter of the outcome with an explanation provided if the EU is rejected.  
A decision on the application is made within a month (DEIR, 2008). 
As the decision-maker has discretionary powers to accept or reject an EU, the 
obligation holder can seek a review of the Chief Executive’s decision through the 
Supreme Court under the Judicial Review Act 1991. Rejected EU applications are 
dealt with by prosecution of the alleged breach in the Industrial Magistrates Court.  
Post acceptance of an undertaking 
Once an EU is accepted by the regulator, the duty holder is responsible for 
compliance with its terms. The EU is published in local newspapers, uploaded to the 
WHSQ website, used in a media release, and publicised at the duty holder’s 
workplace. The regulator clears any material about the EU before it is published.  
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Monitoring and compliance 
Monitoring to ensure fulfilment of the EU’s conditions occurs over the life of 
the EU. The conditions or activities set out in an EU can take up to three years to 
implement. WHSQ staff conduct regular audits consistent with the schedule set out 
in the undertaking. Fourteen days after the audit site visit, duty holders will receive a 
copy of the auditor’s compliance report.  
Closure of an enforceable undertaking 
When a duty holder completes all commitments set out in the undertaking the 
regulator provides written notification that the EU has been discharged. In the event 
an undertaking is not fulfilled, the regulator will take other enforcement action 
including prosecution. A failure to adhere with the terms of the undertaking is an 
offence, and orders may be sought from the court to secure compliance along with 
additional financial penalties being imposed. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter provided a brief overview of the Australian context 
for WH&S. It considered the changes that have taken place in enforcement sanctions 
available to a regulator in recent years with the introduction of EUs as an alternative 
to prosecution when the regulated community breaches WH&S laws. A brief 
introduction to the Queensland WH&S regulator, WHSQ, was provided and a 
discussion of its administrative process for an EU followed.  
In the next chapter the qualitative inquiry designed for this research is outlined. 
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Chapter 4: Research design 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the research design and the decisions taken by the 
investigator to achieve the aims of the research. The study objective is to examine the 
fairness of an EU from the perspective of three stakeholder groups. The voices of 
each stakeholder group are captured to provide an insight into how each party 
experiences and perceives the sanction. The research design takes into account the 
organisational justice theoretical model and its related justice dimensions to address 
the research question:  
How do stakeholders to an EU in the work health and safety context 
perceive the fairness of the EU process? 
The chapter begins by establishing the author’s philosophical position before 
addressing the research design. This is followed by a discussion on the sampling 
approach, data collection and data analysis. The final section addresses ethics and the 
research limitations. 
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Philosophical stance 
In the conduct of research, each researcher will bring to the study their own 
paradigm or ‘worldview’. This is a reference to the ‘basic set of beliefs that guide 
action’ (Guba, 1990:17) of the researcher in relation to the ontology, epistemology 
and methodological premises used in conducting their research. Identification of 
one’s philosophical position will shape the approach to the research design and 
provide readers of the study with an understanding of how the knowledge was 
generated (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011) and the criteria used to 
establish trustworthiness in the research findings (Shenton, 2004).  
This study takes a critical realist perspective based on the assumptions 
presented by Guba and Lincoln (1994). The objective of this study is to explore a 
little known and unexplored social phenomenon involving the experiences and 
perceptions of stakeholders involved in a Queensland WH&S EU process. The study 
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investigates the tripartite relationship between a regulatory body (WHSQ), its agents 
with administrative responsibilities for WH&S laws and policy, duty holders affected 
by WHSQ governance responsibilities and affected third parties. Critical realism is a 
suitable paradigm for this study because realism research seeks to understand the 
common ‘reality’ experienced within an economic system in which many people 
operate independently (Perry, Riege, & Brown, 1999). Realists believe there is a 
‘real’ world although the world is imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Perry et al., 1999). Realism research sits between the 
positivist worldview, whereby the natural world is understood through external 
objective measures, and constructivism with its emphasis on multiple apprehensible 
and often conflicting social realities resulting from the human mind (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). From a critical realist perspective, there is one reality, although there 
are several perceptions of that reality that require these to be triangulated to build a 
more complete picture (Perry et al., 1999). Realists accept scientific knowledge is 
fallible and concept dependent, (there is room for error), with critical scrutiny and 
verification never conclusive (Peters, Pressey, Vanharant, & Johnston, 2013). 
Critical realist inquiry is generally conducted in natural settings that involve 
direct contact between the researcher and participant in gathering situational 
information. It is a process of discovery which depicts the emic or insider 
perspectives, through the meanings and purposes they ascribe to their actions (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994:110). As such, realist research tends to focus on qualitative 
methodologies, with case study research being particularly well suited to situations 
which involve complex social phenomena like organisations and their relationships 
with the world around them (Easton, 2010). With no case studies conducted in the 
area of EUs in the management space, this study will apply an inductive approach to 
unearth the emergent patterns and themes of stakeholders’ experiences and insights 
into the Queensland WH&S EU process. 
Methodological fit 
The ‘methodological fit’ for management and organisational research was 
considered alongside the underpinning philosophical stance of the study. 
Methodological fit refers to the internal consistency of each element of the research 
project starting from the choice of question for the study, previous research work in 
the area under examination, the research design and the study’s theoretical 
 Chapter 4: Research design 64 
contribution (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). This study is considered to fall within 
the nascent or immature theory research because it reflects a topic area with limited 
formal theorising and is a relatively new phenomenon in the Australian regulatory 
environment (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Studies that involve nascent or 
immature theory research tend to be undeveloped as to the issues that may emerge 
from the data, and use research questions that are open-ended with data being 
interpreted for its ‘meaning’ (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). 
Researcher motivations and goals 
Selecting a critical realist perspective using a qualitative methodology and 
case study approach requires some disclosure of the personal interest and background 
of the researcher in the study under examination (Blaikie, 2000). Unlike quantitative 
or positivist research where the researcher is set apart from the participants in the 
study, qualitative researchers actively engage in the world of their subjects (Creswell, 
2007:36). The researcher’s position or personal interest in the study should be 
revealed early to avoid any bias in relation to the choice of topic, the research 
question and preference for research strategy (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). The 
disclosure provides insight into the level of objectivity the author brings to the study 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011:97; Dooley, 2002).  
The researcher’s primary motivation for this study is a desire to fill a gap in 
the knowledge of an underdeveloped area of regulatory enforcement, the use of EUs 
in the WH&S context. As an Australian innovation, EU research has concentrated on 
federal regulatory areas of ACCC, ASIC, Fair Work Ombudsman. Scant research has 
been done in WH&S legislation. The WHSQ EU model is interesting with a 
specialist EUU established to oversee and administer the program and a policy 
allowing voice for the injured party to participate in the decision-making process. 
The Queensland model for EUs was adopted as part of harmonisation of WH&S laws 
across Australia (REG02 transcript, 2013). EUs are embedded into the national 
policy framework for WH&S (Safe Work Australia, 2012c). A single cross-sectional 
evaluation of the Queensland WHS EU program was undertaken in 2008 (Johnstone 
& King, 2008) looking at the first 18 months of the program, but since this date the 
WH&S EU process across Australia has yet to be reviewed. Consequently no current 
documented worldviews from the perspective of the regulator, duty holders or the 
affected third parties on EUs fairness are available. Examinations have yet to be 
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undertaken on whether an EU contributes the intended benefits to industry and the 
broader community. This is especially significant with more regulators gaining 
powers to offer the EU sanction to those they regulate (Nehme, 2010a; Johnstone & 
Parker, 2010).  Without empirical evidence on how the regulated community 
responds to the EU or if the EU realises any benefits, it is difficult to make any 
assertions as to the value of the sanction. The exploratory data from this study will 
help bridge the gap in evidence and provide a foundation for a bigger research 
project.  
A second motivation for the study relates to gaining practical academic 
experience in conducting social research. The experience gained from the study will 
complete fulfilment of my academic requirements for a master’s higher degree 
research qualification. The study is regarded by the investigator as one that will make 
an important theoretical contribution to organisational justice in the regulatory 
environment and a practical contribution to EU policy development across Australia.  
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN – QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 
The choice to apply a qualitative methodology was introduced earlier in this 
chapter and flows from the initial decisions around the objective of this study and the 
philosophical position of critical realism. Qualitative research is considered to offer a 
number of advantages over a quantitative study, especially when dealing with an 
underdeveloped area of inquiry.    
Qualitative inquiry allows the researcher to examine the ‘real’ world that 
individuals inhabit and socially interpret (Easton, 2010). Its focus is on documenting 
the world from the point of view of the people studied (Silverman, 2000:8) and to 
build a rich and multi-faceted insight into a phenomenon (Braun & Clarke, 2013), in 
this case the process of an EU. Qualitative research works with participants in their 
natural settings where the problem under investigation is experienced first-hand 
(Creswell, 2007:37). By working with the subjects in their surroundings the 
researcher becomes sensitive to the subjects’ environment (Bouma & Ling, 2004) 
and is able to observe closely their behaviours and actions within context (Creswell, 
2007). Qualitative inquiry applies an inductive data analysis by working with the 
data from the ‘bottom-up’ to find the patterns, categories and themes (Creswell, 
2007:39), as well as accommodating the emergence of unpredictable things (Braun & 
Clark, 2013:24). Furthermore, the exploratory nature of the study can provide the 
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basis for preliminary research to inform a future phase for a quantitative study 
(Silverman, 2006; Bouma & Ling, 2004). 
 In contrast to qualitative research, quantitative inquiry has its focus on 
objective, unbiased data collection (Braun & Clarke, 2013) with pre-ordained 
operational variables (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) and the transformation of data 
into numbers (Blaikie, 2003) to explain reality. Such an approach was regarded as an 
unsuitable ‘fit’ to examine the multi-level intrinsic information of three stakeholder 
groups. Multiple stakeholders bring with them multiple realities, meanings and 
experiences that can be ‘contradictory and messy’ (Braun & Clark, 2013). As 
Silverman (2000) notes, quantitative methods are unable to accommodate these 
nuances easily.  
Case study  
As identified earlier, the benefits of qualitative research include its flexibility to 
accommodate diverse perspectives of a social phenomenon and to delve into what is 
happening in a particular situation (Bouma & Ling, 2004:165). With the decision to 
take a qualitative approach for this research and focus on stakeholder experiences of 
an EU, a case study was considered best to acquire the relevant knowledge on the 
social phenomena. Case study research involves the investigator examining a 
bounded system (or case) within a specified timeframe using detailed and in-depth 
data collection techniques that draw on multiple information sources (Creswell, 
2007:73). Multiple data sources can cover interviews, audio-visual materials, 
documents and reports (Eisenhardt, 1989). Combining the data, the researcher reports 
on the case, providing both description and case based-themes emerging from the 
data to contribute meaningfully to the application of theory (Creswell, 2007:40). 
The choice of a case study was influenced by different factors. Firstly, the EU 
policy and program is recognised and established as part of the WHSQ enforcement 
and compliance strategy. The EU policy is well developed with a process that has 
clear boundaries, making it an ideal basis for conducting a study. It is administered 
through an established institutional structure involving a dedicated Unit resourced to 
deliver the program. There are specific stakeholders interacting with the authority 
and its agents, as part of the EU program. As such, a case study with defined 
boundaries, social agents and multiple data sources lent itself to conducting a case 
study (Creswell, 2007:74). Secondly, case studies suit research that asks ‘how’ and 
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‘why’ questions (Gray, 2014) about a contemporary set of events over which one has 
no control. Thirdly, case studies accommodate the generation of multiple accounts of 
participants’ perspectives (Gray, 2014:163 citing Lewis, 2003). Fourthly, combining 
the variety of data that can be contrasted and integrated enables the building of rich 
and detailed understandings of context (Gray, 2014:163). Finally, alongside the 
factors above, convenience was a consideration in conducting the research. 
Silverman (2004:89) notes accessibility, time, costs and experience of the researcher 
can guide the selection of the case study. In the current situation, the investigator 
studied close by WHSQ, the authority supported and approved the research, and the 
master’s degree research budget, influenced the scope of the study and data 
collection techniques. Early experience as a researcher formed a secondary factor in 
the decision to pursue WHSQ and the EU process. 
At the outset of a case study, initial decisions to resolve included the type of 
case study design, the unit of analysis to be examined, selection of key participants, 
data gathering and data analysis and lastly the reporting of the data (Dooley, 2002).  
These matters are addressed below and under data collection and data analysis.  
A single case study was chosen to investigate the WHSQ EU process. The 
employment of an embedded single case involves multiple units of analysis in a 
single case (Eisenhardt, 1989:534 citing Yin, 1984). As this is an exploratory study 
of stakeholders’ experiences and perceptions of an EU, the process of the EU is one 
unit of analysis. Documentary material including the process flowchart, guidance 
material on the undertaking and formal letters comprise sub-elements of the unit of 
analysis. A second unit of analysis is the institutional framework comprising the 
EUU and its structures used to oversee and deliver the EU policy. A third unit of 
analysis is the experiences and perceptions of the stakeholders, the regulatory 
officers, duty holders and affected third parties.  
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
Sampling procedure  
The purpose of this study was to explore the first-hand experiences and 
perceptions of stakeholders involved in preparing an EU, its implementation and the 
outcome. Unlike quantitative studies which rely on selecting large random samples 
from the population for research to ensure representativeness and generalisability, 
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qualitative inquiry relies on small samples including a single case (n=1) (Gray, 
2014:217). Participants for the case study were selected purposively, that is they 
were chosen because they provide the relevant information-rich data that can only be 
gathered from parties directly involved in the event, activity or setting (Gray, 2014).   
The number of participants identified for this study was shaped by the number 
of EUs published on the WHSQ website between mid-2006 and January 2013 
(calendar year). Eligible participants had to be a duty holder with an EU accepted by 
WHSQ during the period. Approved undertakings are published on the WHSQ 
website with the total number for each year collated in Table 4.1. Over the 
timeframe, 81 undertakings were published, reflecting the sample size of eligible 
duty holders for the study.  
Table 4.1: Published list of EUs -2006-January 2013  
Year of publication Number of enforceable undertakings 
2006 6 
2007 11 
2008 18 
2009 17 
2010 9 
2011 5 
2012 15 
January 2013 - 
Total 81* 
Source: WHSQ website www.worksafe.qld.gov.au  extracted 18/01/2013.  
*NB this list is unavailable on WHSQ website. Listings of EUs date from 2010 as at June 2015. 
 
The injured parties who are the subject of an EU were eligible sample recruits. 
The injured party is invited to comment on the duty holder’s proposal before the 
decision-maker rules on the EU offer. Eighty-two injured persons were identified as 
eligible for the study. The difference in the number of injured parties and duty 
holders reflects multiple injuries for one entity. 
Regulatory officers who are directly involved in the administration and 
delivery of the undertaking program were invited to participate on behalf of the 
regulator (Chief Executive). Three official representatives of the EUU agreed to 
participate in the study. Each has experience working with duty holders, injured 
persons and affected third parties, the evaluation panel responsible for reviewing EU 
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applications and the regulator. Additionally they support stakeholders like auditors 
and lawyers and respond to public enquiries. 
A disadvantage of purposive sampling is the potential to omit a characteristic 
or subconsciously introduce bias to the sample (Gray, 2014: 216).  In this study, duty 
holders whose EUs were rejected by the regulator and those that opted for 
prosecution have been excluded in the sample population. The stakeholder’s 
omission from the study is acknowledged with limited time, budgetary constraints 
and the exploratory nature of the study as factors influencing exclusion in the study. 
As a first stage, the focus is on having a basic understanding of the complexities and 
issues associated with an EU that can be expanded on for future research, including 
diversity of stakeholders.  
Recruitment of participants 
Combined, 163 duty holders and injured persons were identified as the sample 
population for the study. To preserve the confidentiality of potential participants, the 
researcher approached WHSQ’s EUU with a verbal request for agreement to conduct 
the study and sought the authority’s interest in participation. A written request was 
sent on university letterhead via an email attachment to the Director of EUU. The 
letter sought WHSQ formal agreement to participate in the study and a specific 
request for the Unit to generate address labels for the letters inviting eligible 
participants to be part of the study. This approach protected the investigator from 
having the personal address details of duty holders and injured parties. Written 
permission was granted. A copy of the letter is at Appendix 3A with the approval 
letter Appendix 3B. 
As part of the ethics application, a letter was drafted to each stakeholder group 
and submitted for ethics approval. The letter provided background information on the 
study and an invitation to be interviewed. A general publicity flyer on the research 
was attached to the letter with the researcher’s contact details, email and street 
address if a stakeholder needed to clarify information in the flyer (Appendix 4A, 4B 
and 4C).  An expression of interest form was also enclosed for return via facsimile, 
scan or email (Appendix 5). Each letter contained a reply-paid envelope to be 
returned to the investigator for record keeping and follow-up interview. Five weeks 
was provided for people to respond to the letter with a single mail out conducted. 
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The above procedures ensured the researcher had no access to the names and 
addresses of the population groups held by WHSQ. Conversely, information on 
respondents who agreed to be involved in the project was withheld from the 
regulatory officers. Eight return-to-sender letters were received. Seven respondents 
agreed to be involved in the study: five participants representing duty holders; two 
people representing the injured workers together with one of the party’s spouse to 
form three affected third party stakeholders. The profile of the participants is 
presented in Table 4.2. 
Various reasons, based on speculation, could be provided for the low response 
rate. The study of EUs dates back to 2006, a period of seven years. Injured workers 
failure to respond to the invitation may suggest they relocated, they don’t wish to be 
associated with the employer where the incident occurred or are still employed with 
the same duty holder where the incident occurred and fear retribution if found to be 
involved in the study or an interview may re-ignite trauma associated with the injury. 
Duty holder reasons for non-contact could be associated with business closure, 
protection of the company’s privacy, the responsible people have left the firm, shame 
or embarrassment for having an EU or time constraints to commit to an interview.   
Profile of participants 
Five obligation holders agreed to be interviewed for this study. Each 
participant was given a de-identifier code with the prefix BOH (business obligation 
holder) and a number reflecting the order in which the expression of interest was 
received by the researcher. A participant’s code is used interchangeably in the study 
to refer to both the business obligation holder (duty holder) and the individual 
respondent in the interview. General details about the obligation holders are found in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2  Profile of business obligation holders 
Obligation 
holder 
 
Entity 
structure 
Employees Sector Position of 
interviewee 
No of 
EUs and 
status (a) 
BOH01 Multi-national 
Multi-state 
Corporation 
 450-600 
(varies) 
Dispersed across 
Qld 
Industrial  State Compliance 
Manager 
2 
1 Completed  
1 Incomplete 
BOH02 Non profit 
organisation 
 
46 full and 
permanent staff 
Casual staff – 
dispersed across 
Qld 
Education & 
Training 
Managing Director 1 Completed 
BOH03 Small business Five staff 
Two directors, 
three office staff 
and part-time 
bookkeeper 
Building and 
Construction 
Business partner 
Managing Director 
 
1 Completed 
BOH04 Non profit 
organisation 
Not available Community  
Human 
Services 
Health and Safety 
Officer – later 
position became 
Manager WHS 
1 Completed 
BOH05 Multi-state 
Corporation 
540  Manufacturing National Manager 
Human Resources 
and Health Safety and 
Environment 
1 Incomplete 
Sources: Published enforceable undertakings from www.dier.qld.gov.au at January 2013 and information from interviewees 
(a) At the time of this study in 2013, duty holders were completing their EU. BOH01 was scheduled to complete the 
undertaking by the end of 2013, with final audit in 2014 (Interview transcript) 
 
Each duty holder held a senior functional role in the firm that was closely 
aligned with or responsible for WH&S. Business obligation holders BOH01, 
BOH02, BOH03, BOH04 were male, BOH05 was female. Each respondent was 
responsible for all aspects of the preparation, negotiation, implementation and 
reporting requirements related to the EU. At the time of the interviews, two 
obligation holders, BOH01 and BOH05, were completing their respective 
undertakings. 
A cross section of organisational size and business type participated in the 
study. Entities ranged from a small business with five employees (two company 
directors and three staff (BOH03) to a complex multi-state company (BOH05), and a 
multi-state, multi-national corporation of around 600 employees (Queensland 
Division of the firm (BOH01). Two businesses were from the not for profit sector 
and managed by Boards (BOH02 and BOH04). One duty holder (BOH01) had the 
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experience of two EUs.  Head office for four of the companies was Brisbane, while 
one company was located in regional Queensland. 
Details of each entities’ EU covering the anniversary date of the injury (refer 
(b) below), the timeframes associated with the offer and acceptance of the firm’s 
undertaking, and the approved monetary value of each undertaking are provided at 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Details of the EU by duty holder and the monetary value of the undertaking 
 
Party 
(a) 
 
Anniversary 
Date (b) 
Offer Acceptance $ value of 
undertaking 
(d) 
BOH01 October 2007 
(Estimated)  Jan 2008 
Early 2008 
(not in print) 
 297,100 
BOH01 March 2010 26/11/2010 Jan 2011 339,500 
 
BOH02 June 2007 Blanked out (c) 17/4/2008 215,903 
 
BOH03 February 2007 12/9/2007 7/11/2007 76,119 
 
BOH04 March 2008 2008 
Blanked out (c) 
19/4/2008 52,000 
BOH05 December 2010 23/11/2011 27/2/2012 195,050 
 
Sources: Published EUs from www.dier.qld.gov.au at January 2013.   
 Historical EUs will no longer be available on the WSHQ website. Only record from the past 5 years.  
(a) Information taken from published documents and advice from interviewees 
(b) Anniversary date refers to the 12 month period following the incident when a summons is 
issued against the obligation holder by WHSQ. Since harmonisation the 12 month period has   
changed to 2 years (REG02). 
(c) Details are blanked out on EU  
(d) Listed value on the approved EU 
 
Two injured workers agreed to participate in the study as did the next of kin 
of one party. Each person was given a de-identifier code ATP (affected third party) 
and a number assigned in the order of receipt accepting the invitation to be involved 
in the study.  ATP01 and ATP1A represent a couple. The injured workers were male. 
Table 4.4 gives details on the type of injury and injury date with work status and 
outstanding legal proceedings at the time of interview. 
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Table 4.4 Details on injured workers in the study 
Injured 
party 
Injury 
Date 
Injury Type Employment status (a) 
 
Completion of legal 
compensation claims and 
other proceedings (a) 
ATP01 February 
2011 
Grievous 
bodily harm 
Injured worker Return to work 
(RTW) with the same company 
the incident happened after 3 
months.  
 Re-assigned to new duties and job 
due to functional impairment. 
NO 
ATP01 had yet to have his 
compensation claim 
finalised. 
Was receiving ongoing 
treatment for his injury. 
ATP02 May 
2007 
Grievous 
bodily harm 
RTW within 6 months of accident 
to same employer. 
Relocated to other work duties. 
In 2013, moved to a new 
employer. 
YES 
Compensation matters had 
been completed. 
Some impairment evident 
but could do light work 
duties. 
Source: Interview transcripts, and published EUs  
(a) Information as at time of the interview 
 
Three regulatory officers interviewed for the study were employed in the EEU. 
Two officers held middle management positions (both male) with one officer a 
director (female) in the Unit. The team has worked in the Unit between three months 
(director) and an estimated three years and each employee has experience across 
WHSQ. They have knowledge of the undertaking process, the policy and understood 
the role of the regulator in delivering WH&S across Queensland.  
Research instruments and administration procedure 
A case study approach had been decided on for this study. Consistent with the 
flexibility of a case study approach, multiple data collection methods were used to 
gather evidence on an EU. Multiple data collection methods refer to institutional 
documents, archival material, interviews, observations and questionnaires 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:534). Two key sources of data collection for the study were 
interviews with stakeholders involved in an EU and WHSQ corporate and published 
documents. 
Interview  
The purpose of the interview in social research is to elicit as much information 
as possible from the respondent based on their specific knowledge and expertise. 
This includes interviewee’s own behaviour or that of others, their attitudes, norms, 
beliefs and values (Bryman, 2004). Marshall and Rossman (2011) note that 
successful qualitative research relies on the researcher creating sound relationships 
and trust with participants. To establish trust and build rapport with interviewees a 
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mix of communication styles was applied from the start of the data collection 
process. The first stage of contact was with a letter. Once interviewees agreed to 
participate in the study, a telephone call was made to confirm the respondent’s 
interest in the study and conduct preliminary introductions. Face to face contact was 
made with the WHSQ respondents prior to an interview. Making direct contact 
enabled a voice impression, provided background details and insight to participants’ 
concerns or issues. Participants’ interest in the study was also established. 
The duty holder gave details of a preferred time for an interview on the 
expression of interest form. Both injured workers made direct telephone contact with 
the researcher to arrange interview times. ATP01 and his next of kin organised with 
the researcher to hold an interview in Brisbane, coinciding with medical treatment. 
Interviews were scheduled to accommodate the interviewee’s availability. 
The cross sectional study was conducted between March and May 2013 with 
interviews conducted face to face. With the exception of injured parties, interviews 
with stakeholders were conducted at the respondent’s worksite. Regulatory 
representatives were interviewed together. The interview with BOH03 involved 
travel to the business owner’s office. The fluency of the interview was interrupted in 
interviews with BOH01, B0H03 and ATP02. Interruptions to interviews with 
BOH01 and BOH03 occurred to accommodate workplace matters while ATP02’s 
interview was punctuated to search the WHSQ website for a copy of the firms EU for 
him. Table 4.5 provides details about the schedule of interviews for respondents and 
the location. Times for each interview were not collected due to multiple breaks in 
interviews.  Each interview was audio-recorded. 
Table 4.5 Interview schedule and meeting location  
Stakeholders Date Location 
BOH01 15/04/2013 Brisbane South 
BOH02 22/04/2013 Brisbane South 
BOH03 23/04/2013 Regional QLD 
North 
BOH04 29/04/2013 Brisbane North 
BOH05 16/05/2013 Brisbane South 
ATP01, ATP01A 22/03/2013 QUT Bdg Q, L 7 Student 
interview room 
ATP02 20/04/2014 Redcliffe library 
REG01, REG02 
REG03 
31/05/2013 Brisbane CDB 
Source: Recorded on Excel spreadsheet, cross referenced with transcripts and signed consent forms  
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Interview structure and procedure 
The exploratory nature of the research, the critical realist stance taken in this 
study and the qualitative inquiry approach shaped the framework for the interview 
approach. Gray (2014:383) points out narratives have historically been a way for 
humans to capture their experience. The interview is a key way to record those lived 
experiences and make meaning of the experience. A non-directive or unstructured 
interview was chosen for the case study. Non-directive interviews are a non-
standardised technique often used in qualitative research (Gray, 2014:386) to delve 
in-depth for a participant’s views without applying a set of pre-planned questions. 
The researcher keeps the objective of the research in mind and the general coverage 
of issues and matters relevant to the research topic, but the focus of the interview is 
on a participant talking unrestrained about the topic. Participants drive the phrasing 
and sequencing of the questions resulting in unique conversations (Bryman, 2004, 
113). 
Although a non-directive approach was taken, the process involved some 
structure at the introduction stage. Each interviewee was asked to complete a consent 
form (Appendix 6) giving permission for the interview to be held and to be audio-
recorded. A brief overview of the research was provided including background on 
the researcher and an ice-breaker question was posed by the researcher to duty 
holders and the affected third parties: Could you tell me how you knew about an 
enforceable undertaking? The question was set aside for regulatory representatives 
with their interview examining the administration of the program. 
 Following the initial question asked of duty holders and the affected third 
parties, the interviews identified issues around the respondent’s knowledge of EUs, 
the motives for involvement in the EU, background information and descriptions of 
the incident, and unique situational factors experienced by respondents from their 
involvement in the EU process.  
Prior to the interview with regulatory officials, the researcher met with two 
study participants to arrange the interview. This strategy established a professional 
rapport between the parties. The Director, a recent appointee to the role, was not the 
Director who provided permission for the EUU to participate in the study. Time at 
the outset of the interview was spent talking about the focus of the study and its 
objectives with the participant. After consent was obtained, regulatory staff shared 
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their knowledge and experiences of the EUU and explored how the EU policy and 
legislative framework operates under the WH&S legislation.   
Multiple realities and personal accounts were extracted from the ‘talk’ 
obtained through the interviews with each stakeholder group. Table 4.6 consolidates 
dates of interviews, interview transcript word and page length. 
Table 4.6 Interview data collection information 
Business obligation 
holder 
Date Transcript 
pages (a) 
Transcription word 
length 
BOH01 15/04/2013 47 15369 
BOH02 22/04/2013 34 9893 
BOH03 23/04/2013 37 10953 
BOH04 29/04/2013 26 9932 
BOH05 16/05/2013 15 5471 
ATP01/ATP01A 22/03/2013 40 16621 
ATP02 20/04/2014 29 8324 
REG01/REG02/REG03 31/05/2013 48 13599 
 Total 276 76,563 
Source: Transcripts from interviews with interviewees for WHS EUs – exact word and page count 
(a) Transcriptions were double spaced 
 
Documentary evidence 
Along with the voices of each stakeholder captured in interviews, other 
evidence about the EUs was collected from the regulatory authority. Obtaining 
different kinds of data allowed for the triangulation of information to produce a fuller 
explication of the EU process, irrespective of whether the data yields confirmatory or 
discrepant results (Gillham, 2000). Gillham (2000) suggests all information, even if 
it conflicts, provides a deeper representation of the phenomena and contributes to a 
greater level of understanding. Legislation, WHSQ documents on EU background 
information and policy, official letters and published EUs were collected for the 
study.  Official material published electronically or in hard copy provides for ‘traces 
of everyday or institutional lives to be accessed beyond the participants’ views and 
reports (Flick, 2014:299). 
Some documents used in this study are included in the appendices section of 
the thesis. The information enables the reader to have a physical appreciation for the 
information given to stakeholders. Affected third party letter is found at Appendix 2, 
EU policy guidelines at Appendix 7 and an EU template as at May 2008 is at 
Appendix 1. While changes in documents and templates have occurred between 2006 
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and 2013, most of the duty holders had EUs approved under documents produced in 
the appendices. Historically WHSQ has provided guidance material on the 
department’s website and issued hard copies of information to stakeholders. WHSQ 
was relocated in 2009 to the Department of Justice and Attorney-General from 
DEIR. For reference to any current EUs or WHSQ information, readers are directed 
to www.worksafe.qld.gov.au.  A caveat is the documentary data referenced in this 
study will no longer be available to a reader. The material for this study should be 
read and referenced against documents produced in relation to the EUs between 2006 
and 2013. Undertakings published between 2006 and 2013 vary in their structure and 
content requirements. EU documents pre-2010 are no longer accessible on-line. 
WHSQ’s policy decision to hold EUs for five years now applies (REG03, transcript). 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
In qualitative inquiry the interpretation of the data requires an appropriate 
strategy to explore the experiences of stakeholders to an EU. Qualitative inquiry 
applies an inductive data analysis that involves the researcher building patterns, 
categories and themes from the ‘bottom-up’ and working backwards and forwards 
between the themes and data to establish a comprehensive set of themes (Creswell, 
2007: 38). Additionally, the research process is emergent rather than static, with 
stages throughout the process being adjusted in response to changes made to the data 
collection and the participants to build a fuller understanding of the issues under 
investigation (Creswell, 2007).  
Thematic analysis was selected as a suitable method for identifying, analysing 
and reporting patterns (themes) in the data. The analysis was guided by the approach 
developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). The approach involves searching across the 
whole data set, including each interview and documentary evidence, to find repeated 
patterns of meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is suited to critical 
realist research as it allows for a flexible approach to accommodate contextual 
information within natural settings. Additionally it acknowledges the many ways 
individuals make meaning of their experiences and how the broader social context 
can affect those meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Thematic analysis begins by familiarising oneself with the data. At the 
completion of each interview, a third party transcribed the audio-recording. 
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Following transcription, the record of interview was read and checked against the 
audio-recording for accuracy and detail and corrections were made. Undecipherable 
comments were left unchanged with ‘inaudible’ written in the sentence. A review of 
each transcript allowed for the re-lived experience of the interview, to reflect on 
participant stories and be familiar with the nuances and perspectives of each 
respondent.  Notes were made with interest in the tone, attitude, story-line, concerns 
of the participants and hints of issue comparability. A first response to the interview 
transcripts was the unearthing of the similarities and differences (Ryan & Bernard, 
2003:91) of participants’ experiences with the process. Significantly, one transcript 
(ATP01) had multiple transitions or digressions in the story. The transcript was 
marked by constant interruptions by ATP01 over ATP01A and shifts within topic 
areas, referred to as interruptions ‘in turn-talking’ (Ryan & Bernard, 2003:90). The 
transcript highlighted the hurt, pain and anger both stakeholders were experiencing 
as affected third parties. ATP01 was receiving workplace rehabilitation and remained 
employed with the company where the incident happened. The firm was also 
implementing its EU. Of interest to this study would have been joint interviews 
involving an employer and injured worker from the same organisation, to juxtapose 
the stories, conflicts, similarities and differences in their experiences and 
perspectives of the process. 
Phase two of the thematic analysis involves the generation of codes. Two 
initial decisions about the data analysis influenced the data coding. An early decision 
was made to provide a rich thematic description of the data set in order to report in-
depth on the complexity of the topic, rather than focussing on a more detailed and 
nuanced account of a particular aspect or theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This 
decision is in keeping with the objective of the study which is to provide insight into 
an under-researched area involving multiple participants whose views on the topic 
area were unknown. To generate the broad range of knowledge, an inductive rather 
than theoretical thematic analysis approach was chosen. Here, the themes identified 
emerge from the data or are ‘data-driven’ rather than theoretically (or deductively) 
driven, based on the theoretical stance of the researcher (Gray, 2014: 609). As such, 
coding the data may not necessarily involve ‘fitting’ into a pre-existing theoretically 
derived code frame or any pre-conceptions held by a researcher (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). 
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Coding was carried out manually across each interview transcript using 
different techniques. These included making notes beside the text, applying post-it 
notes to identify segments of data, using highlighters to capture patterns emerging in 
the data and for lumping sections of text together that include the contextual 
information (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  When all the data had been coded, a code list 
was developed to collate the main codes with sub-codes relevant to the code. An 
extract of the code list is shown in Table 4.7 with a sample at Appendix 8.  
Table 4.7 Data coding extract 
Data code Sub code Description/memo 
Enforceable 
Undertakings 
Unit 
Non adversarial,  
Advisory, historical 
data 
Description of the administrative unit working with 
business obligation holders to develop an undertaking  
and affected third parties  
‘It’s not an adversarial process is what you need to 
remember’  
‘… it’s to provide them with suggestions on what 
historically has happened in the past’ 
‘we’re literally there as an advisory’ 
Source: Transcript of WHSQ regulatory officers, 31 May 2013 
The initial coding uncovered aspects of the WHSQ EU process, both its 
administrative and operational functions. Codes were constructed to reflect the 
business arrangements of WHSQ along with stakeholders’ experiences of the 
process.  General descriptions or memos for the codes were prepared at this stage of 
the coding process to give meaning and relevance to each code.  This contrasts with 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) suggestion to defer detailed descriptions and definitions 
of the data until stage five of the thematic analysis when codes are clustered together 
to form an overarching theme. This diversion in strategy is consistent with 
Creswell’s (2007:45) suggestion that the approach employed by a researcher may not 
always be ‘pure’ and may combine a mix of procedures. In this case, the strong 
frequency of similar themes early in the process linked to the WHSQ EU framework 
prompted description and memos.  
Phases three to five of the thematic analysis, focussed on theme development 
and involved a constant review of the data, codes, quotes and expressions. Although 
the stages are lumped together at this stage, the process involved an iteration of 
moving backwards and forwards in the data set and refining the process. A cutting 
and sorting of the codes, quotes and context (Ryan & Bernard, 2003:95) occurred 
frequently. Similar areas were placed together. A label was allocated to the group 
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(using post-it notes) to form the first themes. Themes, according to Braun and Clarke 
(2006) capture something important about the data in relation to the research 
question and are generally recognised by the prevalence of the patterned response 
across the data set. However, the ‘size’ of the patterned response is not always the 
critical determining factor for a theme. Flexibility and researcher judgment is used to 
identify what constitutes a theme based on its contribution to the overall research 
question and the study (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Data codes that clustered around a theme were grouped together and a thematic 
map was developed (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Where some themes did not fit into the 
thematic map, they were set aside and placed into a ‘miscellaneous’ category of 
themes. Refinements to the themes were continuous as data was re-examined, codes 
and initial themes reviewed while linking the material to the research question, study 
purpose, the organisational justice framework and the literature review (Saldana, 
2009). Themes were checked against the coded data and data set, with some themes 
integrated where insufficient data was available to support a single theme or set aside 
if the information was redundant to the study (Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  
Phase five of the thematic analysis involved generating the final themes to 
reflect a coherent and internally consistent account of what each theme meant, and to 
ensure the theme linked with the broader storyline emerging from the data. Sub-
themes were identified and developed within each of the main themes to build the 
information that contributes to the overall meaning and structure of the overarching 
theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Four key themes and a series of associated sub-
themes were identified to examine how stakeholders experience fairness within an 
enforceable undertaking process. The four overarching themes are: 1). knowledge of 
an enforceable undertaking; 2). motivation to undertake an undertaking; 3). the 
business regulatory model used by WHSQ to administer the EU program; and 4). 
outcome satisfaction. 
4.6 ETHICS  
Ethical considerations were addressed in the design and development of the 
research. Gathering information and the perspectives of different stakeholders groups 
may result in professional or personal disclosure and vulnerability. Affected third 
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parties may be sensitive to reliving and discussing the workplace incident; duty 
holders may have disclosures they want to protect or may feel shame or 
embarrassment for the incident; and regulatory representatives are subject to 
confidentiality and privacy constraints in their employment as a government officer 
and working with confidential information. Each element was carefully considered in 
drafting the ethics proposal. 
Ethics approval was sought for the study through the Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) Ethics Committee and granted in March 2013, Ethics Approval 
130000018 (refer Appendix 9). The application was reviewed as a low risk study. 
Issues of data storage, sharing of information, supervision, confidentiality and 
consent, and referral counselling for stakeholders were resolved prior to submission 
of the ethics application, and confirmed again prior to commencing data collection.  
Issues relating to recruitment and participant consent have been discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Further consent matters are considered below. Every 
participant in the study signed a consent form and was advised prior to, during and at 
the closure of the interviews, of their rights to withdraw from the project at any time 
without penalty. The consent form covered permission to audio-record and transcribe 
the interview (Appendix 6). 
Trustworthiness of the study 
To ensure the quality of qualitative research Shenton (2004) established four 
criteria against which the trustworthiness of qualitative inquiry can be assessed:  
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Each measure 
corresponds to a positivist paradigm in which the researcher seeks internal validity, 
external validity, reliability, and objectivity. The research design for this qualitative 
study made various provisions to achieve trustworthiness and these are considered 
below. 
Credibility 
Credibility is closely aligned with internal validity in quantitative research 
and refers to the extent to which the study investigates what it claims to investigate 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In qualitative studies, credibility looks to establishing the 
congruence between the findings and reality (Merriman 1998, cited in Shenton, 
2004).  Shenton (2004) lists a number of strategies to ensure the researcher promotes 
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confidence and builds credibility for the research design and its findings. These are 
discussed here.  
 Firstly, although purposive sampling was used to capture a specific 
population with first-hand experience in the EU process, the names and details of the 
duty holders and affected third parties were concealed from the investigator. WHSQ 
withheld personal details of each recipient invited to participate in the study. This 
strategy reduced researcher bias in the selection of informants. The strategy also 
acted as a form of random sampling by allowing the maximum number of 
participants within this ‘selected population grouping’ to be involved since the EU 
was introduced (Shenton, 2004). Informants who agreed to participate in the study 
were de-identified and remain confidential to the investigator. 
Secondly, the process sought multiple perspectives of the key stakeholders in 
the EU process. Collecting the voices of three stakeholder groups, the data allowed a 
layered insight into the similarities, dissimilarities and various opinions of the 
informants that could translate to the broader ‘community of people’ who get 
involved in an EU process and consider it as an alternative to prosecution  (Shenton, 
2004).  Inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the study allows thick descriptions of the 
EU phenomenon. Real life accounts of stakeholders’ experiences have been 
documented in detail in the data analysis chapter for the reader to assess the extent to 
which the findings ‘ring true’ to those who have experienced similar circumstances 
(Shenton, 2004). 
 Credibility was further strengthened by triangulation of data sources using 
interviews and documentary analysis. The purpose of triangulation is to produce a 
more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the object under study 
(Silverman, 2011). The advantage of triangulation of interviews and institutional 
documents is to verify or falsify details presented by the informants.  Moreover the 
combining of different sources shed light on the behaviours and attitudes of the 
informants (Shenton, 2004). Furthermore, the study was strengthened by the 
inclusion of Chapter 3 setting out a brief description of the WHSQ EU process and 
historical data on the state’s context for the WH&S enforcement strategy. The 
descriptive material contributes important details for the case study as well.  Finally, 
transparency and honesty of participants was maximised with each participant being 
briefed during the process of their right to withdraw consent from the study at any 
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time without penalty (Shenton, 2004) (refer Appendix 6). Participants in the study 
were articulate, open and honest in their contributions and generously shared their 
stories about the EU. 
Transferability 
Transferability refers to how well the findings of one study context can apply 
to other situations (Merriman, 1998; Flick, 2002), and equates to external validity 
and generalisability in quantitative research (Shenton, 2004). The nature of 
qualitative studies is to focus on small sample sizes, particular environments and 
individuals (Shenton, 2004) in which the researcher examines the complexity of the 
study objective (Flick, 2002). Therefore the investigator is not necessarily looking to 
justify statistical generalisability to whole populations, but to explore the phenomena 
in reality and the various perspectives of the study participants (Flick, 2002:5). 
This study sought to discover the diversity of experiences of three stakeholder 
groups involved in an EU process. The focus was on achieving insight, perspectives 
and in-depth knowledge rather than statistical range and generalisability of the data.  
The objectives of the study were realised with detailed descriptions and narratives, 
together with contextual background, to ensure readers gained a sound understanding 
of the phenomenon that can enable them to compare similar instances described in 
the study to other situations they have encountered (Shenton, 2004). 
Dependability 
Dependability, which addresses the reliability of the study and its findings 
(Shenton, 2004) considers whether similar results would be obtained if the work was 
to be repeated, in the same context, with the same methods and the same participants 
(Shenton, 2004). Dependability is checked through the process of auditing (Flick, 
2002:228) and includes detailed information around the research design, data 
collection, interpretation and reporting of the findings and reflections on the inquiry 
strategy. In this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, the reader is provided with 
detailed descriptions and information regarding the decision-making processes taken 
in the study along with data collection and analysis strategies. Diagrams and tables 
have been included where necessary to capture information graphically and to readily 
depict the essence of the material. Additional information has been attached in the 
appendices to assist with replication of the study. A caveat is noted in this study that 
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the changing nature of the phenomenon examined by the qualitative researcher is 
vulnerable to situational, political and temporal factors (Shenton, 2004).  
Confirmability  
Confirmability refers to the researcher’s objectivity in the study and as far as 
practicable to reflect the experiences and ideas of participants in the study over the 
characteristics and preferences of the investigator (Shenton, 2004). Miles and 
Huberman (1994) argue that the key criterion of confirmability is for the researcher 
to acknowledge his or her own predispositions through reporting decisions made, 
methods adopted, explaining approaches and identifying weaknesses in techniques.  
Confirmability was maximised in this exploratory study by including key 
stakeholders impacted by the EU process. Interviews were conducted in a non-
directive manner to elicit the broadest range of experiences and perspectives of 
stakeholders. The approach enabled comparative data to be collected. Each 
stakeholder group contained a minimum of two respondents. The data was compared 
and contrasted within the groups and across the groups. This cross checking and 
verification ensured the voices of the participants were prominent in reporting the 
findings. Triangulation of WHSQ documentary evidence with interviews provided 
additional confidence that the voices of stakeholders were pre-eminent in the study. 
Additionally stakeholder views and perspectives were contrasted and compared 
against institutional expectations and standards. Adopting these approaches limited 
the researcher’s bias and influence in the study while strengthening the respondent’s 
stance.  
Further strategies to minimise the researcher’s subjectivity cover audio-
recording of the interviews, verbatim transcription, the application of an inductive 
approach to theme generation (thematic analysis) and using multiple iterations to 
arrive at the overarching themes and sub-themes. Transparency has been achieved 
with a traceable audit trail detailing the decision process applied to complete the 
study.   
4.7 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Qualitative research allows for a deeper understanding of social phenomena 
using words and images rather than numbers and statistical correlations (Silverman, 
2000). It offers a range of data collection methods with a preference for natural 
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settings and exploratory inquiry. This study is situated in the real world phenomenon 
of regulatory sanction administered by an authority where the impact of the sanction 
is not well understood in the community. The investigator had access to participants 
and data that generated first-hand knowledge and lived experiences of a government 
policy area with limited theoretical and empirical research. The findings of the study 
can form the basis of future quantitative inquiry (Silverman, 2006). Although the 
study is exploratory and potentially contributes to future research, the findings are 
preliminary and based on a cross sectional study. The study was carried out at a 
specific time between March and June 2013 and relied on data published between 
2006 and January 2013. Both timeframes are acknowledged as critical constraints of 
the study.  
One criterion of trustworthiness of a study is the ability to replicate the 
research findings (Shenton, 2004). With changes to the WH&S regulatory 
environment resulting from harmonisation on 1 January 2012, WHSQ policy 
documents, procedures and processes at 2008 are redundant and have been 
superseded by newer document versions, some dating post December 2011. 
Harmonisation and documentary evidence will influence future reproduction of the 
study and is recognised as a study shortcoming. 
The scope of participants selected for the study is also a constraint. Eligibility 
criteria focussed on EUs approved in Queensland between 2006 and 2013 and was 
restricted to state-based duty holders. The study omitted the voices of others such as 
the regulator (the decision-maker), the evaluation panel, unsuccessful duty holders 
who had offered an undertaking (and the reasons for the rejection), offenders that 
elected prosecution over an EU and the voices of duty holders and injured employees 
from the one company.  Relevant industry associations and the legal profession are 
also omitted from the study. Each stakeholder group will have divergent experiences 
and perspectives of the process to expand our understanding of the sanction.  
The study sample would benefit from a broader cross section of small, 
medium and large enterprises and more affected third parties and their next of kin.   
Finally, the study focussed on one state rather than conducting a comparison 
across Australian WH&S jurisdictions. Multiple jurisdictions would offer 
opportunities to look at the similarities and differences in WH&S EU program 
 Chapter 4: Research design 86 
delivery and associated policy. Budget constraints and the academic requirements of 
the master’s program influenced the scope of the study and its sample population. 
In the next section, the data analysis is considered, as it relates to the three 
stakeholder groups participating in this study and the thematic analysis organised 
around the data. 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter presents an analysis of the data gathered from interviews with the 
three stakeholders to an EU process. The first key stakeholders are administrative 
representatives of the EUU within the state based regulatory agency WHSQ; the 
second stakeholder group covers managers and business owners, representing five 
entities with an EU accepted after breaching the WH&S legislation. Each duty holder 
representative had direct line responsibility for drafting their firms’ undertaking, 
working with staff of the EUU and then implementing the EU. The third stakeholder 
group includes two injured employees and the partner of one worker who form the 
affected third parties. Apart from interviews with these stakeholders, documentary 
evidence covering policy guidelines and letters issued by the WHSQ are explored. 
The chapter is structured around the four themes that emerged from the 
thematic analysis discussed in Chapter 4. The first two themes review duty holders 
and affected third party knowledge of an EU, then their respective motives for being 
involved in the process. The themes reflect two stages of the EU process. In the first 
phase of the EU, the preparation involves the duty holder working with the 
regulatory agency staff to draft and negotiate the EU. This stage includes the affected 
third party at one point in time. The second phase relates to the duty holder’s 
implementation and auditing of and compliance with the conditions of the EU.  
Lastly each stakeholder group considers their satisfaction with the EU or the 
outcome. The following data analysis is multi-layered in its presentation. Under most 
thematic headings, each stakeholder group experiences and perspectives is presented.  
5.2 KNOWLEDGE OF AN ENFORCEABLE UNDERTAKING 
The findings of the research study begin with the responses of duty holders 
and affected third parties to the first question posed to them at the interview: Could 
you tell me how you knew about an enforceable undertaking? The stakeholders’ 
responses collectively formed the first theme of the study knowledge of an EU. The 
duty holder’s perspective is given first then the affected third party. 
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Business perspective 
Four out of the five business participants knew of the EU sanction. Only one 
of the five participants had been through an EU process before. Each interviewee 
with knowledge of EUs worked in management positions in their organisation (refer 
Table 4.2, Chapter 4). Knowledge of the sanction was recognised in comments like: 
I did know about them, hadn’t been through the process before both 
personally or with a company (BOH05). 
Because of our association with the building industry, we’re a training 
provider to that sector, so I knew about enforceable undertakings (BOH02). 
Exposure to the enforcement strategy in their work responsibilities was evident in 
statements like: 
I knew that an enforceable undertaking was an option, I guess that’s from 
my training (BOH04). 
We were aware of it anyway within my team because we’ve done our 
various studies and WHSO courses and things, and so we knew about 
enforceable undertakings and had read about them in the Act (BOH01). 
Although the four participants knew about the undertaking, three had no appreciation 
for what the sanction involved practically: 
We had no idea whatsoever what it entailed (BOH01). 
…until you have to go through the rigour of the process I don’t think 
anybody ever really understands what an enforceable undertaking is, and the 
thing is its enforceable (BOH02). 
The fifth duty holder, BOH03, indicated neither he nor his business partner 
knew of the sanction or that it was an option to legal proceedings. When asked if he 
was aware of the undertaking he responded “No no” (BOH03). The firm had no other 
reference point to draw on when the incident occurred “I don’t think anyone else 
around the place had done an undertaking” (BOH03). The local media drew attention 
to the incident providing wide coverage with ‘“everyone on the coast” (BOH03) 
knowing about it. Through the publicity they gained knowledge about the sanction 
via multiple informants: 
It’s amazing how things occur, really.  We had the accident and it went out.  
So when it went out that there … one of our tradesmen and part of our 
family of trades, the B family, … one of them said, “We’ve got a lady that’s 
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come up from Sydney who’s a work health and safety expert in law”. And 
my brother, [A], who was an engineer with the Council, had a friend, 
someone [B] who worked in the Legal Department of the HIA [Housing 
Industry Association] in Brisbane.  And he rang me and said, “You know, 
there’s a thing called enforceable undertakings where you form a contract 
with the government.”  He said, “I believe that is something you should 
pursue.  I’ll send you a list of preferred solicitors on the coast to handle this 
sort of matter” (BOH03). 
Legal advice provided an important source of information for BOH03, who 
found a lawyer immediately the firm realised it could be involved in litigation. They 
used the referral suggestion from business associates and local HIA representative to 
find a suitable lawyer. The solicitor BOH03 contracted advised: 
There’s three options.  You go guilty, or you go not guilty and challenge it, 
or you go to an enforceable undertaking.  The good aspects of an enforceable 
undertaking, the bad aspects of an enforceable undertaking.  Good aspects, 
no prosecution but no conviction, no guilty plea, no fine, no threat to simple 
suits.  Bad aspects, undertakings can be excessive, significant benefit to the 
community.  Acknowledge that there was a breach.  We’re acknowledging 
we didn’t have everything covered (BOH03). 
Legal advice was gained by all other duty holders and is discussed further in 
this chapter. 
To summarise, the majority of duty holders were aware of the existence of 
the EU as an enforcement sanction. Information about the sanction was obtained 
from various sources including professional training, functional role in the 
organisation, industry associations, friends and trade associates. Legal advice was an 
important source of information for each duty holder. A clear difference in 
knowledge was apparent between urban and rural based duty holders. 
 
Injured workers and affected third party 
  Neither injured workers had any understanding of EUs and were surprised 
when asked to participate in the process.  Injured worker ATP01 was employed with 
the company where he sustained his injury when WHSQ asked him to comment on 
his employer’s EU proposal. He advised his “work didn’t tell me” (ATP01) about 
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their offer of an EU. Unable to recollect how he was advised by WHSQ, whether 
verbally, via telephone, email or letter, ATP01 stated WHSQ contacted him and said: 
We would like some input. The company is going forward in an enforced 
undertaking and if you’ve got any input you’d like to put into it before it 
goes to court (ATP01). 
He made the observation that like him, others have no knowledge of what an 
EU is “probably 99% of people on the street would have no idea or no concept of 
what a workplace – an enforceable undertaking is” (ATP01). Similarly, ATP01’s 
wife was unaware of the undertaking and stated “I didn’t understand the concept …” 
(ATP01A), and inferred it was associated with the worker’s compensation claim: 
Well, I thought it was really like – like – compared to the injury and the 
consequences that he’s had to suffer for (ATP01A). 
ATP02 heard about the manufacturer’s proposal to offer an EU when he 
received a letter from WHSQ. The letter arrived over two years after the incident 
(May 2006) on 28 July 2008 (Appendix 2) with a request for his feedback on the EU. 
He recalled “I didn’t really know much, you know”.  His reaction to the undertaking 
was: 
I got the impression that the guy wanted the courts to go a bit easier on him, 
so he sort of made a deal with them that he’d like to do some stuff to make 
industry safer and local community safer (ATP02). 
In summary, affected third parties had no knowledge of the EU and had no 
understanding of the sanction or the process. One affected third party (ATP01) was 
still working with the same employer, and was only made aware of his employer’s 
intention to offer an EU when WHSQ made contact over 12 months after the 
incident.  ATP02 was told about the EU offer more than two years after the event. 
Affected third parties reflected different interpretations of the purpose of the EU. 
Assumptions of the EU was another ‘formal process’ for ATP01 and ATP01A, with 
ATP02 regarding the EU as a ‘softer’ option to court for the offending entity. 
Motivation to be involved in EU 
Understanding the factors bearing on the duty holder’s decision to elect an 
EU rather than be prosecuted and an affected third party’s agreement to participate in 
the process combined to form the second theme of motivation for being involved in 
the EU process.  
 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 91 
The findings in this study suggest that duty holders’ motives for offering an 
EU involve co-existing factors. The decision of affected third parties to be involved 
in the process was motivated by different reasons. Duty holders’ views are provided 
first. 
Acceptance of fault 
Each duty holder gave background details of the incident and acknowledged 
the company had responsibility for the injury. Being accountable for having a safe 
work environment was a critical factor for obligation holders in the decision to offer 
an EU. The EU agreement provides for an acknowledgement of blame attributable to 
the business entity under the heading of ‘Alleged Contravention’ (WHSQ, 2008).  
Although each respondent accepted liability, some also felt contributory 
elements were present: 
We put our hand up and said “Yes it did happen” (BOH01). 
Look, we acknowledge that something went wrong and that we’re to blame 
(BOH04). 
… some fault was certainly evident on our part and there was certainly fault 
evident on the injured party, but at the end of the day it did happen on our 
watch. What happened was we accepted that we were at fault because we 
weren’t [staff member] observing… So at the end of the day I think blame 
fairly feel back with [firm]. It was the reason we had to enter the undertaking 
(BOH02). 
It’s enforceable and it’s an undertaking. And we said “Well, okay and 
through all of this we’re saying, “But we are innocent.” It doesn’t matter, the 
structure is you’re the head contractor. And this other fellow – doesn’t 
matter, the structure is he’s working under your instruction (BOH03). 
Two duty holders employed contractors on their worksites with the incidents 
involving these parties, making the firms accountable: 
We’re actually not his employer so the employment agency had to go 
through the same process as us. We’re deemed liable because it’s our 
workplace, him being at our workplace (BOH05). 
Because you are the principal contractor at any stage you are held 
responsible (BOH03). 
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Prosecution 
Prosecution was considered damaging to a business with a conviction as a 
tarnish on the company “No company wants prosecution against their name” and 
“…it’s sort of a bit of a black mark if you’ve got prosecutions and you’re hurting 
people obviously” (BOH05). To opt for an EU was viewed as a better outcome for a 
duty holder: 
I think the enforceable undertakings are a very powerful tool to have 
available to an industry other than just prosecution (BOH02). 
The sole purpose of an undertaking is an alternative to court and pleading. I 
guess we were motivated by a desire to keep our record clean (BOH01). 
It means you don’t get a black mark against your name (BOH03). 
Being prosecuted and having a conviction recorded against the business was 
considered to have a deleterious effect on its commercial sustainability. Each duty 
holder relied on procurement activities as part of their business operations. When 
applying for tenders, the form asks for details about the safety history of the 
company “Have you any prosecutions?” (BOH01). To future-proof the business, an 
EU was the preferred mechanism to protect the ongoing viability of the organisation.   
The risk management strategy applied by business is exemplified in the following 
statements: 
The perception is that a poor safety record will eliminate you from winning 
tenders, so it’s in our interests to keep our record as clean as we can 
(BOH01). 
…both of those organisations, I think, would take a pretty dim view of 
organisations that they’re contracting with not being safe, you know?  So 
there was every risk there that we could lose those contracts had we not sort 
of been effective at dealing with the enforceable undertakings in the way we 
did.  And we wanted to assure them – assure them that we were doing 
everything in our power to make sure that we fixed things, we made things 
right.  We wanted to continue in business (BOH02). 
…if we had, you know, a number of prosecutions against us for injury, that 
needs to be declared … when you’re tendering for jobs, both government 
and private, you have to give all that information.  They particularly ask for 
it. … so it would affect your business definitely (BOH05). 
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Although business respondents suggest a prosecution would have an adverse 
impact on the outcome of a tendering process, BOH01 noted that this belief had yet 
to be proven in court, “I guess it’s untested. I don’t know. Yeah, no, I just don’t 
know.  It would just be speculation” (BOH01). 
The effect of having a prosecution translates to another area of business 
activity. The credibility of the company came under examination in the case of 
BOH03.  Closely aligned with tenders and contracts was a businesses’ potential loss 
of insurance cover. Small business operator BOH03 indicated his business was 
closely scrutinised by the firm’s insurance company and was asked to attend the 
insurance company’s office to provide justification for why the business should 
continue to be covered by the insurer. The questioning of BOH03 by the insurance 
company’s solicitor on the incident is related as follows: 
Well, we need to – I’m working for the insurance company to decide 
whether or not your insurance holds, and I said, “Well, we’ve been paying it 
for 20 years – quite a substantial amount of money including public liability.  
Why wouldn’t it hold?”  And he says, “Oh well, if you seem to be in the 
wrong…” (BOH03). 
Influence of Boards  
Two respondents (BOHO2 and BOHO4) said that their Board played a 
significant role in the decision to opt for an undertaking. Respondents said both 
Boards had directors with first-hand knowledge and experience of the sanction. The 
undertaking was preferable to prosecution: 
… rather than have it drag through the courts and have a completely adverse 
outcome (BOH02); 
and: 
It was the Board of Directors that actually decided that we wanted to pursue 
an enforceable undertaking (BOH04). 
As the businesses were not for profit, the emphasis for these organisations 
was on serving their constituents. The two Boards had similar arguments for offering 
an undertaking to WHSQ, preferring to invest the funds that would be paid for a 
prosecution into improvements in the organisation. In turn, the investment would 
trickle out to benefit the communities they serve: 
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We’re a not for profit organisation and we’re dealing with bettering the 
community, so that’s what we want to do…we need to improve and so rather 
than fork out 60 odd thousand or whatever for a fine let’s use the money and 
go down the enforceable undertakings route (BOH04).  
In relation to BOH02 the view was that: 
Through the enforceable undertakings we might be able to contribute 
something meaningful to the industry (BOH02). 
Reputation 
An overwhelming need to protect the reputation of the duty holder played an 
important role in a duty holder’s decision to offer an EU. Reputational issues came in 
various guises. The desire to preserve the good name of the business, the services it 
provided or to maintain the business’ standing in the community, clustered to form 
attributes related to reputation. Table 5.1 captures the different ways in which 
reputation and reputational damage were discussed. Table 5.1 also shows the 
prevalence of similar comments made by duty holders reinforcing the concerns for 
managing image in the business world and in the community. 
 
Table 5.1 Examples of respondent references to facets of reputation 
Interviewee Number of  
References 
Quotes – not definitive  
BOH02 3 ‘you have to take out a full-page ad in the Courier Mail to indicate that you’re doing it, 
and I guess the counter to that was, well, if it goes to court, you know, how will it get 
reported and what would it do to [company], what was and still is a premier reputation 
in the training sector, so which all I think contributed to the board and my view with 
the lawyers that the enforceable undertakings at the end of the day was the best avenue 
for us to pursue.’ 
‘irrespective of the circumstances, there’s a great embarrassment factor in the fact that 
you’ve had to enter into one, notwithstanding that everybody knows that you’ve had an 
incident, you know, the industry or industries at the end of the day are pretty small 
ecosystems, it doesn’t take long for the information to get out.  Somebody tells 
somebody, and boom, it’s just like a telegraph wire.’ 
‘You know industry becomes very aware of your enforceable undertaking. I wouldn’t 
say gossip but everyone knows that you’re doing it and every time you do something 
that contributes to it or is a requirement of it you’ve got to explain to people this is part 
of our enforceable undertakings and, you know, the ripple effect would just go out’  
 
BOH04 4 ‘In terms of reputation, yeah, I mean obviously there’s a concern there.  You know that 
it’s going to become public knowledge, you know that it’s going to be printed in the 
Courier Mail, that it’s going to be available on Workplace Health& Safety Queensland 
website’.  
‘Has it hurt us?  Maybe, maybe...  Quite possibly our reputation’s been tarnished there.  
I guess that’s, you know, our own fault really, isn’t it?  We’ve got to build it back up 
again which is what we’re trying to do.  But yeah, I think it’s going to cross everyone’s 
mind, the reputation side of things.’ 
‘I guess, if you try to hide it and cover it up then people will obviously think you’re 
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doing the wrong thing.  If you just say yes and accept it and say we did the wrong thing 
but this is what we’ve done to fix it I think that’s better’.   
 
Relationship management was closely aligned with upholding the reputation 
of duty holders. Services provided by business BOH02, linked the company with 
networks and industry associations across the state. Additionally they had a 
longstanding relationship of working closely with WHSQ. Moreover two board 
members’ influence reached into the industry sector because of work histories and 
union involvement. The EU was seen as an important leadership decision. The 
undertaking supported a process recognised as targeting firm level measures around 
behavioural and attitudinal changes to induce safe work practices for workers, “At 
the end of the day it always favours the injured and that was fine” (BOH02).  
The combined need to preserve business alliances, maintain the firm’s long 
standing industry connections, as well as to promote safe workplaces underpinned 
BOH02’s focus in offering the undertaking:  
The board decided at the end of the day it was more in the interests of [firm] 
and its association with the industry to enter into an enforceable undertaking 
… [because] we didn’t want to burn our bridges with the Division (of 
WHSQ) (BOH02). 
Similarly BOH01 indicated that his company, which was both multi-state and 
multi-national had a strong ‘social conscience’ driven by safety performance that had 
a domino effect across four continents. His division of the organisation had the ‘only 
two [EUs] that have ever taken place within the [company’s] history’ (BOH01). 
Reputational damage not only extended to external relationships between the 
business, its networks and those they contracted with, but was a serious matter for 
internal scrutiny.  BOH01 said “I’ve got national office in Sydney and people at very 
high levels who are aware of it and just trusting me to get it dealt with and closed off 
and keep us out of the courts” (BOH01). 
Philosophically, an undertaking was regarded as being more fruitful: 
We saw this as a far more productive outcome than just paying the fine, so 
we agreed with it – with it in principle in terms of what it was trying to 
achieve (BOH01). 
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Business investment 
An important reason to elect to an EU was its emphasis on promoting change 
within the organisation. Change could be achieved by the organisation investing the 
funds that would normally be committed to paying for a conviction, to improving 
WH&S practices at the coalface.  BOH01 commented “this is good because it forces 
us to do all of these good things and locks us into them and then there can be no argy 
bargy” (BOH01). The undertaking forced businesses to focus on internal compliance, 
contribute to worker safety and improve organisational processes and procedures: 
…[we] made an absolute commitment that we would do it, whereas 
previously we might have drifted along on certain things if we just had our, 
you know, just in the normal course of business. So it did provide a 
significant degree of accountability (BOH01). 
Small business owner BOH03 observed that the EU provided the impetus for 
transformation and rewarding outcomes: 
It kind of gave us an opportunity to not just put the money into the 
government coffers and have them, you know, squander it, let’s say, but put 
the money towards some incredible things that we did in that undertaking 
(BOH03). 
One non-profit organisation contributed: 
the [business] just doesn’t see any benefit forking out that much money for 
no real reason – no real benefit to either the [business] or the community and 
we would always try to improve things, and if we spend the money towards 
improving things then they would be better off  (BOH04). 
Obligation holders believed that having the legislative framework to make a 
choice between a prosecution and an EU was significant in facilitating organisational 
transformation. Without the legislation, two businesses felt it was unlikely the 
transitions necessary for building a culture of compliance and workplace safety 
would occur: 
…a lot of organisations opt to go to court and I don’t always think that at the 
end of the day that makes them better organisations … because at the end of 
the day it doesn’t change the systems of the organisation whereas the 
enforceable undertakings force you to look internally at yourself (BOH02). 
and: 
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…because organisations are not going to be able to do anything about it, and 
it’s going to be left to the organisations to do it themselves, … sometimes it 
takes an accident to prompt some organisations to do a little more (BOH04). 
Corporate conscience emerged as a subset of investing in the business with 
the emphasis on safety as a priority for the organisation. Opting for an EU signalled 
to workers and the broader community the duty holder was committed to, and 
responsible for, creating and maintaining a safe place for everyone. Sentiments to 
this effect were reflected in the following quotes: 
…we put safety at a very high level in the business, and we are genuinely 
committed to it, not only because it’s good for business but we – in terms of 
our moral obligations to our employees, that’s just the sort of company we 
are (BOH01). 
We’ve got a very strong safety culture here and an inclusive culture 
(BOH05). 
We want to be able to ensure that when a member of the public comes on 
site or is engaged in one of our programs they’re safe (BOH04). 
…workplace health and safety’s all about, you know, go to work, be safe 
and go home safely to your family.  You know, it’s that – embracing that 
whole mantra rather than just giving it lip service, and I think it makes the 
enforceable undertakings, certainly from my perspective personally it makes 
you much more conscious of safety every day (BOH02). 
We saw this as a far more productive outcome than just paying the fine, so 
we agreed with it – with it in principle in terms of what it was trying to 
achieve (BOH01). 
Disincentives to an enforceable undertaking 
In a counter narrative, two firms, BOH01 and BOH05, remarked on the 
impediments to offering an EU to the regulator. Both businesses commented on the 
inequitable nature of the sanction which they observed favoured well-resourced 
corporations. The two companies which indicated a multiplicity of factors were 
involved in successfully completing an EU including team support, business 
sustainability over the lifetime of implementing the EU (approximately three years), 
and a firm’s financial capability. They believed these critical ingredients are unlikely 
to be available in small enterprises, affecting their decision to offer an EU and 
suggesting shortcomings in the sanction: 
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the expectation for small companies which was, let’s say, 60 or 80 grand, 
whereas they might have been facing a $500,000 fine, and they are saying to 
themselves, “Look, just fine me” because I’m a little company, I didn’t have 
– I mean, I’ve got … I’ve got 10 in my team in Queensland.  They’re 
compliance, safety, and environmental people.  Although I tend to have done 
all of these myself because they need that level of control because they are 
legally binding documents, but for a small company, say a carpenter or 
something like that there’s no way in this world that this is just going to – 
it’s just – it’s such long-term hard work, particularly when you look at things 
like you’re obliged to put in place a AS4801 externally-certified 
management system.  Give us a break, you know. And that in itself could 
cost, or would cost tens of thousands of dollars. And as honourable and 
desirable as it may be a company probably would otherwise not do that 
(BOH01). 
…I can totally understand small to medium-sized businesses that don’t have 
the resources to go through what we went through. You know, they wouldn’t 
even have safety professionals in their businesses (BOH05). 
Both firms concurred that paying the penalty for a prosecution was an 
expedient route for an organisation so it could quickly move beyond the adverse 
event. The duty holder could forego the time and effort needed to invest in the EU as 
reflected below: 
 …the big companies just pay the fines and don’t even notice it anyway so it 
has no impact on them (BOH01). 
 and: 
if we’d been fined $100,000 then it would’ve been paid and forgotten. You 
know, we’re – and our operation in Australia, you know, we’re getting up 
near a billion dollar revenue a year so that becomes of no consequence 
(BOH01). 
Finally: 
they can, you know, be prosecuted and be fined $40,000. They’re going to 
take it, and it’s not because they don’t care I don’t think, it’s – an 
enforceable undertaking is not easy to complete, that’s for sure (BOH05). 
Lastly the adoption of an EU relates to risk management. Businesses weigh 
the cost-benefits of an undertaking against prosecution and the risks that go with 
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either choice. For some companies, the decision is reduced to a pragmatic self-
assessment of the probability of getting caught. The risk of being caught, or being 
caught more than once, is likely to be a persuasive factor for many companies to opt 
for a prosecution. This aspect was more likely to override concerns of reputation, 
moral obligation, safety and commitment to change: 
… once a company gets to a certain size, and perhaps even, arguably, small 
companies – cause if they do get caught out and they get fined $50,000 and 
they take the hit, they’re probably then going to think, “Well, it’s happened 
once, what’s the chance of it happening again?”  Probably that’s my lot for 
my lifetime, so we’ll carry on as we always have (BOH01). 
 
To summarise, a range of reasons for participating in the EU are offered by 
duty holders.  Important explanations provided for offering an EU were the benefit of 
no conviction recorded against the company, managing reputation and maintaining 
important business relationships. Significantly the EU signalled to employees, 
industry and the regulator, the willingness of the business to address wrongdoing and 
protect those in the workplace. Absent in these views are views about why duty 
holders prefer prosecution over an EU and the effects a prosecution has had on a duty 
holder. 
Motivation for the injured worker 
Contrary reasons for being involved in the EU process were offered by the 
injured employees. Self-interest was a key driver for ATP01. ATP01 believed that by 
participating in the process, he would receive some benefit although it is unclear 
what this would look like. He said “I thought it would lean towards the person 
getting hurt” (ATP01).  
After being approached by WHSQ to provide input into the EU, ATP02 said 
once he understood how an EU worked; he had no hesitation in supporting it: “as 
soon as I got the gist of it I thought it was a good thing” (ATP02). He believed 
WHSQ was seeking only his agreement to proceed with the EU and reported “I got 
that impression – it might be the wrong impression, but I sort of got the feeling they 
were asking my okay for it, and I didn’t hesitate to say yes” (ATP02). 
In summary, affected third parties reflected opposing perspectives for their 
involvement in the EU process. ATP01 believed the process was to support him, 
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while ATP02 interpreted his involvement as WHSQ getting his opinion on the 
proposal offered by the duty holder. 
5.3 REGULATORY BUSINESS MODEL 
 The discussion thus far has focussed on two important themes of ‘knowledge 
of the undertaking’ and the ‘motivations’ to offer an EU to the regulator. The voices 
of two stakeholders, duty holders and affected third parties, have been heard. In this 
section the third major theme to emerge, the Regulatory Business Model, is 
discussed. The theme is informed by interviews with each stakeholder and 
documentary evidence including DEIR policy guidelines and published EUs. Falling 
under the umbrella of the regulatory business model are three sub-themes: Advisory 
Service, Preparation, and Auditing and Compliance. Each will be considered 
independently. 
EUU and its advisory service 
The introduction of the EUs under the Queensland WHS Act 1995 in 2003 led 
to the creation of a dedicated EUU initially located in the former DEIR but in 2009 
the Unit moved to the Department of Justice and Attorney-General. Staff interviewed 
for the study advised that their work experience in the EUU was for mixed periods, 
from a recent appointment up to three years. This meant the corporate knowledge 
and experience of administrators working in the program is concentrated in the last 
few years, covering the preparation for harmonisation. Staff indicated the program 
administered through the EUU has evolved into an ‘advisory service’ (REG02) 
offered to stakeholders at no cost. Staff in the unit are available to support various 
stakeholders during the preparation phase of an EU including Managing Directors of 
firms, the person with functional responsibility for the execution of the EU and duty 
holder’s legal officer (DEIR, 2008).  
The EUU has been designed to be non-confrontational and non-coercive, 
working with parties that engage with the service “…it’s not an adversarial process 
… and there’s not one party.  Everybody’s working towards the same goal at the end 
of the day” (REG01). In relation to the comment of the administrator to the ‘same 
goal’ there was no clarification provided to explain the collective goal shared by each 
stakeholder. Staff in the EUU help duty holders carry out their decision “to make an 
application” (REG01) if a breach of the WH&S law goes to court and they make the 
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decision to apply for an EU. “That’s all they’re doing is making an application” The 
EUU service is very specific: 
…we can’t sway their decision (REG02). 
We give them the options (REG02). 
We help them prepare – we provide them with feedback on their application 
(REG01). 
When we discuss the development of an undertaking … there’s never any 
obligation put on it, there’s never any guarantee it will go through (REG02). 
We can’t advise them on what they should be doing (REG02). [and] None of 
us are involved in the decision-making process (REG01). 
In addition to supporting duty holders prepare their proposal, the EUU has 
available other useful information for stakeholders and the public. The Unit produces 
policy material on EUs, an EU template, information packs to prospective applicants, 
auditors and injured workers, and has a comprehensive departmental website. 
Importantly for the drafting of an EU document, the Unit publishes ‘historical data’ 
on its website and uses ‘experiences’ to assist stakeholders (REG02) with drafting 
the proposal.  Up until January 2013 every EU approved was publically available on 
the WHSQ website.  Internal policy changes in early 2013 restrict EUs to being on 
the website for five years (REG03). ‘Experiences’ is a reference to the staff in the 
EUU contributing their collective knowledge and expertise to help obligation holders 
prepare their proposals.  
The regulatory business model is also characterised by engagement with the 
stakeholders “Our advisory service has developed – and we do purposely do that, 
engage … with the obligation holder” (REG02). The objective of engagement is to 
facilitate a “document that both parties would be happy to agree on and to make a 
decision on” (REG02). The engagement strategy is to “do that face to face [and be] 
available to these people” (REG02). 
Business obligation holders, however, have ownership over the undertaking: 
“It’s their document at the end of the day and it’s between the Department and them” 
(REG02). Once the document has been prepared to the satisfaction of the EUU team 
and an obligation holder, the Unit collates all the information and passes it to the 
Evaluation Panel for feedback to the obligation holder (DEIR, 2008), and writes a 
recommendation to the regulator. Since inception in 2003 the panel system has been 
part of the process and:  
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…since the program has begun there has always been a panel of three, one 
being a senior member of the Department, and two of those panel members 
being from the private sector who were invited to be part of that panel 
(REG02). 
 The final package, containing all the material, is presented to the Deputy 
Director General for a decision (REG02):  
…he or she would look at those – in the entirety of the injured person – the 
obligation there and everyone’s submissions, and then make a decision based 
on that (REG02). 
In recent years the EUU has split the responsibilities for the service according 
to the two EU stages. The first stage of the process concentrates on the preparation of 
the EU (REG02).  The second stage focuses on the EU’s implementation and the 
duty holder’s compliance with fulfilling the conditions of the undertaking: 
we’ve separated the advisory service of the initial stage up until the 
consideration by the Deputy Director General and then an officer – a 
different officer looks after compliance for the rest of the time so that it is 
separate so that the person at the front end is assisting in that preparation, 
and then once a decision is made, if it is granted, there is a different officer 
for the compliance (REG02). 
In summary, WHSQ has established a business model focussed on assisting 
duty holders complete the proposal for an EU. The establishment of the EUU 
resourced with trained staff, various information and a website assists duty holders to 
have available sufficient material to make an informed decision.  
The following section expands on the processes associated with the EU 
drafting and negotiation between the EUU and duty holders. Both the regulatory 
stakeholder and obligation holders’ perspectives are reported in the next section. 
Preparation stage of the EU 
Before an EU can be considered by an obligation holder, they must be 
advised a breach and allegation has occurred. An offer of an undertaking can only 
occur when a complaint and summons has been issued by the regulator, as REG01 
observed: “Somebody doesn’t just get injured at a workplace and then the company 
says ‘I want an enforceable undertaking’”. A business entity applies for an 
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undertaking after being served with a summons in relation to the alleged 
contravention (DEIR, 2008), 12 months after the incident (REG01).  
Business perspective 
Each duty holder reported knowledge of an intention by the regulator to 
prosecute their business for a breach of the WH&S legislation when the inspector 
conducted the investigation of the incident: 
He [inspector] was involved in the initial investigation, and he was the one 
that explained the options that were there in front of us … I would suggest to 
you that you go and get legal advice (BOH02). 
An incident occurred obviously, WH&S intervened straight away, and then I 
guess you get informed of your options from that point on (BOH05). 
Some businesses made the decision to pursue an EU early, long before the 
summons was received. When advised of the options after the incident occurred, a 
decision followed quickly:  
Once we understood our options of either just facing prosecution or 
endeavouring to get an enforceable undertakings accepted, we took the 
option to – for the enforceable undertaking (BOH05). 
We didn’t wait.  And that decision was made inside 12 months (BOH02). 
We chose to get into it straight away (BOH03). 
One corporation, BOH01, held off until the anniversary of the incident and 
the summons. This has happened on two separate occasions. The delay in decision-
making relates to the application for an EU which becomes relevant only if the 
company is charged “If you’re not charged it doesn’t serve any purpose ’cause if 
they choose not to charge us then all’s well, see you later, life goes on” (BOH01). 
Each business reported involvement by the EUU team in the preparation of 
the EU. The appointment of a WHSQ officer to the prospective applicant was a 
consistent story across each respondent: 
I had a Division officer that was appointed to that particular case ….  he was 
involved in the initial investigation (BOH02). 
We formed a good relationship with that – not sure what they call them – 
inspectors or – they get assigned to these cases (BOH05). 
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…they appoint this particular person as our contact for the enforceable 
undertakings, and any questions regarding the enforceable undertakings, you 
know, we – that’s our contact (BOH04). 
Three businesses confirmed an initial meeting with WHSQ on a face to face 
basis and involvement of other stakeholders with one firm’s legal representative 
attending the meeting: “We had a meeting with the solicitors and, I believe, 
Workplace Health & Safety at the solicitors’ offices” (BOH04). BOH02 attended the 
meeting on his own, “I initially dealt with it myself personally”.  The first meeting 
for BOH05 involved two senior managers from the same company with WHSQ. “I 
met with them along with our National HSC Manager who reports to me, and it was 
his first experience with an enforceable undertaking, so we were briefed” (BOH05). 
As noted under the first theme, duty holders indicated involvement with 
lawyers for advice and information about an EU.  Responsibility for the preparation 
of the EU varied across obligation holders. One organisation, BOH05, completed the 
document with limited lawyer involvement, seeking counsel on a needs basis: 
We utilised that legal firm for advice, checking our undertakings and also 
represent us at court through the process which was really a representation of  
what BOH05 want to do and just the formalities of it (BOH05). 
The same company sourced the knowledge and experience of the WHSQ 
contact person and “used our network in the steel industry … to guide what the 
expectation is to get an enforceable undertaking actually accepted” (BOH05). 
In contrast, BOH03 left the drafting and negotiation of the EU to the 
contracted lawyer: “[she] acted on our behalf totally” and “created the document” 
(BOH03). Management of the business would attend meetings as necessary with the 
EUU. “We did separately [meet] with Workplace Health & Safety and with the 
[lawyer]” (BOH03). The other duty holder’s integrated their personal knowledge and 
skills with that of their lawyers to prepare the document. Table 5.2 presents a 
summary of the different approaches adopted by business duty holders. 
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Table 5.2 – Summary of legal involvement in the preparation of an EU 
Business Legal representative Role of Lawyer  
BOH01 Engaged external lawyer  ‘When we did the first [undertaking] one we had a lawyer 
largely involved in the process’ 
The second undertaking had limited involvement from the 
lawyer: ‘… from my perspective, like, we went through 
their template and we filled their template out and it had 
certain sections which is consistent with both of them’. 
BOH02 Engaged private sector 
lawyer 
Originally ‘just me initially’, then engaged lawyers. 
Lawyers had main carriage of responsibility for drafting  
the template and ‘there was dialogue between the Division 
and the regulator and the lawyers’. 
BOH04 Engaged private sector 
lawyer 
Combined involvement between WHSQ and HSE manager 
and ‘we had some solicitors assist in the development of 
the actual enforceable undertakings agreement’. 
BOH05 In house counsel could be 
sourced but used as a 
reference point for advice 
Lawyer not involved in the drafting and negotiation 
 ‘[EUU contact person] they just guided us, as I said, along 
the way, and she was very good.  Her name doesn’t come 
to me it’s been such a long time.  And yeah, then away we 
went’.   
Source: Data taken from transcripts 
Interviewees reported various communication channels were available to duty 
holders to work with EUU in the preparation phase and implementation. Strategies 
used by the EUU included face to face discussions with duty holders with the contact 
person travelling to the obligation holders office or a duty holder going to WHSQ 
head office. Various technologies to communicate with each other were also 
employed: 
I went to them first and then they used to come to me and, yeah, it to-ed and 
fro-ed a little bit.  They were always available to me on the telephone.  We 
exchanged emails – [Brisbane] (BOH02). 
There was, you know, a few occasions where I had questions and I sent 
emails to … the person who was overseeing the enforceable undertakings, 
always answered thoroughly, great response really (BOH04). 
We met with them and had meetings face to face (BOH05). 
One duty holder acknowledged the flexibility and convenience of accessing 
WHSQ staff across the state. The respondent could source the EUU contact at the 
site of the incident (regional Queensland) where he regularly visited and staff at the 
Brisbane office of WHSQ, close to the firm’s head office: 
I had recourse to the Division down here [Brisbane] as well but he [regional 
Queensland EUU EU coordinator] was my main go-to person in relation to 
this particular incident (BOH02). 
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There was common agreement amongst the respondents that the EUU staff 
stood at arm’s length to the duty holder during the drafting and negotiation stage as 
captured in the following statement:  
I got the clear impression that they weren’t able to give much in the way of 
advice other than just in a very general sense. The responsibility was on us to 
determine what it was we were going to commit to, and he would give us a 
little bit of practical advice over the structure of it and so on (BOH01). 
WHSQ has designed a template “a structured document” (REG01) to 
facilitate the drafting of the EU. The template is provided to businesses as part of an 
information pack “They [WHSQ] gave us a pack … and we were given a template” 
(BOH05) and together with the guidance material available on-line these combine to 
assist duty holders to draft the EU. Originally the template “was a one-page 
document” (REG02) but has evolved into what is considered “a fairly watertight 
legal document … it’s detailed” (REG02).   
Regulated entities found the template clear and straightforward to complete 
as reflected in descriptions such as “it was helpful” (BOH04), “it was pretty good 
communication in terms of what they are expecting to see in us” (BOH01), and “the 
format was good” (BOH02). One firm reported “I made some pretty significant 
changes to [the EU] purely because I just followed the information that Workplace 
Health & Safety had on their website regarding the enforceable undertaking and the 
format of them” (BOH04). Another respondent noted the controlled nature of the 
document “it’s on their terms” (BOH02). 
Duty holders recalled their experience of preparing the content of the 
undertaking being like a “game of tennis” (BOH03) with the draft offer moving back 
and forth between the EUU and the businesses before it was submitted to the 
regulator. Common statements by interviewees reflect the flow and revisions: 
That’s the sort of advice that I guess to-ed and fro-ed from the lawyers [and 
the department] (BOH02). 
Some of the things we suggested they rejected.  They just said “No we don’t 
think that’s appropriate and it’s not sufficient penance” (BOH02). 
There was a bit of to-ing and fro-ing because there were a few different 
options. They proposed certain things, we went back. We challenged, as we 
do… (BOH03). 
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I think there was a bit of to-ing and fro-ing, fine tuning, but it was signed off 
relatively easily (BOH01). 
You sort of negotiate the enforceable undertakings and they’re saying, well, 
you need to do something in this space and you need to do something in this 
space, and yep.  It’s a lot of back and forward which is fine (BOH05). 
Business obligation holders understood it was their responsibility to develop 
the EU. Using published, historical data and drawing on the knowledge of the EUU 
contact, regulated entities constructed their undertaking: 
I looked up a few of the other enforceable undertakings that had been 
published, we had brainstorming sessions about things that we could do, so 
yeah, we did a bit of research and stuff beforehand and, sort of, choosing 
what we were going to include in the enforceable undertakings and what we 
felt we could do (BOH04). 
And understood some conditions: 
Like, for example, if you were going to put positions in there they need to 
have a minimum life expectancy, so we – ’cause otherwise the committee 
will reject it, so those comments were based on his previous experience.  So 
we got that sort of advice but at no stage did you really get any indication as 
to what level to pitch it at (BOH01). 
One interviewee mentioned difficulties he experienced with devising suitable 
activities for the undertaking: 
The difficult part I found was coming up with what to include – you know 
what things you are going to do (BOH04). 
Making decisions around the content of the EU is influenced by the template 
structure and the three levels of compliance activities to be met: firm level, industry 
level and community level measures. BOH04, having responsibility for the 
implementation of the undertaking, took the view the content needed to be realistic 
and tailored to how he could fulfil the obligations: 
I basically decided to put in what I was going to do.  I mean, I was the one 
that was going to be overseeing it and pretty much in charge of doing all of 
the work for the enforceable undertakings so it had to be something that I 
felt I could manage (BOH04). 
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Scope for creativity and innovation was evident in the EU developed by 
BOH03’s firm. BOH03 recalled persisting with the department to have their ideas 
accepted. The company submitted two novel projects in their EU – one involving a 
golf day for local builders and sub-contractors incorporating WH&S seminars, 
presentations and prizes. The second activity, a community benefit, involved the 
construction of a house, auctioned with the funds raised, donated to a charity:  
We’re proud of the fact that we challenged the initial draft, added a bit of life 
and substance to it for our excitement from our point of view and as a result 
it became a pleasurable journey as opposed to a punitive, you know 
uncomfortable one (BOH03). 
With the experience of two undertakings, BOH01 remarked that one of the 
challenges in developing the activities was making them relevant in the long term. 
“When you’re actually developing the enforceable undertaking you’re trying to 
predict the future, and it becomes very hard to do”.   
WHSQ policy guidelines stipulate an ‘enforceable undertaking may be 
withdrawn or varied by the obligation holder only with prior agreement of the Chief 
Executive’ (DEIR, 2008), and the request to vary the undertaking will only be 
granted on two grounds. The first ground is where compliance with the undertaking 
is subsequently found to be impractical, and the second ground is where there has 
been a material change in the circumstances. Two obligations holders varied their 
EUs because of changed circumstances during the implementation stage. BOH02 
sought an amendment through the Chief Executive and this was granted (EU 
Agreement, 2009).  
Business BOH01 realised that some of activities agreed to in the approved 
undertaking were no longer appropriate to deliver and advised the WHSQ 
compliance officer “this doesn’t make sense anymore. It seemed like a good idea 
back then but now it’s just plain dumb” (BOH01). The duty holder suggested 
alternative activities and as a consequence, the discretionary powers available at the 
administrative level enabled the business to make minor amendments to the EU and 
kept the process “ticking along” (BOH01) unimpeded by delays to get regulatory 
approval “… she’s got some discretion as long as it’s not too big a change just to 
make a call and say, ‘Yeah, go for it and I’ll make a note that that’s okay’” (BOH01). 
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Despite some respondents having concerns about the content and activities of 
the EU, BOH02 recognised the tailoring of the EU and its contents remains the 
responsibility of each regulated entity. He acknowledged the benefit of having 
individualised EUs as it provided the freedom to design an undertaking to meet the 
organisation’s circumstances rather than reliance on WHSQ to provide solutions.  
Organisations are so varied you can’t really expect Workplace Health & 
Safety to present examples of what to include in an enforceable 
undertakings, but I think that’s sort of best left up to the organisation to 
figure [it] out for themselves (BOH02). 
The WHSQ policy guidelines set out the arrangements for applicants to lodge 
their offer of an undertaking, and the timeframe within which the regulator will make 
its decision (DEIR, 2008). When the decision-maker receives the application, a 
decision on the offer is made within ‘4 weeks’ (DEIR, 2008). In practice, the 
timeframes for meeting the legislative and policy guidelines reveal mixed 
experiences for duty holders and the regulator as shown in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3  EU application approval timeframes (a) 
Party Injury date Anniversary Date (b)  Final offer Acceptance 
BOH01 17 October 
2006 
October 2007 Blanked out 
Est date Nov/Dec 
2007 (e) 
Jan 2008(b) 
(not in print) (d) 
BOH01 March 2009 March 2010 26/11/2010 Jan 2011 
BOH02 June 2006 June 2007 Blanked out (c) 17/4/2008 
BOH03 February 2006 February 2007 12/9/2007 7/11/2007 
BOH04 March 2007 March 2008 2008 
Blanked out (c) 
19/4/2008 (f) 
BOH05 December 
2009 
December 2010 23/11/2011 27/2/2012 
ATP01 February 2010 February 2011 14 /2/2012 17/7/2012 
ATP02 16 May 2006 May 2007 2009 March 2009 
Sources: Published enforceable undertakings from www.dier.qld.gov.au at January 2013, copies held by researcher.  
 
(a) Historical EUs (2006-2009) will no longer be available on the WSHQ website. 
(b)  Anniversary date refers to the 12 month period following the incident when a summons is issued by WHSQ for a 
breach of the WHS Act.  
(c) Blanked out on the published EU 
(d) Advice from interviewees 
(e) EU details are blanked out 
(f) BOH04 – Regulator sign off for the agreement is dated March 2008. The document was listed as a published 
document under the year 2009 and the business obligation holder reports 2009 as the date the EU was signed off. It 
is suggested the approval was on 19 April 2009 and an error on the year was made on the document. 
The period of time between the anniversary date, duty holder EU submission 
date and regulator’ approval date varies greatly. Both BOH01 and BOH03 took 
around seven months to draft and complete the preparation of the EU before lodging 
the EU offer to the regulator. BOH05 took more than 11 months to submit an offer 
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after the anniversary date.  Duty holder’s offer of an EU (for the two affected third 
parties) took a long time before lodging the application. ATP01’s employer 
submitted the offer 14 months after ATP01’s anniversary and in the case of ATP02, 
the company took two years. Explanations cannot be provided for the longer 
timeframes in relation to the affected third parties. 
 Regulator decisions ranged in time between an estimated two (BOH01, 
BOH03) and three months (BOH05). In the case of ATP01 the decision took 
approximately five months.  It is noted that in relation to the regulatory timeframes 
for approving or rejecting the EU application, some submissions overlap with the 
November – February Christmas /New Year holiday break. This period may affect 
the regulatory timelines for approving an EU.  
Evaluation panel 
The WHS undertaking flow chart (DEIR, 2008; Figure 3.2, Chapter 3) 
reveals the Evaluation Panel is actively involved in the EU drafting and feedback to 
the duty holder. The contact officer acts as an intermediary between the obligation 
holder and the panel to finalise the EU. Duty holders found the panel contributed to 
delays in the process in getting signoff by the Chief Executive. BOH05 reported the 
following experience: 
The panel came back with a couple of questions. You have to time it because 
the panel only meet so many times throughout the year, is my understanding, 
so you have to wait for your turn for the panel to have a look at it. It came 
back to us once with a couple of questions to clarify. We clarified them then 
you have to wait for the panel to meet again for it to go back in, so we only 
had those two processes and they were happy with it. Then it gets submitted 
to the Attorney General’s Office for – or I think the Deputy or something 
signs off on them, and he only signs off on certain times of the year as well, 
so that’s my understanding of it. It sat in that office for quite a long time and 
then I think there was an election at some point and it got held over, nothing 
was being signed, so those sorts of things come into it which was a big 
surprise to me. I don’t know exactly why enforceable undertakings are sort 
of treated at that level and then politically they can just sit in somebody’s 
tray, is my perception, for a period of time while a business is really trying to 
get on with business and dealing with the issue and making the 
improvements (BOH05). 
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Delays were experienced by BOH01 when drafting their second 
undertaking. He explained the firm “got stuck into it [second undertaking] in 
May/June-ish and whipped it through and it was probably June/July that we 
got our first draft submitted, and we went to and fro for the rest of the year” 
(BOH01). The process continued for some six months but the overall 
timeframe was much greater: 
Another six months, yep, and then it was finally signed off and we had it 
delivered – the signed and accepted version back in our hands in early 
January – January the 22nd or something like that – was the final acceptance 
date, or when we actually received the final version.  So it’s a long period of 
time.  So it takes almost – almost two years after the event (BOH01). 
The unclear expectations of the panel were referenced as a contributor for the 
delays experienced by BOH01:  
’cause this one went to and fro a number of times because the committee 
with the industry representative, Workplace Health & Safety representative 
and some others on this approval committee sent it back to and fro much 
more so than with this one [first EU] – very pedantic about terminology and 
things, and they – for example, they were – we had a couple of positions in 
here that we were going to create, and they were very sceptical of this, and I 
think they’ve been burned a few times.  A company would say, “Okay, I’ve 
got to spend $400,000. I’ll just employ a few people that I was going to 
employ anyway, and once we get past it we’ll just un-employ them, job 
done.”  So they were looking for a commitment of ongoing – of a minimum, 
sort of, period of time that we would commit to so we can’t just take 
someone on then terminate them, which of course companies are – people 
are coming and going constantly, see?  So they were very picky about the 
wording and so there were three or four to-ings and fro-ings and durations in 
terms of getting it to their satisfaction (BOH01). 
Another respondent indicated the firm “went through quite a few [revisions] 
before we got it to a point where the panel found it acceptable” (BOH02). For 
BOH04 it took around six months.   
I’m not sure how long it took to put together the enforceable undertaking but 
might have taken six months or something like that … And so we sent the 
enforceable undertaking through to him [contact person] and he would 
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forward it on and then got some feedback, and sent back the feedback and 
we made some changes and sent it back again, and then he sent back an 
email saying they’re happy with it all (BOH04). 
Regulatory perspective on delays in the EU signoff 
The regulatory officers were silent on the reasons for delays in the regulator 
making a decision on an EU application. One administrator offered the following 
perspective on the panel’s involvement and how they assess an application: 
The panel’s really just basing it on their experiences within industry. They’re 
experts within their field, and again, there’s no set document on this is – 
they’re working on a – not the word I was looking for – compliance within 
industry. So really they’re working on ‘beyond the compliance’, so within 
the Act and their regulation what is the standard compliance within industry 
or what’s expected of an obligational PCBU [person conducting a business 
or undertaking]. Anything above that they will consider and provide a 
recommendation to the decision-maker on whether effective measurements 
they’re putting place, and if it’s a suitable measure as opposed to prosecution 
(REG02). 
In summary, thus far the preparation stage involves collaboration between 
the duty holder and WHSQ. Various resources are available to assist a duty holder 
draft the EU including a specific EU template, historical EUs and the policy 
guidelines. The role of lawyers in drafting the EU varied across the obligation 
holders. Duty holders reported scope in drafting the content of their EU and 
opportunity to challenge the views of the evaluation panel and the EUU staff. Duty 
holders experienced delays in getting the EU document completed with the 
Evaluation Panel being actively involved in assessing the suitability of the EU 
content for submission to the regulator.    
 
In the next section perspectives of the affected third party are canvassed along 
with duty holder views on the involvement of the affected third party in the EU.  
Involvement of injured party in EU process 
The EU application process allows for the injured employee and next of kin 
to comment on the undertaking proposal. This occurs after the regulated entity has 
lodged the proposal with the regulator (DEIR, 2008). According to the WHSQ 
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flowchart (refer Figure 3.2, Chapter 3) the seriously injured person is contacted and 
asked if they would like to have input on the proposal (DEIR, 2008).  
Contact with ATP01 was made by a representative of the EUU about his 
option to give input to the EU proposal. He said there was little guidance as to what 
he was actually required to do: 
All it is is just an email.  There’s nothing in it, there was no format, there 
was nothing.  There was just – what they wanted to know was a quick story 
of what happened and what I went through (ATP01). 
As ATP01 had no idea about the EU, he researched the WHSQ website to 
find information about it: “I went through and had a look at the Department of 
Justice [website] to pretty much find out what it all meant and what happens to the 
companies” (ATP01). Additionally he contacted his solicitor “I even had to front my 
solicitor to find out what an enforceable undertaking meant” (ATP01).  In response 
to WHSQ’s offer to comment on the proposal, ATP01 said he provided “them the 
facts”.  He prepared a detailed written statement of the events surrounding his injury 
and recalled “word for word …everything that has happened”. But he stated his input 
“… just fell on deaf ears”. WHSQ advised ATP01 that the process was designed for 
the employer, discounting any direct benefit for the injured party: 
… As the fella from the Department of Justice told me, he goes, “It’s not 
there for you.”  And I said, “Well, what happens to the person who did it?”  
And he goes – I said, “What about me?”  He goes, “You’ll get your 
compensation.” And I said, “No I won’t. I haven’t got it yet.”  “Oh, you 
will.”  And I said to him, “Well, what about the company that did it?  What 
about the people that did this to me?”  “It’s not there for you.”  He goes, “It’s 
there to stop it happening again?”  (ATP01).  
The partner of ATP01 disclosed her naivety about the undertaking. She 
interpreted the request to comment on the EU as another paperwork task for the 
couple in support of their legal proceedings, although this is not specified. She 
observed that to do this required effort: 
To fight this I would spend – tend to spend a lot of time researching things 
like that, so I know what’s going on so I don’t get caught out (ATP01A). 
Two years after ATP02 was injured, he was advised the EU was being 
offered by the duty holder. The EU proposal was explained in a letter from WHSQ 
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(refer Appendix 2). When ATP02 reviewed the correspondence he telephoned the 
WHSQ contact in the letter. The WHSQ representative gave ATP02 an overview of 
the process and invited his contribution:  
I talked to the guy who the letter told me to call if I wanted to find out more 
about it … I had a discussion about what it all meant … but he did ask me if 
I had anything that I might want to request, that be a part of the undertaking 
(ATP02). 
In response to providing input ATP02 verbally offered to the WHSQ 
representative a suggestion to include in the undertaking: 
… while I was talking with him he was saying about the community too, and 
that’s when I thought about the school bus seatbelts …(ATP02). 
The WHSQ contact told ATP02 he could call the authority any time to follow 
up on the undertaking, however, he said “I just forgot about it … and I didn’t follow 
it up” (ATP02). ATP02 assumed his suggestion would automatically be included in 
the undertaking: 
I trusted that it was going to happen ’cause if it didn’t happen the – probably, 
you know, it was going to be a court-ordered thing or, you know, it was 
going to be an official thing that he had to do, so I thought if he doesn’t do it 
he’s going to have the court come down on him.  So I just – yeah, I didn’t 
follow it up (ATP02). 
Because ATP02 did not pursue the EU further he was uncertain whether the 
undertaking was accepted by the regulator or if his suggestion was included in the 
final agreement. He took personal responsibility for his inaction: 
I’m not sure if what I suggested come through or not.  And that’s my own 
fault though, that I didn’t follow it up (ATP02). 
Business perspective on injured party involvement in process 
One duty holder, BOH03, was unaware the injured worker had the 
opportunity to participate in the undertaking process, while the other entities did 
(BOH01, BOH02, BOH04, BOH05).  
Four of the five obligation holders believed the inclusion of an injured 
worker’s views was worthwhile:  
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… the worker obviously has a much better knowledge of the internal 
workings of the organisation, the systems and everything like that.  So in 
those circumstances, yeah, I think there would be definite benefits there to 
involve the injured person (BOH04). 
Yes, probably after the trauma part of things has probably passed, yes, I 
think so … I think it’s transparent enough, but I think it’s also a worthwhile 
approach, that sort of 360 degree (BOH02). 
I think any comment from any angle, you know, that’s a great democratic 
process, you know, and if you’ve got something to hide you might be 
concerned about that, and if you’re a totally open book and there’s nothing 
to hide, well, you wouldn’t be concerned about that, so I’m not.  Very secure 
within myself and the company.  You know, there’s nothing to hide in any of 
this (BOH03). 
The affected party in the case of BOH04 was a child whose family acted on 
behalf of the person. “This is a little bit different because it involves a non-employee 
whereas a lot of enforceable undertakings are around an injured worker” (BOH04). 
The business welcomed any ideas that would lead to improvement in service delivery 
and suggested injured parties’ comments be fed back to a business through WHSQ: 
That can come to us, you know, or they can go to Workplace Health & 
Safety Queensland – could discuss with them and then provide the 
information to us from, you know, what the injured person suggested and we 
can take that on board as part of the enforceable undertaking. Any 
suggestions – I was happy to receive any suggestions whatsoever about what 
we could include in the enforceable undertaking, so that’s what I think 
(BOH04). 
One business obligation holder, BOH01, believed that the inclusion of the 
injured employee in the process was unsuitable and wrong: 
No … because the enforceable undertaking goes – the commitments go way 
beyond the knowledge or understanding or comprehension of the injured 
worker (BOH01). 
The respondent expanded on his position: 
When it went on to all the other aspects of it [undertaking] we were getting 
into areas of safety management that he [injured employee] would have no 
understanding or comprehension of it at all, so for him to have had any 
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greater – both of them – any greater involvement would have been 
counterproductive from our point of view simply because you’re operating 
in areas well outside their expertise and experience.  I think it’s good that the 
division consult with them.  Exactly as to the nature of that consultation I 
don’t know, but it’s obviously part of the process that they have to talk to 
them about what they are intending to do (BOH01). 
The same respondent said the passage of time between the injury and WHSQ 
contact was considerable, supporting his view to exclude the injured person’s voice 
in the process: 
Yep, and the one year before charges are laid, and then the development 
process and then a year’s gone by, and so it’s a long period of time – 18 
months or so from the time of the incident (BOH01). 
Regulatory administrators’ perspective on injured worker’s participation 
Despite WHSQ policy guidelines offering injured parties input to the EU, 
REG02 said the number that actually chose to participate is minimal, only a “very 
small amount [of injured workers and next of kin] make a contribution to the 
process” (REG02). An explanation for the low participation rate in the EU was 
unavailable. Both REG01 and REG02 observed injured parties are “… not 
compelled” to provide comments under the procedures because it is voluntary. 
Although historically few injured employees have contributed to the process, REG02 
said getting input from the injured party or next of kin was a “bonus” as the 
information builds “a bigger picture for the decision-maker” (REG02). How this 
translates to the regulator’s decision-making process and the regulator uses the 
affected third parties input is unclear. When affected third parties reviewed their 
respective EUs they could not find evidence of their input in the published EUs.  
WHSQ respondents noted after the first letter is sent to the injured worker, 
other contact may be made with the affected third party to check if they received the 
department’s correspondence. This may entail an email or telephone call. 
Engagement between the administrators and the affected third parties is pragmatic: 
We provide each one of them, next of kin and injured parties, the 
opportunity if that’s the case, and we don’t question at all if we don’t receive 
anything, although we may follow up with a phone call just to, you know, 
make sure they got the letter.  We don’t question that at all so, look, it’s very 
much left to them to respond … We don’t question what they write or how 
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they write it, we just present what they provide to the decision-maker 
(REG02). 
A WHSQ respondent clarified the position of a “very seriously injured 
person(s)’ opportunity to comment” (Appendix 7) on the EU. The intention of having 
injured workers involved is to get their agreement or otherwise if the EU should go 
ahead. This perspective is different from a detailed statement surrounding the 
incident, the employer’s treatment of the injured worker after the incident, or 
suggestions made for putting into the content of an EU. These matters may be looked 
at by the regulator but would not constitute the basis of the regulator’s decision:  
Very rarely would we ever get any suggestion of what should be involved in 
it.  It really comes down to do they agree with the option or the idea of an 
enforceable undertaking. We ask for their opinion, again, on you know, 
around the particular incident and their thoughts and safety and so forth, so 
there’s nothing in there that states that they, you know – it does state that it 
will go to the decision-maker.  It does state that it’ll be – it’ll form part of the 
decision, it won’t be the decision based on that, and it’s very clear on those 
sort of things.  So all we offer them is a copy of the accepted enforceable 
undertaking, if accepted, and advice on it if it’s not accepted (REG02). 
WHSQ participants were asked whether the EUU had at a previous time 
asked the injured party to contribute their ideas to the content of the undertaking. 
Respondents were unclear on the early processes used by DEIR on the EU. 
Corporate knowledge of the process was limited to respondents recent work history 
in the Unit focussing on the last three years. Despite uncertainty about past 
processes, the administrators confirmed current practices [the EU, policy and 
process] gave no indication to affected third parties they could influence the content 
of an EU. The injured party’s role was restricted to agreeing or not to the 
undertaking:  
… that would be dependent on the injured person and what incident that 
references to, whether or not it’s from the earlier stages of the [enforceable 
undertaking] program.  I know that there are ones now that there’s nothing 
on there that states that they have an input as to how it should look. It’s 
really, again, their opinion on their thoughts on an enforceable undertaking 
going through as opposed to prosecution … (REG02). 
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WHSQ respondents noted two considerations they keep in mind when 
involving an injured party in any ‘content’ issue associated with the EU. The first 
matter relates to WHSQ legal responsibilities to protect the confidentiality of parties 
and the disclosure of their personal circumstances: “It’s a process we do… we have 
to be careful in how we do that. They’re got– the privacy and the … the injuries 
involved and so forth” (REG02).                                
  The second issue relates to the EU objective to ensure the duty holder 
institutes WH&S cultural change in the organisation. Although an incident happens 
to the employee, the change being sought in an EU goes beyond the “individual 
circumstances” and “workplace tasks” (REG02). The regulator and the policy 
guidelines expect an EU will lead to significant social change: 
A greater benefit to health and safety beyond the workplace through to the 
community … The organisation, the industry sector and then beyond that to 
the community because health and safety is – it needs to be a community 
issue.  It affects the community, it affects real people, it’s not abstract, and 
so it’s not – you know, we would seek not to limit it (REG01). 
Giving injured workers involvement in the content of the undertaking was not 
to be seen to “create an expectation” (REG01) their views would be incorporated into 
the EU. If this was the situation, from the regulator’s perspective, the affected third 
party’s contribution may be at odds with the intent of the sanction and its broader 
goal:   
The EU process by its very nature we need to see a magnitude of change that 
we would get that’s far greater than what we would get through prosecution 
(REG02). 
Regulatory officers advised communication with the affected third party is 
continuous while the EUU is in the preparation phase with the duty holder. Affected 
third parties are kept abreast of the progress of the EU drafting and when it is signed 
off as inferred in the following statement by REG02: “And they’re advised along the 
way of the stages that we’re at as well.”  It is a requirement contact is maintained 
with injured parties and forms part of the WHSQ quality assurance system: 
I know since doing the process, since I’ve been here, it’s imperative that we 
do follow up to that, so if it’s accepted we notify them.  It’s part of the 
process.  We don’t, you know, it’s a quality control that we do … (REG02). 
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The WHSQ flowchart (Figure 3.2) indicates “The injured person(s) do not 
receive a copy of the proposed undertaking”. The flowchart suggests there is no 
ongoing contact with the injured party or next of kin, including advice on the 
publication of the undertaking.  
In summary, the WHSQ EU process provides for affected third parties to be 
involved by commenting on the proposal drafted by the duty holder. There is some 
uncertainty as to what actually constitutes involvement of affected third parties in the 
EU with the affected third parties offering ideas for the content of the undertaking. 
On the other hand regulatory officials regard affected third party involvement to be 
limited to giving their consent or disapproval for the duty holder to have an EU.   
Publication of the undertaking 
Following regulatory decision to accept or reject the EU, the applicant is 
advised by letter (DEIR, 2008; REG01). The EU is published in local newspapers 
and on the department’s website. Two obligation holders acknowledged that 
publication was part of the process and accepted the strict conditions surrounding 
any advertisements associated with the undertaking: 
… once the Chief Executive had signed that off that we were entering that 
then they advise you – the Division – you’ll do the ad now, this is what we 
want you to say, so they basically stipulate – you can’t defend yourself in it, 
…, it’s got to be very neutral … and you just say that we’ve entered into an 
enforceable undertaking … because of these reasons (BOH02). 
 
We knew that the requirements under the enforceable undertaking were that 
it was going to become public knowledge and that’s just the way it was 
(BOH04). 
Another duty holder remarked the published information around the 
company’s activities was highly controlled and under the close scrutiny of WHSQ to 
prevent self-aggrandisement: 
… local radio station.  The ads had to be structured in such a way so that the 
content was acceptable by Workplace Health & Safety.  We had to have that 
all approved, the script, so that we weren’t promoting ourselves. …We are 
doing this … because of a work incident and entering an enforceable 
undertaking. It’s all very closely controlled, and I can understand that, 
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otherwise, you know, a less noble company – and I don’t want to sound 
righteous here – but, you know, a scurrilous character would just use the 
money to promote themselves (BOH03). 
 The publication of the EU had limited impact on one duty holder: 
We weren’t actively monitoring it.  It wasn’t really that much of an interest 
to us… And it was published in the newspaper, and we saw that as well and 
that was fine.  That didn’t have any particular impact on us one way or the 
other (BOH01). 
Affected third parties provided no views on the publication of the EU. ATP02 
had not seen the final EU until the day of the interview. 
EU monitoring, auditing and compliance  
In the following section of the chapter, the second phase of the EU process is 
considered. This phase of the EU process relates to the implementation of the 
undertaking by the business entity. It includes the regulatory authority monitoring 
and auditing the duty holder in fulfilling the conditions of the EU and the external 
auditor to ensure compliance with the activities of the EU against the timeframes. 
The voices of the regulatory authority and duty holders are heard on their 
respective experiences and perspectives of the EU implementation phase. 
Regulatory administrators’ perspective 
Considerable importance is placed on duty holders to fulfil their EU 
obligations with REG02 advising “We view compliance, especially in this area, as 
very important that the people do what they say they’re going to undertake is actually 
done within the time limits.” Resourcing investment by the regulator has been 
committed to ensure compliance is fulfilled as suggested in the comment: “We’re 
quite – we put a lot of effort into making sure that those things are done, and if 
they’re not done on time as promised there’s follow-up with those parties straight 
away to ensure that they realise that it is very important to meet those time-lines” 
(REG02). 
Random checks are carried out by WHSQ on the progress of duty holder’s 
compliance with their EU deliverables: 
Part of the enforceable undertaking process incorporates auditing and worksite 
visits.  Any company that’s under an enforceable undertaking is not exempt 
from having visits by the Inspectorate, so we would have an idea of how the 
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enforceable undertaking is progressing, and whether or not they’re complying 
with the requirements of the enforceable undertaking (REG01). 
 
Furthermore a compliance contact person is appointed to the obligation 
holder to oversee the implementation of the EU (REG02). They conduct the audits 
and use a number of strategies to collect data against the undertaking deliverables: 
“ring up, go to the workplace, go and visit, do post audits” (REG01). Additionally, 
“we measure compliance through our field staff to make sure the compliance is still 
in place” (REG01). 
Business perspective 
The timeframe of the EU is generally dictated by the implementation of the 
AS4801 externally certified Occupational Health and Safety Management System. 
The implementation phase is regarded as a significant time commitment by a 
business entity:  
… you’re looking ahead – you’re committing up to three years, so it’s a big 
commitment. … So that effectively sets the life of the enforceable 
undertaking, and within those three years you’ve got these three audits, but 
you’ve also got all of the other activities that you committed to on the way 
(BOH01). 
Duty holders indicated over the lifespan of the EU implementation, WHSQ 
instituted changes to how compliance was monitored by the EUU. Initially BOH01 
and BOH04 had desktop audits for their EUs with periodic visits from the inspector 
(BOH01). Without any guidance on audits, BOH01 described the company’s 
preparation for its first one: 
…we had everything all controlled, and we kept all of the documentation 
and – so when we had our first audit, not knowing what to expect, we took 
over the board room and we had all these little piles with numbers on them 
and they were – all the verification documentation was there, and this guy 
came in and he took one look and he said, “My goodness!”  And we flicked 
through a few things and he said, “It looks pretty good to me” and he didn’t 
even remotely look closely at it – anything – just ticked it off and said, “You 
guys are onto it” (BOH01). 
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Similarly, BOH04 held a substantial quantity of evidence to present to WHSQ 
to verify the EU progress: “I sent heaps and heaps of information for that one, and 
they obviously reviewed all that and were happy with it. And the third one went a 
similar way, it was more just sort of correspondence type” (BOH04). 
Over time, the auditing trail shifted from the face to face Inspectorate contact 
to technological reporting. BOH01 explained the new approach to data collection on 
compliance, “They dropped the audit process on the second one [EU]”. Even though 
they say, “It’s acknowledged that Workplace Health & Safety will conduct 
compliance monitoring to ensure compliance, [involving] a departmental officer at 
approximately six-month interviews – they scrapped that” (BOH01). Monitoring 
changed to telephone and electronic verification of EU deliverables with the EUU 
contact advising the duty holder of the reporting due dates: 
It comes down to contact with, in this case, XX.  And so she’s simply 
monitoring that.  A date’s coming up and she’ll say, “On this particular date, 
BOH01, you’re due to have this completed.  Can you please send through 
your verification” (BOH01). 
Although duty holders receive no feedback on the audits, one obligation 
holder expressed a preference for some face to face contact. “I … would have liked 
to do it more face to face” (BOH04). The value seen in having a face to face auditor 
from the Department was for the information and advice passed onto the business, as 
BOH03 highlighted: “our auditor, you know, [was] just an absolute walking 
encyclopaedia of workplace health and safety”. 
One duty holder was satisfied with the verification process acknowledging 
the loss of an inspector to audit and replaced with “an audit sheet so you just sort of 
fill that in and have the phone conversations really. …it works for us” (BOH05). 
 In summary, WHSQ regard the monitoring, auditing and compliance process 
as an important stage in the EU process. WHSQ perspective suggests that the 
authority has an investment in this stage of the process to ensure businesses complete 
the EU in a timely manner. The implication from the regulatory authority is adequate 
resources are dedicated to supporting business entities to achieve their milestones. 
Business entities acknowledged the implementation stage of the process has changed 
over time. Overtime human resources dedicated to monitoring and auditing of the EU 
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deliverables has transitioned from face to face now being conducted through 
electronic communications.   
Discharge of the Undertaking  
The regulator advises the regulated entity in writing of the successful 
execution of the undertaking (DEIR, 2008). A discharge of the EU signals 
completion on the EU process and the fulfilment of its conditions. 
Three duty holders had received formal closure on their undertaking (BOH02, 
BOH03, BOH04). BOH02 said: “We got that from the Chief Executive, so that gives 
you, I guess, closure to say that, you know, you’ve done everything that you 
undertook to do and we’re satisfied with all of the processes, yeah.  So that does give 
you the closure to it”.  Closure was expressed by another business as “We’re finished 
with it. In that part we’ve got closure” (BOH03). The receipt of the letter from 
WHSQ was the determining factor for the end of BOH04 obligations “Other than the 
formal letter saying that we fulfilled all the requirements under the enforceable 
undertaking I guess that’s what you’d call closure. Done” (BOH04).  
The psychological influence of closure is important to regulated entities “It’s 
a sigh of relief” (BOH02) and “We got that letter – framed” (BOH04). Business 
obligation holder BOH01 stated the long time with an EU was stressful and 
demanding, “It’s a bit of a pressure – I’ve got to say that getting near the bottom of it 
I’m very much looking forward to having it closed off” (BOH01). BOH01 reported 
his organisation still had an open case from the firm’s first EU, despite the 
deliverables being finished. “Now, the interesting thing is that the first one was never 
closed off and I don’t think I’ll ever hear from anyone ever again” (BOH01). Acutely 
aware of the potential to return to court for incomplete undertakings, the respondent 
said, “You’re really hanging out there a bit because if you don’t meet your 
obligations you’ll be back in court” (BOH01).  
Regulatory administrators’ perspective on discharge of EU 
Regulatory official response to a duty holder’s outstanding discharged letter: 
… if there’s a company out there it would be nice if they actually 
approached us and – that is waiting for some kind of confirmation that 
they’ve discharged their enforceable undertaking (REG01). 
In summary, the EU completion is a major milestone for obligation holders, 
with the discharge letter signifying closure. All duty holders shared a common sense 
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of relief the EU had been finished. Failure by the regulatory authority to finalise one 
duty holders EU, long after the EU has been finished, remains an indelible mark on 
the company and the manager with responsibility for the EU implementation.   
5.4 OUTCOME SATISFACTION 
The final theme in the data relates to stakeholder’s perspective of the 
‘outcome’. In this study the outcome relates to the content and consequence of the 
EU. Outcome satisfaction is a generic phrase taking into account a stakeholder’s 
perspective of the content of the EU and on the benefits or otherwise of the EU as an 
intervention strategy to achieve WH&S objectives. To reiterate, the DEIR (2008:2) 
WH&S objective is to deliver effective and credible compliance and enforcement 
strategies to achieve WH&S goals of reducing the incidence of work related death, 
injury and illness and workplace hazards. Multiple perspectives on the content of the 
EU and its benefits are presented under the overarching theme of outcome 
satisfaction.  Two sub-themes sit beneath this theme: Proportionality and Outcome 
Reaction. 
Business perspective 
One respondent, BOH04, saw the undertaking as a precipitator for change on 
two levels. The respondent indicated the undertaking was a persuasive intervention 
measure that forced the organisation to act. The EU was as a change agent:  
…if the intent of offering an enforceable undertaking was to ensure that an 
organisation pulls their socks up and implements things that are a little better 
than what they had and doesn’t let it happen again, I think it’s serving its 
purpose well (BOH04). 
The undertaking played a major educative role for BOH04 on workplace 
safety and standards. The organisation implemented better systems across the whole 
of the business and in doing so embedded a health and safety workplace culture. 
BOH04 observed it was: 
a learning experience and I learnt very fast. I learnt very fast about the 
systems that we had in place which I thought were okay. I mean, I knew at 
the time that our systems weren’t brilliant, but after having … the audits 
against the Australian Standards, our systems were definitely needing to be 
improved yeah, which now they have, and now we’ve got lots of – a lot 
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more developed system which still can be improved. So we do continual 
improvement (BOH04). 
Similarly BOH02 witnessed the business improvement that can occur from 
having an EU: 
I personally do and I know the board does [hold] a great deal of respect for 
that incident …there’s lots of things that I think about that the enforceable 
undertaking actually did a lot of good for us that it might not have done that 
sort of good had it gone to court, we’re certainly a better place because of it.  
I just wish that there didn’t have to be an injury to make you realise that you 
can be better at what you do, and that you can certainly improve your OH&S 
management systems (BOH02). 
The EU forced BOH02 and its Board to introspect and realistically assess the 
company’s safety performance across the whole business’s operations: 
I think that was the most telling and learning thing that we did, we really sat 
down and took a very serious look at ourselves as an organisation (BOH02). 
Pursuing an undertaking was transformational for BOH03, the company and 
staff. The EU educated the business owners and the company on the importance of 
maintaining high WH&S standards and to promote safe work practices. The 
company overhauled all its systems: “Our systems were totally turned upside down” 
and they create “site induction paperwork”. Following on from the EU, regular 
auditing is conducted across the company’s worksites with the business partner 
taking personal ownership for checking every work site (BOH03). The undertaking 
has played a major role in the values the company espouses: 
It [the incident] keeps us on line with what has to be done, and when we’re 
competing for a job and there’s some opposition who hasn’t covered the 
safety aspect to the degree that we have, that’s the only way they could have 
won it at that price, it reinforces why we’re happy not to have won that job 
’cause we’re not prepared to compromise ourselves and ever have this occur 
again to the company, to an individual working for the company. If there’s 
something that’s needed from a safety point of view, do it (BOH03). 
Despite experiencing some frustrations during the preparation phase of the 
EU, duty holder BOH05 found the undertaking process accommodated the 
company’s needs. The structure of the program and the departmental resources – 
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both the regulatory staff and the guidance materials, enabled the firm to remain 
independent and self-determining. Being able to complete the tasks without reliance 
on a lawyer was a plus for the company. The ability to do it yourself extended the 
skills and knowledge of staff, and the concomitant learning that flowed from the 
project: 
…you know, there’s the good and the bad, there are frustrating parts to it.  I 
must say we’re glad we didn’t go down the road of just letting legal people 
handle it.  I think it’s doing it the way we did with our internal resources – 
’cause we’ve got them – has been a good learning as well, rather than just 
flicking it off to a lawyer to do. So I’m happy we’ve had that option I 
suppose from Workplace Health & Safety – that you can get through it on 
your own (BOH05). 
The educative focus from the EU continues beyond the workplace and after a 
firm has completed their undertaking. Duty holder BOH02 indicated the company 
maintains an interest in supporting other organisations to improve their WH&S 
safety and standards: 
I’ve watched – I do, quite rabidly now, watch enforceable undertakings that 
come through and the incidents that occur, and then we think about in here 
how do we actually contribute to fix that – how might we actually assist 
those organisations to – in your enforceable undertaking as well from a 
training perspective is there something that we could do that would assist 
them in some way, shape or form (BOH02). 
Moreover, the same duty holder saw their organisation and their reputation in 
the sector not only as an important training resource to share knowledge but also as a 
flagship for the standards that industry and businesses could aspire to:  
it makes you much more conscious of safety every day – what are people 
doing.  I wander around all the time and look at our organisation.  Constantly 
we remind each other, “Hey, don’t do that, don’t do this”, you know?  ’cause 
at the end of the day we are under the microscope. If you’re a training 
organisation, you know, people are looking at you, plus you’ve got – every 
other day you’ve got people from the industry coming in here to do new 
training or learn new skills.  And they’re watchful and they’re looking and 
they’re saying, “Well, gee, I wish we did this out in industry”, or, “I wish we 
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had this level of safety out there”, or whatever, and, you know, you can arm 
them (BOH02). 
A number of duty holders indicated their involvement in this study was a 
continuum of their corporate responsibility beyond completion of the EU. 
Participation formed a valuable contribution to educating the wider community, but 
also feedback to policy makers and legislators. Two respondents made a direct 
reference to knowledge transfer and the importance of good corporate citizenship as 
a reason to contribute to the research: 
The reason that I accepted to participate [in the study] was that I saw it as a 
natural extension to our own EU, and to continue to contribute in some way, 
shape or form to the force of EU and how they continue to improve 
workplace health and safety in the industry. So I think it’s an important 
research to be doing, and what it does at the end of the day contributes to the 
industry (BOH02). 
From BOH03 perspective:  
… you know, I mean a lot of the people – we don’t understand what 
occurred with this. Our families do and our workers do, but a lot of people 
don’t understand where some of this went, you know.  And that’s fine, we’re 
not here – we’re not proud of it and you’re [investigator] asked to understand 
this and I’m very happy to share it with you ’cause I’m hoping it shows 
someone else down the track that there are other ways to skin the proverbial 
cat (BOH03). 
Duty holder BOH01 stated having an evaluation of EUs and WHSQ 
conducting a thorough investigation of the sanction was necessary: 
If there was an opportunity to sit down, say, with representatives from the 
legal profession and the regulators and those who are policy makers who are 
– ’cause the policy makers that invent these things wouldn’t have a clue as to 
what they’re like in the real world. They wouldn’t have a clue, and why 
wouldn’t they? Because they’ve never asked. They haven’t done what you’re 
doing, and so these people can sit in their ivory towers and can write 
legislation until the cows come home, they would have no concept of the 
impact of them in the real world (BOH01). 
Duty holders’ real interest in the EU is the quantifiable outcomes that the 
undertaking can achieve. As yet such information is not reflected in the process, a 
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requirement BOH01 believes is necessary in order to define the true benefits of the 
program: 
I’m sure that those people that formed the legislation and created this 
template and put in the statements of regret and stuff, they wouldn’t have a 
clue as to the impact it actually has on the employer, and in fact has it made 
the workplace any safer than just paying the fine?  Or has it not – because 
that really is the question that has to be asked, and they’ve got to seek an 
answer to that (BOH01). 
Regulatory officer’s response to an evaluation of the EU 
In response to any evaluations of the EU program, the administrators 
confirmed no specific evaluation of EUs has been conducted “I don’t think – the only 
thing that’s been done, I think, is a study by… Richard Johnstone” (REG03), which 
was conducted some years earlier. One regulatory officer remarked that any 
examination of the program would be problematic because there are so many 
variables to be considered:  
Do we do evaluations on a program to see whether or not it’s effective? 
What was the experience for the company? Some companies are so large, 
some have had multiple enforceable undertakings, some have had one, the 
experience for a small business may be significantly different for a large 
corporation. The impacts may be significantly different for those different 
entities. I don’t know whether it’s size-related, number of employees 
(REG02). 
Despite the regulatory sanction being in place for over 12 years and over 80 
EUs signed off, no evidence-based data substantiating the value and benefit of the 
program across each level of compliance, at the coalface and firm level, to industry 
and the community, has been conducted. 
 
Intact reputation and clean record 
Having had two EUs against the company, a critical benefit of the 
enforcement sanction was the absence of a criminal conviction for duty holder 
BOH01. The company remained free of prosecution for a decade and this enabled the 
company to report on its clean record and uphold the firm’s reputation: 
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And there’s no question that the benefits of having a clean record as 
compared to having two occasions that we would have to be reporting on 
every week or two in tender documents is not something that I would 
particularly want to do (BOH01). 
EUs are hard work 
Duty holders acknowledged there were real benefits to be gained by pursuing 
an undertaking, while conceding the EU is lengthy, time-consuming, expensive and 
hard work. The question of the firm’s future involvement with an undertaking or for 
them personally was canvassed. The personal perspective of the respondent is 
presented first followed by the views of duty holders (senior management) as 
perceived by the interviewees): 
… ask me whether I’d jump one way or the other I think I really don’t know 
until the situation was confronted again. I’m not sure that I would 
necessarily go down the same path. There were even times during ours that 
we thought, “Should we have gone to court?  Would this still be hanging 
over us two years later?” (BOH02). 
However in reality, if the matter was pushed: 
…probably, if I was being honest with you, I’d say yes, I’d do the 
enforceable undertaking again ’cause there’s value, a great deal of value, 
enforcing you to look at what’s gone on and analysing it to the nth degree to 
make it better for everybody (BOH02). 
Board reflections on the undertaking: 
The board at different times agonised over – “Gee, we could’ve just spent 90 
instead of 215”, but at the end of the day we took a more humanistic view I 
guess (BOH02). 
After the experience of two EUs, BOH01 had “years and years to reflect” on 
the value of the sanction. The respondent explained he and his team have found the 
undertaking to be challenging and tiring work “the first one had been an extreme 
amount of work” (BOH01) with the second undertaking similar:  
It’s hard work, and I’ve got to say that, you know, coming to the end of this 
one, um, so many years after the event, I’ve got a lot to do on a day-to-day 
basis. Our plate’s – we – we want to move on and there’s been many 
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occasions when me and my team have said, “This is just all too hard.”  
Although we agree with it in principle, its way, way too hard (BOH01). 
If asked by management to do another undertaking: 
…if I’m directed to by management then I would, but I would certainly [be] 
recommending to them that we don’t (BOH01). 
The decision for BOH04 was straightforward: 
I don’t want to do it again … if you’ve been through an enforceable 
undertaking you know there’s a fair bit of work involved with it but at the 
end of it you can see the benefits, and you end up with better systems in 
place (BOH04). 
The Board’s view:   
I don’t think the board would have to think too much about it.  I think it 
would be an undertaking (BOH04). 
Regulatory perspective on EU effectiveness 
Regulatory administrators believed the EU sanction has been instrumental in 
bringing about cultural shifts in WH&S at the firm level with one important 
contributor to the change being attributed to the EUU service delivery model and its 
focus on engagement with duty holders (REG02): 
You’re making a difference, there is an impact, there’s the cultural change, 
and that’s what we’re looking at, cultural changes, better engagement, and 
that’s I think, the fact that we do that face to face and we’re available to 
these people is a big difference  (REG02). 
Behavioural changes were being effected within management: ‘they take 
ownership’ (REG02) and attitudinal shifts were evident with duty holders: 
We’ve [seen] significant changes from the CEO especially owners of 
companies where they have just – anti regulator government, everything, and 
they’ve just totally turned around and their company’s just running 
amazingly now (REG02). 
Finally, the investment from an EU and its impact was being realised at the 
workplace, in industry and at the community level:  
I think we’re seeing real change effected, and industry-wide, community-
wide it’s, as you say, from the development stage and first contact to getting 
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an agreement put together, I think the work that we put into it, especially in 
the last few years, is coming out now and we’re seeing those changes 
effected and we’re seeing the monetary values effected as well. 
Your bigger companies especially are finding that it’s effective, and look, 
we’re seeing some good changes and some significant changes injected in 
the safety community (REG02). 
Perspectives of affected third parties  
The two injured workers had opposing perspectives on the value of the 
undertaking and its overall benefit to the workplace, industry and the community.  
ATP01 questioned the credibility of the EU sanction. He believed the 
undertaking was a mechanism for his employer to avoid any form of accountability 
for the injury he sustained at the workplace. He stated firmly “It’s not designed to be 
any sort of punishment for the company that hurts people” (ATP01). During the 
interview 28 references were made by ATP01 of the failure of EUs to defend the 
rights of the injured party. The phrases used by ATP01 contained in Table 5.4 reveal 
his dissatisfaction with the EU process and his belief the company was being 
‘protected’ by having an EU rather than being prosecuted. 
 
Table 5.4 – ATP01 perception of the EU and a company’s accountability 
Phrase Number of references 
‘Makes them look good’ 1 
‘Gets them out of trouble’ 3 
‘Some-one should be charged’ 2 
‘Expense of some-one who got hurt’ 8 
‘Nothing happened to anybody/company’ 7 
‘There’s no punishment’ 4 
‘Legislation looks after the company’ 1 
‘Pat on the back’ 1 
‘They got away with it’ 1 
Source: Transcripts of ATP01 
 ATP01’s statements disclose confusion and misunderstanding around the 
purpose of an EU with limited appreciation for the responsibility the duty holder has 
to address the alleged breach of the WH&S legislation. At the same time his level of 
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stress and anguish in dealing with the injury and his adjustment to the injury is 
revealed:  
You know, these companies, like, they’re getting a pat on the back for doing 
– for donating this money to non-profit organisations at the expense of 
someone who got hurt. … They didn’t say thanks to ATP01 getting hurt and 
we’re doing this because we’ve done this. This is why you’re getting it.  
There’s none of that, all they get is [company X] – you know, donated by 
[company X] or, you know, and this is what happens.  Everything’s swept – 
as soon as you get hurt you’re swept under the carpet, you’re just a piece of 
crap (ATP01). 
His misunderstanding is communicated to others in the community: 
I have to explain it to a lot of people what it means. … I said, “When you 
read a newspaper and a company has given money to a non-profit 
organisation or for driver training or things like for schools and it makes 
them look good, 90 per cent of that is not right”.  It’s because they’ve had an 
enforceable undertaking and they’ve done that to get themselves out of 
trouble (ATP01).  
ATP01 believes he was deceived by WHSQ because the organisation failed 
to consider his needs. He was aggrieved for the time and effort he committed to 
respond to WHSQ’s request to comment on his employer’s EU application. He had 
provided a detailed account of everything that had occurred since the event “I was 
giving them the facts”, however, he stated “nothing was taken into account” in the 
published undertaking.   
Furthermore ATP01 believed the EU was a failure as a strategy to institute 
workplace change in safety because it didn’t support the employees directly affected 
by the incident. He implied some form of collusion existed between the regulator and 
the duty holder, although who was involved in the conspiracy was not explicitly 
stated. He commented “It’s not there for you and it’s not there for I, it is there to 
keep the companies out of trouble, it’s the boys – it’s the big boys’ club and that’s all 
it is” (ATP01). Multiple references were made by ATP01 to get rid of an EU and 
replace it with an alternative, transparent sanction: 
I want to see this all publicly accountable, not just hidden on an internet site.  
You need to find out – you need to start from scratch, how the person got 
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hurt, the whole report from when the person got hurt to what he’s lost, to 
what his life – to how his – what quality of life he’s got, to how much he had 
to pay out of his own pocket for his injuries and what he’s lost out of his 
own pocket, not what the company’s lost (ATP01). 
Next of kin, ATP01A, felt her husband’s employer was inadequately 
punished for neglecting to provide a safe workplace for her husband. She thought the 
punishment for the duty holder “… was pretty light considering … I thought it’d [the 
undertaking] be a lot heavier” (ATP01A). She found the process unsatisfactory 
because no particular person in the company was identified for wrong doing and held 
responsible for the event: “No-one was held accountable. No-one, you know, like, 
no-one was named or shamed, you know, like, we have to live with this” (ATP01A). 
The EU process for the next of kin was considered unfair: “There is no justice for 
anybody in any case, whether it’s you or anybody else. If another bloke lost his [X] 
tomorrow and they get the same deal where’s the justice? There is no justice” 
(ATP01A). 
In a contrary narrative, ATP02 acknowledged the EU signed off by the 
manufacturer was worthwhile even though the EU failed to represent his ideas: 
…they mightn’t have got the seatbelts but at least they’ve made their 
community – they’ve still made it safer. … And of course, those sort of 
practices they flow on too to other communities and other trade shows, so 
yeah, I’m quite happy with what I’m reading even if they didn’t take my 
suggestion into consideration.  Well, it was never told me that that was going 
to happen, I felt like I was being asked if I approve of the undertaking – an 
undertaking happening, and just if I had any suggestions.  I was never told 
that that would happen, yeah.  But I think what they’ve done is probably 
better than what I suggested, yeah (ATP02). 
Providing his support for the EU, ATP02 identified two important outcomes 
of the undertaking for him was firstly, the duty holder remained financially viable 
and secondly, was made to be accountable for the supply of safe equipment. In the 
compelling quote below, the injured worker reflected his humanity towards the 
obligation holder, despite providing faulty equipment that impacted him personally:  
I actually thought it was a good idea, and rather than him just pay fines and it 
goes straight into the government coffers or whatever something good can 
come out of the accident. You know, something that would teach him a 
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lesson so he wouldn’t put dodgy equipment on our farms again to injure 
other workers, and something that’s going to help the community rather than 
just help the lawyers or the government or – and that, you know? So I 
thought it was a good idea and I’d prefer him to be penalised like that than to 
cop a bit of a whack and make him go bankrupt, you know?  I’d prefer he do 
something like that, so he could keep on doing his job but just do it properly, 
you know? I didn’t hold any grudges, you know? I didn’t think he 
deliberately put that stuff on the farm. I just think it was a bit of slackness, 
you know, not considering the implications of what could happen (ATP02). 
Despite the differing perspectives and experiences of the affected third 
parties, each party expressed an appreciation for having the opportunity to participate 
in the program, with ATP02 achieving closure in his process after accessing the EU: 
“I do [feel closure] after all this time.  I’m glad that I contacted you before the 30th”. 
Although, this study re-ignited the hurt, pain and anger ATP01 and ATP01A have 
experienced since the incident, they believed there was value in research of this kind, 
reflected in the following statements: 
Like I said, it’s – it might be just a little, like, an hour interview for you and 
a thesis study and all this sort of thing, but it’s a very, very important integral 
part of life of the community. It’s not just me. It’s not – like, the community 
as a whole, sort of. My family has to suffer with this, everyone suffers 
(ATP01). 
In summary, overwhelmingly duty holders reflected positively on the EU and 
noted it had made a significant difference to the WH&S of the workplace from 
implementing the sanction. The EU acted as an agent of change and forced duty 
holders to review their internal WH&S processes and systems and take a hard look at 
safety performance and business operations. The sanction was found to be 
demanding and hard work for duty holders. However each gained a great deal of 
understanding and insight into improving WH&S at the coalface. Although WHSQ 
has no formal feedback or review system of the EU process to measure its 
effectiveness or benefits, it reports anecdotally the sanction is making a difference. 
Affected third parties failed to see their contributions and input in the EU. Despite 
there being no visible recognition of the affected third parties voice in the EU, 
ATP02 believed the sanction to be productive and constructive in what it can achieve 
with duty holders. ATP01 and ATP01A were unsupportive of the sanction. In part 
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this may be explained by the stage of resolution of the injured worker’s 
compensation and legal action against the employer coupled with the unfair 
treatment he was experiencing in the workplace by his employer.  
The next section presents the costs of the EU to the duty holder.  
Proportionality 
A consistent sub-theme in the data related to what constitutes reasonable 
expenditure on activities for the EU. Translating the requirements of the 
departmental policy into an EU that incorporates actions that are ‘substantial’ in 
nature, generates multi-level benefits (organisational, industry and community) and 
reflects an appropriate financial investment as recompense for the incident, was a 
challenge for regulated entities. The DEIR (2008) policy guideline indicates 
proportionality is one of four principles underlying the WHSQ enforcement efforts. 
Proportionality is not defined in the policy guideline.  
Business perspective  
Proportionality for business entities begins with an assessment of the 
monetary value to be committed to EU activities. Duty holders indicated they were 
unclear what constitutes a reasonable financial commitment to fulfil the requirements 
of the EU and be approved by the regulator, reflected in the next two statements: 
We never got any guidance ’cause what the division don’t do is they don’t 
actually tell you much about – they leave it up to you to make a submission 
and they’ll then tell you if they accept it or not, but you really don’t know 
how much they expect of you, particularly in terms of the spend (BOH01). 
And [WHSQ] wasn’t forthcoming with solutions (BOH02). 
Making a decision on what is a suitable monetary contribution BOH01 said 
organisations used the size of the company as the basis for how much money would 
be committed to the EU activities. Company size as the main measure to calculate 
the financial commitment was recommended by the firm’s legal advisers. The 
company had two EUs. When faced with developing the second one, company size 
continued to form the basis for calculating the monetary commitment to the EU:  
We were told when we did the first one that the measure of the acceptability 
of the enforceable undertaking at the end of the day would come down to the 
amount of financial commitment, and although there was no hard and fast 
numbers they gave examples of other large companies, but back then they 
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were throwing numbers around of about 300 to 350,000 worth of spend 
would be seen as being appropriate for a company like ours, so we thought, 
“Okay, well let’s work through some of the things that we think we can put 
into it and just see how they value up” (BOH01). 
In the intervening period between the first EU and the second EU, 
approximately two and a half years, BOH01 said expectations of the monetary 
commitment had changed significantly: 
I guess the assumption was the second time round that it would be similar. 
We subsequently found out that the whole world had changed between the 
two and the expectation of the spend had come way down, and major 
companies were getting away with spending as little as $100,000, and I kind 
of thought, “Well it’s a pity they don’t actually tell you – give you a better 
insight as to what they expect” (BOH01). 
The duty holder offered the second EU to the regulator with a similar 
financial commitment ($297,000) to the first undertaking. Once the EU was 
approved, the duty holder became aware, the EU program had declined in use: 
I heard – we got this feedback that the enforceable undertaking’s process had 
almost fallen over. … None had been submitted. Queensland industry simply 
weren’t availing themselves of this option, and the perception was that 
because industry … and the word out there was that these things cost way 
too much.  Forget it (BOH01). 
 Another duty holder, BOH03, used the solicitor’s advice to determine the 
financial commitment for EU activities. The solicitor advised the basis for assessing 
the value of the EU was the prosecution: 
Quite simplistically, it had to be worth more than prosecution. So where 
prosecution might have cost us somewhere between, in those days $70 and a 
$100,000, this was to cost us between $100 and $140,000 in real terms 
(BOH03). 
Duty holder BOH05 had sought advice from WHSQ on the approximate 
value of a prosecution against the company when the incident happened and said: 
“…we didn’t get a clear answer on that” while duty holder BOH02 indicated: “they 
[WHSQ] suggested after the event that it might have been around about $90,000 had 
it gone to court” (BOH02). 
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Financial commitments listed in the final offer to the regulator, form part of 
the cost of the EU. Hidden costs of the EU are less obvious and not well understood 
by the duty holder until the activities are being implemented: “…what’s not factored 
in, of course, is our time and effort and things … and that’s huge” (BOH01).  Duty 
holders unanimously agreed the EU was a costly agreement to implement with each 
sighting different examples of how costs were borne.  BOH01 involved a dedicated 
“team of 10” to help implement “only two tiny deliverables” that took “weeks and 
weeks” and involved travel across Australia to speak with industry to fulfil the 
deliverables (BOH01). Significant staff and time was dedicated to compliance 
reporting: “…to provide the information there [costings on training] I had myself and 
a couple of my team members we spent a week on that…you have to deliver the, you 
know, the verification …” (BOH01). Furthermore BOH01 said WHSQ requested a 
financial statement in addition to standard verification reports. “We have to produce 
a final statement of all of the spends and how we have finally measured up, and 
we’ve being doing it one at a time. So we’re got to consolidate all of that” (BOH01). 
It was noted by duty holder BOH01 the final statement was not required when the 
company completed the first EU: “This was never done on the first one” (BOH01). 
Small business owners BOH03 employed a solicitor and safety officer 
immediately the incident occurred and said: “To do it properly with the right solicitor 
and … what we’ve accomplished in adding to our own systems, it’s not cheap” 
(BOH03). The duty holders continued to support the ‘community’ element that 
formed part of the EU, a project involving a house construction: 
We were not going to let any of those things be half done, so despite what 
was presented to the government, when something needed to be done at the 
house, for example, … we would pay for that.  We weren’t there not to, you 
know, promote the fact that we were doing the right thing, but all in all time 
lost, you know, effort to complete, the whole exercise probably would have 
cost the company in excess of $300,000 (BOH03). 
The cost burden associated with implementing the EU activities was 
acknowledged by BOH05 with ongoing meetings and staff committed across the 
whole organisation to finalise tasks: 
It’d be weeks and we still have meetings today obviously because we’re 
being audited and there’s actions that need to be done and I hold meetings 
with the site management here to see where they’re at, where are the 
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engineers at, so yeah, it’s still ongoing at least, you know, another few hours 
every month to review (BOH05). 
 A comparison of estimated prosecution penalty for each duty holder, the 
approved EU value and the estimated expenditure on the EU is collated in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5 Comparison between a prosecution, an EU and actual expenditure 
Business Organisation 
type 
Prosecution 
Estimate (a) 
Value of  
Undertaking 
(b) 
Estimated 
expenditure (c) 
BOH01 Corporation 
Multi-state,  
multi-national 
$60-70,000 $297,100 Exceeded – triple the 
value 
BOH01 Corporation 
Multi-state 
$ 60-70,000 $339,500 Exceeded – triple or 
more. Training alone 
$412k as one 
deliverable 
BOH02 Not for Profit 
Community 
$90,000 $215,903 ‘Double, treble’ the 
value 
BOH03 Small business 
Owner /operator 
$70-100,000 $76,119 $350,000 + 
BOH04 Not for Profit 
Community 
$60,000 $52,000 No value provided 
but costs exceeded 
the undertaking 
BOH05 Corporation 
Multi-state 
$ not provided $195,050 Exceeded (d) 
$200,00 
Source: Data taken from interviews and from the published EU for each duty holder 
(a) Where information was available via the obligation holder and transcript. 
(b) Information taken from the published EU document for each entity. 
(c) Interviewees provided the figures – all firms exceeded the $ value provided in the approved undertaking. 
(d) BOH05 had not completed its undertaking at time of the interview.  
 
 
With the exception of BOH04, duty holders submitted applications for an EU 
beyond the estimated prosecution penalty. Duty holder BOH02 disclosed the 
company expended beyond the $215,000 on its EU, “it’s probably double or treble 
that” (BOH02). Obligation holder BOH03 also submitted an EU that was marginally 
greater than a prosecution however as recorded in the estimated expenditure column, 
the company’s EU came to more than $350,000. This is because “the total cost at the 
end of the day was more like $350,000 in processes and what we put into place” 
(BOH03). The same duty holder generated over $167,000 from the auction of a 
house they built and donated the funds to a local charity. The activity was listed in 
the EU for a baseline figure of $40,000. 
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Not for profit duty holder BOH04 reported it was able to modify the EU 
because of its status as “a community organisation”. WH&S changes implemented 
by the organisation directly flowed onto those it served: “…any changes at an 
organisational level to improve safety automatically impacts the community because 
that’s who we service” (BOH04). WHSQ, through the contact person, acknowledged 
this and requested the duty holder to notate it in the EU: “that was a question that I 
did shoot through, and the guy that I was conversing with there said he understood 
that, and [said] just make mention of that in that section [of the EU] about it, so I did 
that” (BOH04). 
Regulatory perspective on proportionality – costs 
  The regulatory administrators’ perspective on the costs associated with an EU 
was that all costs remain the responsibility of the obligation holder. “We don’t 
control costs” (REG01) and “It’s got nothing to do with us” (REG01). REG01 stated 
that “You’d think that’d [costs] be part of your consideration before you make 
application”. Hence the emphasis of the EUU advisory staff to offer historical 
knowledge, encourage obligation holders to seek independent consultants and legal 
representation (REG02) during the proposal’s preparation because:  
We don’t know at the end of the day exactly what it’s going to cost them.  
We’re very clear – you know, and historically again we look at it and say – 
suggest that, yes, it could well be well above the figure that’s the minimum 
cost, we don’t know (REG02). 
Regulatory officers made a number of general observations about duty holder 
expenditure on the EU. Variation in the costs of an EU may be related to the 
intentions of the business and what they hoped to achieve as an outcome from the 
company’s investment “It would all depend on the business and how much further 
they go” (REG03).  Another factor offered by a respondent was that of business 
economics and the viability of an EU: “They’re a business and the reality of it is 
there’s a cost involved” (REG03).  
 One regulatory respondent suggested that an obligation holder may find the 
cost-benefits of a prosecution outweigh an EU because it can be “far cheaper to go 
through a prosecution … and quicker” (REG01). In the final analysis, regulatory 
officers re-iterated the importance of independent decision-making by the obligation 
holder, with each noting how a business makes its decisions is irrelevant to them or 
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the regulator. “That’s not something that we’re privy to or should be privy to” 
(REG01) and “We don’t know. We’re not privy to – no, not at all” (REG02) and 
“Nor do we really want to be” (REG03). 
In summary, duty holders viewed an EU as a costly sanction for their 
organisation with substantial ‘hidden costs’. Different approaches were applied to 
making decisions as to the expenditure to be committed to the EU. Company size and 
the value of a prosecution penalty formed the basis to decide on an appropriate 
amount to invest in EU activities. The majority of duty holders reported the EU 
exceeded the approved agreement by two to three times its value. This represented 
double and triple the amount of a prosecution. Hidden costs were excluded in 
calculating the cost of fulfilling the conditions set out in the EU. Regulatory 
administrators recognised the sanction is incomparable to the prosecution. However a 
duty holder’s costs to execute an EU were irrelevant and inconsequential to the 
authority as costs remain exclusively a duty holder’s responsibility. 
5.5 OUTCOME REACTION 
The final sub-theme to emerge in the data and closely aligned with outcome 
satisfaction was the various reactions stakeholders had to being involved in the EU 
process. Outcome reaction focuses on personal responses contributed by the different 
stakeholders as distinct from firm level and regulatory authority perspective. 
Business representatives’ perspective 
Each duty holder in the study was directly involved in the drafting and 
negotiation of the EU agreement and worked closely with the EUU to submit the EU 
to the regulator and then work with the monitoring and compliance officer over the 
life of the EU implementation. The level of responsibility that went with being in 
charge of the preparation, gaining approval and implementation of the EU had a 
significant personal impact on duty holders. Appointed to carry out the Board’s 
decision to propose an EU, BOH04 said he had total control of the project. BOH04 
recalled there were times he found the process so overwhelming he would be driving 
home and feel “sick in the stomach and stressed” because of the enormity of the task. 
Having sole responsibility for the EU he observed the gravity of the job; “… this is 
big and it’s serious, it’s the first time I’ve been involved in anything like this and I 
don’t really know what I’m doing” (BOH04). 
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Respondents used different words to express their feelings about being 
involved in the EU. Duty holder BOH02 spoke of the undertaking process in terms of 
being “overwhelming and a very confronting thing to face”, “daunting” (repeated 
five times), and a “terrifying” experience (BOH02). He suggested irrespective of 
whether a company goes to court or otherwise, having a serious injury in the 
workplace is stressful and if the firm proceeds either “to court or pursues an EU it 
will be intimidating” (BOH02). BOH02 said he felt accountable for the incident: “I 
felt very much responsible for what had happened, even though… we had a manager 
up there … I did take it very personally as did the Board” (BOH02). 
The burden of responsibility expressed by respondent BOH02 was shared by 
BOH01 who had managed the company’s two EU processes over 10 years. He 
expressed exhaustion, felt depleted from the workload and observed that the constant 
threat of prosecution never left him: 
If you don’t meet your obligations you’ll be back in court and you could end 
up facing the original charges if you fail to deliver.  Now, that’s a bit of a – 
bit of a pressure and it’s one that I’ve taken myself because this has all been 
– this is all about me.  You know, I developed it, I negotiated it, I then had to 
make sure that we delivered it.  Managers come and go all around us but 
we’ve got this legal obligation that we have to meet, and so that’s why it’s a 
bit like a monkey on your back (BOH01). 
Respondent BOH03 recalled that the company was shattered when the 
incident happened. The word “devastation” was expressed on four separate occasions 
by BOH03, reflecting the impact the incident had on employees at an emotional level 
(BOH03).  The incident had a lasting impression on the business owner: “… it’s like 
a death in the family. …the memory of it will probably never leave us” (BOH03).  A 
similar sentiment was shared by obligation holder BOH02 “…I don’t think you ever 
get closure, nor do I think the victim does either” (BOH02). 
The main emotion expressed by BOH05 was frustration related to the long 
delays in getting through the preparation phase, especially with the Evaluation Panel. 
Discussing delays, BOH05 believed the internal processes of WHSQ should be 
reviewed to reduce the time a business can progress an EU:  
I think the internal processes of it need to be looked at because, as I said, 
there was a lot of waiting.  And businesses want to address it and get on with 
it, and I don’t mean that in a, you know, uncaring way, but when you’re in 
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limbo on prosecution and you’re in limbo of, well, we want to get these 
things improved and you’re waiting for somebody to sign something or 
somebody to review something, I just thought that was drawn out.  If internal 
processes could be reviewed I think they may be able to streamline it a bit 
better and not to leave businesses hanging (BOH05). 
Another frustration for BOH05 was the turnover of staff within the EUU 
hindering the finalisation of the proposal. Staff changes occurred on a regular basis 
during BOH05’s engagement with the department. “They kept changing who was in 
charge. You know, such-and-such has been shifted to another department now, I’ve 
passed the file over to such-and-such and then you sort of have to go through it again 
with the new person.  And then I think one of them was only in there for about four 
weeks and then he was shifted” (BOH05). 
Regulatory perspective on stakeholders’ emotional reactions 
Regulatory officers offered a number of perspectives on the emotional 
responses of businesses. Firstly, the administrators observed that businesses can be 
impacted emotionally simply from having a serious incident in the workplace that 
results in the firm facing prosecution. Often, duty holders are unaware of their 
responsibilities and the level of accountability they have for providing a safe work 
environment:  
Quite often it’s not their [obligation holders] fault, that they don’t understand 
the process or understand their obligations because it’s quite difficult, and 
sometimes its foreign territory for them, and that’s what we find (REG02). 
Regulatory officers acknowledged the regulated entity can experience shock 
when an incident occurs in the workplace. An event in the workplace, particularly 
serious grievous bodily harm to a worker, is traumatic for any organisation with its 
associated implications, as explained by REG01:  
I don’t think that any employer sets out to injure a person, and so that within 
itself is extremely true I think.  You know, so it has very – that within itself 
has a high emotional burden, and a high financial burden irrespective of the 
government’s response to it. 
However, the regulatory officers suggested opting for a prosecution can be 
just as traumatising and intimidating as pursuing an EU: 
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It’d be a different type of emotion …, you know, they can be quite 
protracted as well.  It could be quite difficult to have to sit in court with the 
family of the injured workers (REG01). 
Injured workers’ emotional reaction to the undertaking 
One injured worker voiced wholehearted endorsement for the undertaking 
process and believed the EU created something positive out of an adverse event: “I 
think it’s a good system” … “his community is safer” and confirmed his support for 
the undertaking: “I am happy that all this has apparently happened, yeah” (ATP02). 
 In contrast, the undertaking process re-triggered the agony, pain and anguish 
ATP01 experienced with the incident. During the interview, 35 transitions were 
recorded by ATP01. He moved from one point to the next, with incomplete 
sentences. This resulted in a disjointed storyline. A reason for ATP01’s unfocussed 
conversation, offered by ATP01A, was her husband’s reaction to everything he and 
the family had experienced. In particular she noted his employer’s behaviour and 
attitude towards him: 
…they don’t want to – they’re not going to say anything because legally if 
they say anything they’re going to be liable, but – and it doesn’t solve his 
problem because he’s venting and no-one cares (ATP01A). 
 
The injury ATP01 suffered reduced his functional capacity and has 
irreparably altered his life. He made references to the changed circumstances in 
comments like “loss of identity” and “being a shadow of [his] former self”.  He 
stated his family has suffered as a result of the injury and rehabilitation, exemplified 
in the following examples: 
I’ve got my boys –  like, every time I go somewhere I have one of my boys 
stand on my right hand side, you know? I was an – I’m an outdoors person, 
right? I’ve got survival courses [XX] I’ve been, you know, like, 
recommended for survival instructor’s course, a signal operators, outdoors, 
you know, like, running down the Tubby River in a little one-man kayak and 
all this shit, and climbing up and down mountains and stuff, you know, this 
is what I used to do for a living. Right?  I can’t do that anymore.  I can’t go 
jogging down the footpath.  You try jogging of a night-time. Close one eye 
and go for a jog and see how far you get (ATP01). 
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As a result of the injury, ATP01 stated he was totally dependent on others, “I 
can’t even look after myself anymore properly” (ATP01). Affected third parties 
ATP01 and ATP01A explored the mistreatment ATP01 experienced from his 
employer on his return to work. The resentment and the dynamic between employer 
and injured employee were reflected in the following quotes: 
When I was [back] about three days – I was approximately three days back 
at work after this injury and the boss walked into the office, spoke to the 
High Controller, said – ’cause I kept on catching my fingers ’cause I’ve got 
no depth perception, so I was always end up catching – hurting myself.  And 
I caught my finger at work and I took the top of my finger on [inaudible] so 
– and he walked into the office and said to the lady in the office, “If he keeps 
doing that I’m going to sack him” (ATP01). 
The injured worker commented on the victimisation and bullying he has 
experienced: 
I’ve been – had my cheek painted – paint me ’cause they know they can do it 
because I’ve got nowhere else to go so, you know, I get written up and 
threatened with the sack over it. You got no idea what I’ve gone through 
over this at work just to keep this job ’cause I can’t get a job now.  What am 
I now? I’m classed as a liability at a workplace now. I can’t get a job 
(ATP01). 
In addition: 
And then I’ve had no end of – how would you put it – it’s a bullying – it’s 
been a lot of bullying to make you leave the place (ATP01). 
As a consequence of the challenging work environment and the traumatic 
experiences the injured party has suffered in the workplace, ATP01 has involved a 
lawyer to facilitate the relations between him and his employer: 
I’ve got – Jesus Christ, I had to pull a solicitor in at work to sit down and 
stop them harassing me because they could, ’cause they could treat me like 
shit ’cause they know there’s nothing I can do about it (ATP01). 
Both affected third parties were asked to comment on the value or benefit of 
the EU. The respondents unanimously reacted with the descriptor ‘angry’ (ATP01, 
ATP01A). The injured employee was angry, claiming he was not given the 
opportunity to be heard. “I didn’t get to go to court” (ATP01), because “no-one got 
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prosecuted” (ATP01), “no-one got sacked” (ATP01), and “he is still fighting for 
compensation” and “has $280,000 worth of bills” (ATP01A) to pay off. 
The couple’s dissatisfaction with becoming involved in the undertaking 
process and the final EU was captured in the following action the affected parties 
took towards the EUU in response to the Unit’s failure to acknowledge his injury in 
the process. ATP01 and ATP01A recollected they sent photographs to WHSQ 
revealing the cysts at the site of the injury.  ATP01 commented:  
Yeah. I sent the photo of this to the Director of – I’ve got his name – of the 
fella I spoke to on the phone, like, the Director of the enforceable 
undertakings – the photo – and I said, “You put this on your wall in front of 
your office – in front of your desk, and every time you think about making a 
decision on giving someone toilets so they can sit on a toilet, right, have a 
look at that [X] and think what that bloke went through who lost that [X] just 
so you could say someone could have a free toilet to sit on at a festival”, and 
he just said, “Thank you” and hung up the phone (ATP01). 
In summary, a variety of reactions to the EU process were reported by each 
stakeholder group. Duty holders acknowledged and accepted the gravity of the 
breach of WH&S and committed to fulfilling the organisation’s obligations under the 
agreement although considerable financial resources were dedicated to the EU 
activities. Non-financial resources covering time and effort to execute the EU were 
also devoted by organisations and formed a substantial hidden cost. At a personal 
level business respondents shared similar emotions about their experience of the EU. 
They were overwhelmed and challenged by the magnitude of responsibility and level 
of accountability that went with having carriage of responsibility for the EU project. 
Respondents faced high levels of stress, compounded by additional workloads as a 
consequence of the organisation electing an EU.  
Affected third parties had contrasting emotions and reactions to the process. 
ATP02 was supportive of the process while ATP01 and ATP01A felt deceived, 
cheated and unsupported from being part of the process. The interview exposed 
ATP01’s pain and the anguish the family was suffering because of the hostile 
treatment by his employer. This insight was unexpected and highlighted the 
psychological and emotional damage to an injured worker due to management’s 
workplace behaviour and attitude. Addressing the discriminatory treatment and 
negative behaviours by an employer is not apparent in the EU. Here the voice of the 
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affected third party has a role to play to inform the regulator. How the information, if 
reported, is used by WHSQ is unclear.   
For each stakeholder, regulatory administrators, duty holders and affected 
third parties, an injury in the workplace is traumatic. Irrespective of the role in the 
EU process, the voices of each party and the stories told suggest that no party is 
exempt from having some form of emotional, psychological or behavioural response 
when a serious workplace injury or illness happens or there is a fatality.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided the data on the three stakeholder groups’ experiences 
and perceptions of the EU sanction and its process. Four key themes were explored. 
The first theme considered duty holders and affected third parties’ awareness of and 
knowledge about the EU sanction. Duty holders generally were acquainted with the 
sanction while injured workers had no knowledge of it. The second theme presented 
stakeholder motivations for being involved in the process and revealed duty holders 
had co-existing and multifaceted reasons for seeking an EU. Three main 
justifications given by duty holders were a conviction free record, preserving and 
maintaining the organisations reputation and relationships and investment of the 
companies’ money into self-improvement. While benefits were acknowledged in 
having an EU, duty holders indicated the sanction favoured well-resourced firms. 
The third theme covered the regulatory business framework established by WHSQ to 
deliver the program and stakeholder groups’ experiences of different components of 
the process. The final theme of stakeholders’ satisfaction with the outcome indicated 
duty holders found the sanction had a range of transformational benefits for the entity 
despite its disproportionate cost. The regulatory administrators found the sanction 
was instigating WH&S change at the firm level, in industry and to the community. 
Affected third parties had different responses to the outcome. 
Chapter six will discuss these findings, consider the implications of the 
research and suggest future areas for investigation.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an integration of a number of previous chapters. The literature 
review presented in Chapter two, the background on the WHSQ EU process model 
examined in Chapter three and the findings presented in Chapter five are brought 
together to address the research question of this thesis. To reiterate, the question is: 
1. How do stakeholders to an EU in the work health and safety context 
perceive the fairness of the EU process? 
 
The chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part will address the 
research question of this study, taking a multi-layered approach to reflect the voices 
of the tripartite stakeholders participating in the research. Following the discussion 
on the fairness perceptions of the EU as an enforcement sanction, the chapter will 
consider the study limitations. The theoretical and practical contributions of the 
research will be presented and conclude with suggested areas for future research.  
 
Fairness perceptions of the EU process 
 One of the objectives of this research program was to examine the fairness 
perceptions of the three stakeholder groups involved in the enforcement sanction, an 
EU. The application of the organisational justice construct, comprising of 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice, was applied to evaluate fairness 
perceptions of the regulatory authority, duty holders and injured workers.  To 
recapitulate distributive justice refers to the fairness of the allocation decision or 
outcome, procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of process used to reach 
an outcome with interactional justice taking account of the fairness of the 
interpersonal treatment and communication of the decision-maker during and after 
the implementation of an outcome.  The justice types were operationalised according 
to their rule norms (refer Table 2.1). 
The question addressed in this research is How do stakeholders to an EU in 
the work health and safety context perceive the fairness of the EU process?  At the 
outset of this discussion, the responses to this question elicited divergent views and 
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perspectives, depending on the stakeholder group one belongs to. Additionally, the 
experiences of stakeholders suggest a mix of fairness and rule violation occurs across 
the justice types. These findings are unsurprising given stakeholders will have 
opposing perspectives, depending on the role they play in the WH&S regulatory 
environment and the tensions arising in performing the different roles. 
THE VOICE OF WHSQ 
Distributive justice 
The ultimate goal of the regulator is to ensure business entities comply with 
the law and behave in a manner that is consistent with political and societal 
expectations. WHSQ, as a regulatory body, has legislative powers under the WHS 
Act 1995 to promote and protect individuals from the risk of injury, disease or death 
created by the workplace, workplace activities or workplace equipment. 
When the WHSQ regulator makes the final decision to accept or reject an 
EU, the decision reflects the decision-maker’s overall assessment of the package of 
material available before him or her. The approved or rejected EU is the decision 
outcome achieved from an allocation decision process, or the distributive justice an 
entity receives from the negotiation and preparation of the EU with the regulatory 
authority. Under the WHSQ policy guidelines, it clearly identifies an EU as 
distributively unjust as a sanction. The policy guidelines stipulate an EU is not 
equivalent to or a substitute for a prosecution. It is required to incorporate activities 
(or elements) ‘that go beyond mere compliance with the Acts’ and ‘therefore achieve 
a standard higher than legislative compliance’ (DEIR, 2008:2). The activities must be 
‘substantial’ (DEIR, 2008:4) and contain multiple health and safety initiatives that 
will bring benefits to the workplace, industry and the broader community. From the 
outset, the regulatory authority is not providing the regulated community with a fair 
sanction, rather it is offering an unfair sanction, over a prosecution. The perceived 
fairness of the outcome one receives from a social exchange (Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1997) will not be evident. 
Equity rule 
As established above, from a WHSQ perspective, an EU is a distributively 
unjust sanction, consequently the equity rule (Adams, 1963) is violated. Equity is 
based on the principle people determine fairness by firstly evaluating the perceived 
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contributions or inputs they make to the outcomes they receive. This is then 
compared to the ratio of a ‘comparison other’ or referent standard to determine if the 
outcome received is fair. An EU is significantly inequitable and disproportionate as a 
sanction. When a decision-maker evaluates an application for an EU, the review 
takes into the account a range of contributions or inputs that an entity makes to the 
EU. These include, for example, an assessment of the objective gravity of the alleged 
offence, the entities contributing factors to the incident and degree of remorse for the 
incident, past prosecution history, the perspectives of the affected third party and the 
activities it proposed in the EU, to address incident. Signing off the EU by the 
regulator signals the outcome decision, the terms of the EU, meet WHSQ 
expectations of sufficient restitution for an entity failing to meet its WH&S 
legislative obligations.  
Historically EUs and the penalty for a prosecution form the basis of the 
‘referent other’ or ‘benchmarks’ to compare the fairness of an EU. Historical EUs 
that provide information about the past performance of what have been acceptable 
EUs to meet the regulator’s expectations and the penalty for a prosecution, become 
less significant as reference points to determine fairness judgments. Each application 
for an EU is based on its own merits, that is, on a case by case basis, with the 
circumstances surrounding each incident varying. This makes comparison with 
historical EUs difficult. The policy guidelines place an expectation on the duty 
holder to propose an EU that is in excess of the value of a prosecution. Moreover, in 
accepting an EU, the regulated entity agrees to cover other costs associated with the 
breach such as those recoverable in law, for example, the investigation, any technical 
or legal consultancy costs of the department (like advice provided to the evaluation 
panel), publication of the EU and monitoring costs. Implied in the EU agreement is 
the firm’s acceptance it has responsibility for all costs associated with implementing 
the activities the entity has devised in the EU. The regulator and its official 
representatives understand the sanction is inequitable and offer the regulated 
community opportunities to investigate their options, make it a voluntary process, 
free of coercion and encourage entities to freely access independent stakeholders, 
like lawyers, industry representatives and safety experts to assist with their decision-
making. 
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In reviewing the injustice of the sanction, an important caveat is 
acknowledged. From a regulatory perspective, the EU sanction is an alternative to 
prosecution for a workplace incident that resulted in a serious injury with significant 
physical, socio-psychological, emotional and economic impacts on the individual, 
next of kin and community (Gahan et al., 2014; Safe Work Australia, 2012a). WHSQ 
responsibility is to address the conduct and the behaviour of the offender and apply 
compliance and enforcement options to deter similar behaviour in the future. 
Simultaneously, WHSQ must signal expectations of behaviour to the regulated 
community. Although found to be inequitable, the sanction has a number of 
significant incentives built into it. If the EU is offered by the offending entity, 
accepted by the regulator and is wholly discharged according to the conditions of the 
EU, entities have the waiver of a criminal conviction recorded against them, no 
guilty plea or fines to pay (OFSWQ, 2015). The sanction is a trajectory for change at 
the firm level and is designed to target the organisation’s management (Parker, 2003) 
to ensure changes are implemented to make the workplace safe. The financial 
commitment the offending entity invests in its own organisation addresses the 
workplace deficiencies rather than contributing to Queensland’s consolidated 
revenue. The distributive injustice of the sanction is well understood by the decision-
maker (regulator), and is made transparent through the regulator’s published 
documents, its website and reinforced through the voices of administrators from the 
EUU and the review panel. The nature of the sanction is communicated to the 
regulated community and offending entities at all times. 
Equality and needs rules 
The policy guidelines indicate an EU is available to all regulated entities that 
have breached the Act and have been served with a summons in relation to the 
alleged breach. Based on the principles of equality, people should receive the same 
outcome or be treated in the same way (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1980). In 
evaluating the perceived fairness of the equality rule, there are two aspects to 
consider. Firstly the operationalisation of the equality rule implies outcomes are 
distributed equally across all parties. The EU sanction is inconsistent with this 
definition. The nature of the sanction targets ‘alleged offenders’ and each entities 
incident. Each incident reveals wide variation in the final EU that is agreed between 
the decision-maker and the decision-recipient. Consequently the outcome one 
 Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 151 
business receives will be different to another resulting in the equality rule 
unsupported in this study, reducing perceptions of distributive fairness.  
The operationalisation also considers the EU process. The study recognises 
all offending entities have equal opportunity to participate in the process and equal 
opportunity to benefit from the incentives the regulator offers, with the spin-off of 
substantial improvements to its business’s WH&S systems together with other 
positive outcomes. Once an entity decides to propose an EU, the process is the same 
for all potential applicants. They have access to the EUU and the evaluation panel’s 
expertise and knowledge. Each regulated entity has control over the way it 
approaches the EU (use a lawyer, do it themselves or combine the involvement of 
stakeholders) and whom they consult with. Entities are provided a template which 
sets out what is expected of the applicant with the structure and terms to be filled in 
the same for each entity. All applicants have an equal chance of either a rejection or 
acceptance of the proposal before the decision-maker. From this perspective of the 
equality rule, perceptions of fairness are upheld.  
The needs rule, with its emphasis on the outcomes distributed based on the 
specifics of a situation, is supported in the EU process. The EU decision is tailored to 
reflect the business needs and the set of circumstances associated with the incident. 
Entities are able to consult with a wide range of stakeholders to develop an EU 
appropriate and consistent with its business needs and the severity of the incident. 
The policy guidelines indicate each case is taken on its merits. Business entities will 
design an EU based on its economic and organisational capacity to fulfil the 
requirements of the EU. Thus, from the perspective of the regulator, the needs rule is 
accommodated with perceptions of fairness upheld. 
Procedural justice 
Acknowledging that the EU is a distributively unjust sanction, establishing a 
process that will be perceived as fair is critical for the regulator. Thibaut and Walker 
(1975, 1978) recognise that having fair procedures in the face of an unjust outcome 
(EU), can enhance the perception of fairness of the outcome, increase acceptance of 
an adverse decision, and minimise the individual’s reaction to the unjust decision. 
WHSQ has been cognisant of the need to create a fair process to facilitate acceptance 
of the severity of the sanction. The WHSQ business regulatory model provides a 
framework to support alleged wrongdoers decision-making. The business model 
 Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 152 
seeks to increase the regulated community’s awareness of its obligations associated 
with sanction, sensitising entities to the expectations attached to the sanction. At the 
same time the regulator highlights the implications for a failure to fulfil the EU 
obligations, if the applicant’s proposal is accepted. It has also been designed to 
safeguard the regulator from accusations of being unfairly discriminatory and 
unaccountable for its actions when negotiating with the regulated community 
(Yeung, 2004; Parker, 2003). 
Consistent with Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) process control and decision 
control principles, and Folger’s (1977) ‘voice’, the WHSQ EU process provides the 
regulated community with the ample opportunity for ‘control’ over the decision to 
propose an EU. The regulated entity is under no compulsion to participate in an EU 
process as ‘it’s voluntary’. The offender can exercise its voice by opting to propose 
an EU or electing prosecution. This reflects decision-control. The EU process is 
designed to place responsibility for the design and development of the EU with the 
alleged wrongdoer and in doing this, WHSQ acknowledges the entity is best placed 
to provide the information and details to address the workplace deficiencies. The EU 
is tailored to the circumstances of the situation. This reflects process control.  
In its role, the EUU acts in a non-confrontational and non-coercive manner 
and supports the decision of the alleged offender. The WHSQ and the EUU offers 
diverse information, accessible through the website, staff and the evaluation panel to 
maximise an entity’s decision to pursue an EU and once accepted to follow through 
to fulfil the EU conditions. Additionally, the WHSQ allows for a broad 
representation of stakeholders to contribute to the decision-making process of the 
regulated entity. The process allows input from stakeholders affected by the EU, 
including the affected third party and next of kin. Stakeholders directly relevant to 
the duty holder include senior management of the entity to participate in meetings 
convened by the EUU to consider the process, and inclusion of lawyers, safety 
experts and independent consultants. The decision to embrace the flexibility of the 
process resides with the regulated entity. Representation of stakeholders is consistent 
with Leventhal’s (1980) representativeness criteria to enhance judgments of 
procedural fairness and Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) process and decision control. 
Imbedding the voice opportunities through process and decision control and allowing 
representativeness in a process that leads to a legally binding agreement, as was 
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examined in Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) research, foster greater levels of 
perceived fairness. This process enhances acceptance of an unfavourable outcome.   
 Procedural justice criteria – Leventhal (1980)  
In addition to finding evidence of process and decision control in the WHSQ 
EU process, other criteria associated with increasing the perceived fairness of the 
procedures, based on Leventhal’s (1980) research, also exist. Representativeness, 
through access to a range of stakeholders was established earlier. Other rules to 
promote perceived fairness are also identified. The study found WHSQ:  
1. Consistency in the EU policy and process overtime has been found to be 
evolving. Regulatory officers indicated gradual changes have been 
occurring in the EUU since the EU policy was first introduced in 2006. 
The policy and the process was relatively stable during the time 
respondents had worked in the Unit although with harmonisation of 
WH&S subtle transitions were emerging in response to the national 
model Act. Human resourcing had varied over time with the 
administration of the policy remaining similar for all stakeholders, 
upholding the consistency rule. Changes in policy, process and staffing 
would be realistic with political changes including elections, legislative 
reviews and amendments occurring and budgetary and resourcing factors 
having a bearing on the sustainability of a policy and delivery of the 
process over time;    
2. Staff is required to carry out its responsibilities impartially. The EU 
process establishes clear boundaries of responsibilities in its dealings with 
the regulated entities. WHSQ remain free of bias and avoid any conflict 
of interest by engaging with the entities to provide assistance and 
information but stand independent and detached from the decisions made 
by the regulated entities;  
3. Relies on accurate information and record keeping processes. This has 
two elements. WHSQ places responsibility for the information it receives 
in making a decision about the EU proposal with the obligation holder, 
drawing on its internal knowledge and first-hand experience to craft an 
EU that reflects accurately business’s circumstances. Duty holders are 
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required to maintain records and provide data to the regulator throughout 
the process (preparation and monitoring and auditing). Additionally the 
regulator has its own record keeping and data collection systems on 
offending entities. Their system contains investigation reports, 
verification data, historical and current EUs in order to be able to generate 
reports, monitor the progress of  EUs against milestones and discharge  
EUs; 
4. The policy guidelines acknowledge the correctability rule is evident in the 
EU process. The EU can be modified or varied subject to the consent of 
the Chief Executive (DEIR, 2008:11) and the Act provides for an 
aggrieved duty holder whose EU was rejected by the decision maker to 
seek a review of a decision through the Supreme Court under the Judicial 
Review Act 1991; and 
5. Ethical standards are upheld through the enforcement of WHSQ code of 
conduct and the public service requirements to comply with relevant 
employment conditions. The WHSQ has demonstrated it conforms to 
regulatory best practice such as provision of information to alleged 
offenders (ALRC, 2002). 
Moreover, closely aligned with Leventhal’s (1980) criteria of evaluating a 
fair procedure, is Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational model of authority. WHSQ has 
built an organisational structure through the EUU that promotes the value of the 
‘groups’ or stakeholders it serves (that is, the offending entity, affected third parties, 
lawyers, auditors). The EU process signals to each stakeholder group their respective 
importance to the regulator by giving them ‘voice’ opportunities. The process also 
encompasses relational elements of neutrality, trust and standing and in fostering 
these elements supports enduring relationships with its stakeholders, industry in 
general and the community at large rather than one-off encounters. The WHSQ 
business regulatory model is consistent with promoting fairness perceptions. 
Interactional justice 
The EUU organisational structure facilitates perceived fairness in its 
interpersonal relationships consistent with Bies and Moag’s (1986) rules of respect, 
propriety, truthfulness and justification. These criteria are apparent when 
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representatives of the EUU engage with its stakeholders. The EUU structure is 
premised on staff working responsively to assist and support stakeholders (especially 
evident with business entities), they offer honest and truthful feedback to 
stakeholders and avoid coercive, adversarial and confrontational interactions. The 
appointment of a contact officer to work directly with the duty holder at each stage of 
the EU process further emphasises the regulatory authorities’ focus on strong 
interpersonal exchanges. Furthermore, multi-modes of contact and communication 
are provided, recognising the specific operational demands of a business entity and 
other stakeholders. WHSQ makes available written and electronic communications, 
including being accessible via a public website consistent with the ALRC 
recommendations (ALRC, 2002), and more recently COAG regulatory reforms 
(COAG, 2008a; 2008b). Lastly, EUU staff has clear boundaries in the scope of their 
responsibilities, restricted to providing accurate and timely information, giving 
feedback to stakeholders and acting without coercion or influence over duty holders 
or other stakeholders. 
A few points of departure from the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) 
should be distinguished here. Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) research focused on 
formal legal procedures applied to court situations while WHSQ EU process is based 
on policy guidelines, developed in response to its overriding statute (WHS Act). A 
distinction is made between an impartial, disinterested third party judge in a legal 
system (Thibaut & Walker, 1978), and a regulator. A regulator is not a disinterested, 
neutral third party, lacking interest in the outcome of the EU process but a delegated 
position holder appointed under legislation to carry out the objects of the WHS Act 
and a government employee. The regulator is supported by the Evaluation Panel, 
appointed for their expertise, by the government. The relationship and the experience 
with a disputant in legal proceedings and the judge is generally a one-off encounter, 
while the relationship between the WHSQ and the duty holder and other stakeholders 
is long term. Finally, in contrast with a legal system involving two disputants (their 
legal representatives) and the decision maker, the EU process is a bilateral 
arrangement between the duty holder and the regulator. The duty holder takes full 
responsibility for the decision to propose an EU. This implies the duty holder is well 
informed of their rights, responsibilities and obligations across the actions taken and 
decisions made. They accept the premise of the EU that an allegation of a 
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contravention of the WHS Act has occurred. A duty holder also accepts there is no 
appeal mechanism once the EU is accepted.  
Summary 
Figure 6.1 represents the perspectives and perceptions of the WHSQ 
regulator, taking into account the integrated framework of the organisational justice 
construct. From a regulatory perspective, the framework has been modified to 
illustrate that the EU sanction is distributively unjust and the rule of equity is 
violated. The rule of equality is upheld in the EU process, being available to all duty 
holders to make application for an EU.  However equality is qualified if reviewed as 
operationalised to suggest that all duty holders with receive the same outcome in an 
EU. This is unrealistic on the basis that each incident leading to an EU is different. 
The wide variation and inconsistency in outcomes will create perceptions of 
unfairness. The angled line represents the divided elements of the equality rule. 
Partly fairness perceptions are met for all offenders having the option to propose an 
EU however, each outcome is unique. The needs rule has been implied based on the 
policy guidelines. The model provides voice opportunities (Folger, 1977) to ensure 
maximum acceptance of the unfair distributive component via the rules of process 
control and decision control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978) and representativeness 
(Leventhal, 1980). Voice opportunities also ensure all stakeholders can freely 
participate in the process and communicate with the regulator. Each of Leventhal’s 
(1980) other five criteria of a fair procedure (Leventhal, 1980) is embedded in the 
process.  
  WHSQ has reinforced a commitment to fairness with the establishment of 
an organisational mechanism, the EUU, resourced specifically to support the 
decision-making of duty holders, the expert industry panel and the regulator. The 
structure promotes other fairness perceptions rules including the ‘resourcing rule’ 
and ‘information rule’ identified in the management studies of Sheppard and Lewicki 
(1987). The focus on engagement and facilitation over adversarial, coercive and 
confrontational interaction set out in Bies and Moag (1986) supports the social 
components of a fair procedure and enhances fairness perceptions.  
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Figure 6.1 An integrated model of organisational justice – WHSQ 
 
Source: Diagram developed by the author 
In the next section, the perceptions and experiences of business entities are 
explored.   
THE VOICE OF THE BUSINESS OBLIGATION HOLDER 
The EU process is a substitute for the formal legal proceedings of court and 
litigation. Although WHSQ provides an organisational structure and process to 
promote perceptions of fairness, the study reveals a number of inconsistencies 
between the voices of the regulatory authority and the voices of duty holders. Duty 
holders’ experiences and perspectives suggest that violations of fairness principles 
translate across the three justice types.  
Distributive justice 
Regulated entities that propose an EU begin a process that is inequitable from 
the outset, with the study findings revealing duty holders understand this and accept 
the sanction as distributively unjust relative to a prosecution. While the duty holders 
accepted the distributive unjust nature of the sanction, they observed it is 
substantially disproportionate in costs that are carried by the organisation or a 
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prosecution. The study identifies the estimated monetary commitment of the signed 
EU was double, and in some cases triple, the cost of the EU and significantly greater 
than the prosecution. The comparative data can be reviewed at Table 5.5. This 
finding supports Johnstone and King’s study in 2008 for the same organisation. The 
direct costs listed in the EU document, exclude quantification of indirect costs (staff, 
meetings, travel, visits to industry). Indirect costs were acknowledged as a significant 
hidden cost for duty holders that had not been quantified in the decision to offer an 
EU.   
Adams’ (1963) equity theory as noted earlier is premised on proportionality 
of inputs to outcomes compared to a referent other to determine the perceived 
fairness of the outcome. Evaluating an EU outcome on the basis of the equity 
principle is problematic. Each WH&S ‘incident’ will have a unique set of 
circumstances with one incident not the same as another. The duty holder’s EU is 
required to accommodate ‘substantial activities’ that go ‘beyond mere compliance’ 
on the basis of the incident. This makes an evaluation against the two key types of 
comparison used in EUs, the prosecution penalty and historical EUs, difficult.   
 Where a breach of the WH&S Act results in death, grievous bodily harm or 
bodily harm, penalties are applied. Penalties are expressed as penalty units based on 
a monetary value or jail term. In 2003, when the EU was first introduced, the penalty 
unit for a breach of the WHS Act was $75 per penalty unit (Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld)). The penalty applied to two main types of injury defined in the Act. 
The first, grievous bodily harm, is defined as the loss of a distinct part or organ of the 
body, serious disfigurement, or bodily injury with potential to endanger life or lead to 
permanent injury to health; with the second injury, bodily harm meaning any bodily 
injury which interferes with an individual’s health or comfort (Criminal Code, 1899 
(Qld)). The maximum fine for a breach of the Act causing grievous bodily harm was 
$60,000 or two years imprisonment for individuals and $300,000 for corporations, 
while a contravention of the Act leading to bodily harm likely to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm is a $37,500 fine or 12 months jail. The maximum fine for a 
breach of the Act for a corporation is $187,500. Other contraventions by individuals 
result in a maximum of $30,000 or six months imprisonment with corporations up to 
$150,000 (DIR, 2006). The penalty system is an objective referent standard. 
However, from this study, how this standard is applied by the regulator or the 
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industry review panel is unclear and lacks transparency for a duty holder. The policy 
guidelines acknowledge ‘proportionality’ as a key principle underlying the WHSQ 
WH&S enforcement efforts (DEIR, 2008) and the enforcement response taken by the 
department ‘will be proportionate to the level of risk and seriousness of the injury 
and illness when it occurs’ (DEIR, 2008). A definition of proportionality is not given 
in the policy document.   
 The second source of comparison to determine fairness in the EU process is 
the use of historical data. Published EUs are available to the public to review as 
information on what is expected as content in the EU. The EUs guide the community 
on what has previously been ‘expected and accepted by the regulator’ and closely 
scrutinised by the evaluation review panel. A disadvantage in applying the historical 
data is finding ‘like cases’ as the referent or comparative standard. Published EUs 
have rudimentary disclosure about the incident and the details surrounding the event, 
making a comparison with other cases difficult. Published EUs only offer ideas on 
what other duty holders in the industry have proposed.  
A third source of comparison to determine fairness is based on non-pecuniary 
evaluations. The Evaluation Review Panel provides a subjective source of advice and 
feedback to duty holders by contributing their knowledge, expertise and applying 
what they understand as ‘compliance in the industry’ (refer Chapter 5). The panel has 
no publically available assessment criteria against which they assess a proposal and 
as noted by the regulatory administrators ‘there’s no set document on this’ (refer 
Chapter 5). Consequently, duty holders reported the EU ‘too-ed’ and ‘fro-ed’ 
between the panel and the business, some over lengthy periods of time, until the mix 
in the EU was finally acceptable to the panel. Without guidelines on how the panel 
reaches a consensus on the suitability of the content of the EU, the process is open to 
perceptions of unfairness. Data from the study suggests during the preparation stage, 
there is a high level of intervention by review panel and a high degree of panel 
discretion involved in directing duty holders as to what they believe will be 
acceptable. Duty holders are vulnerable to ‘arm twisting’ and ‘bullying’ (Parker, 
2004) to include terms and conditions acceptable to the evaluation panel. Without an 
assessment criteria against which to measure the EU, duty holders may be subjected 
to excessively disproportionate EU conditions. Furthermore, because the process 
results in a binding agreement, without an appeal mechanism in place to seek a 
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review of the terms of the EU, the process fosters perceptions of unfairness. 
Furthermore, should the regulated entity fail to comply with the EU, it will be subject 
to additional penalties (DEIR, 2008). Compared with a prosecution, the EU becomes 
harsher and more disproportionate for the regulated entity (compared with a 
prosecution) and accentuates the distributive injustice of the sanction.  
Equality rule 
The equality rule (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1980) argues that all people 
should have the same or receive the same opportunity to benefit. This implies that 
under the EU process, every duty holder will have an equal chance of proposing an 
EU and having it accepted. This proposition is in agreement with WHSQ. A key 
observation by regulated entities was that the process was highly discriminatory as 
one key requirement for offering an EU is a capacity to resource it. In particular, the 
multi-national and multi-state owned companies such as BOH01, BOH05, and not 
for profit BOH02 found the disparities in opportunity significant and unfortunate but 
understood the position of many duty holders to opt for prosecution. Duty holders 
were in agreement having available resources in a businesses (small, medium and 
large) influenced their capacity to take up the sanction, and importantly benefit from 
its advantages, notably freedom from criminal conviction (OFSWQ, 2015) 
minimising reputational damage and preserving relationships (Tyler & Lind, 1988).   
The unique circumstances of small business (and for many medium sized 
enterprises) will prevent many from applying for an EU. Resourcing an EU is a 
major impediment to applying for one. Resourcing covers time, access to specialists 
with work health and safety knowledge and skills, dedicated staff to manage the 
process, the financial capacity to engage lawyers and auditors, and to implement the 
AS 4801 WHS management system across the company which forms a major 
requirement of the agreement. Duty holders in the study noted the indirect costs were 
unquantified but formed a major cost component to implement the EU. There are 
over two million small businesses operating in Australia. Roughly 60 percent of 
those functioning as a sole operator are without employees and a further 25 percent 
have less than five employees (OBPR, 2015). Offering an EU and being able to fulfil 
its compliance and regulatory obligations is unrealistic for small and for many 
medium sized entities. The rule of equality will be inaccessible to many in the 
regulated community with its current bias towards the better resourced duty holders. 
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Needs Rule 
Evidence of accommodating the needs rule (Deutsch, 1975) of different duty 
holders was found in the study. One not-for-profit entity was provided with an 
exemption from the community based activities because the organisation was 
delivering community based activities and the implementation of WH&S in its 
organisation would directly benefit the community.  Reasonableness on behalf of the 
regulator is demonstrated in this action and upholds fairness perceptions of the needs 
rule. 
Procedural Justice 
Duty holders provided evidence the EU process by the WHSQ contained fair 
procedures and promoted fairness perceptions. Duty holders have voice (Folger, 
1977), and control over the process with conditional control over the decision 
outcome (Thibaut & Walker, 1978). A duty holder makes the decision to elect an EU 
or be prosecuted. They present the best possible information in formulating the 
content of the EU although the EU is structured ‘on their [WHSQ] terms’ (BOH02). 
Duty holders freely engage with the regulatory authority during the preparation stage 
(and beyond) and devise the contents they offer in the EU. Each of these activities 
enhance the perceptions of fairness of the EU process and the acceptance of the 
outcome (the EU).  
Duty holders are motivated to accept the unjust sanction because it is a ‘trade-
off’. The sanction enables the duty holder to achieve the longer term economic 
objective of future-proofing the firm’s sustainability. It is attractive because it 
provides a conviction free record and promotes social ‘repair’ caused through 
reputational damage for the wrong doing and the harm caused to the individual and 
this cascades onto the community (Safe Work Australia, 2012a). It also helps to 
preserve the relationships within the obligation holder’s organisation and its 
employees, the industry sector it operates in, the regulator, and the community. The 
legislative provision of the sanction and the policy guidelines support the opportunity 
to make a choice to elect one enforcement sanction over the other. The motivations 
for electing an EU support each of the theories explaining why voice counts. Voice 
in the EU process promotes self-interest and instrumental models of justice (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980); voice maintains 
relationships with different groups consistent with the relational model of authority 
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of Tyler and Lind (1988) and it supports corporate social responsibility by signalling 
a moral obligation to want to do the right thing by the injured party, other employees 
and the community through electing an EU (Folger, 2001). 
Leventhal’s six criteria of a fair procedure 
Duty holders’ experiences of the EU process identify components where 
Leventhal’s (1980) justice rules for evaluating procedural fairness judgments were 
violated in the EU process. 
Consistency rule 
The study shows that the consistency rule (Leventhal, 1980) across time and 
across people was problematic for duty holders. Duty holders noted over time there 
were changes in the EU policy document, changes to the template and changes in 
expectations of the EU content. In particular, duty holders reported at one point in 
time there was considerable changeover of EUU staff, which resulted in changing 
expectations and information to be provided to the regulator. Considerable variability 
was reported on the level of intervention by the expert review panel influencing the 
activities duty holders had to focus on. There was also lengthy delays experienced by 
some duty holders to complete the EU. Delays were reported in the timeliness of  
regulator decision-making, beyond the 4 week turnaround (DEIR, 2008). Timeliness 
in getting EUs finalised during the preparation stage led to delays in businesses 
implementing the EU quickly.   
Change was evident in the procedures related to duty holders’ monitoring and 
auditing of the EU, with a shift from face to face contact between duty holders and 
the regulatory administrators to electronic and technological methods for record 
keeping and document verification. This trend shift suggests impacts were being 
experienced by WHSQ internally on its resourcing capabilities. One duty holder 
expressed concerns for the increasing workload associated with verification reporting 
and submission of financial statements, requirements not present in the first EU but 
required under the second undertaking (BOH01). The lack of stability in procedures 
reduces procedural fairness judgments and accentuates the vulnerability of duty 
holders being captive of the regulators’ unconstrained demands but also its internal 
resourcing constraints. A failure to fulfil the requests of the regulator can be 
construed as non-compliance.  
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The rule of consistency suggests that if changes are made too frequently or 
are deviated from too readily, the perceived fairness of the process will be reduced. 
A key aspect of the consistency rule is to set up in advance the expectations and 
specify the requirements for evaluation or performance (Leventhal, 1980). While 
processes are in place, perceptions of fairness are reduced across the consistency 
rule, with the changeable nature of the expectations being placed on duty holders by 
WHSQ own internal constraints. Some form of cap should exist on the regulator to 
ensure the authority maintains proportionality of requirements and is restrained from 
over stepping its discretionary powers over duty holders. 
It is not surprising procedures and processes will undergo change. As noted 
earlier under the voice of WHSQ, procedures used in the EU process are unlikely to 
remain stable for long periods of time, influenced by legislation, budgetary 
constraints, technology, political direction of governments and WHSQ management 
decisions. These factors will constantly impact on duty holders’ perceptions of 
procedural fairness. However, as suggested in the consistency rule, ensuring 
timeframes are adhered to, putting in place realistic expectations that have some 
restraint over the regulator and communicating these well in advance to the duty 
holder would improve fairness perceptions. 
Bias suppression rule 
The lack of transparency and accountability in establishing an assessment 
criteria for evaluating the duty holder’s EU by the industry review panel, exposes 
duty holders to the risk of abuse. The duty holder may be ‘bullied’, ‘arm twisted’ 
(Parker, 2003) and ‘coerced’ (Yeung, 2004) into incorporating unreasonably 
excessive EU obligations that are disproportionate to the conduct of the entity and 
the breach. Failing to provide a transparent  assessment criteria to evaluate the EU 
leaves WHSQ open to concerns of biased procedures against the duty holders 
(Leventhal, 1980) and an erosion of confidence in the process (ALRC, 2002, Yeung, 
2004). Moreover it reduces trust and neutrality (Tyler & Lind, 1992) in the 
organisation. Stronger process protections are required to remove perceptions of 
biased procedures and prevent a duty holder being adversely prejudiced by biased 
procedures that lead to a disproportionate outcome. 
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The accuracy rule  
The accuracy rule relates to two elements – information and monitoring and 
record keeping. Leventhal (1980) argued that the accuracy rule was critical when 
collecting information specifically related to the receiver of a punishment (or 
reward). The accuracy rule suggests that the information in the allocative process 
must be the best available at the time and be based on informed views, with minimal 
error. This principle applies to both the duty holder and the regulator. The duty 
holder draws on its own internal knowledge and information to develop its EU 
content. Duty holders rely on WHSQ to provide relevant information on EUs and 
have suitably qualified and skilled staff to support them to devise the EU content.  
Where the EU is to be evaluated by the industry panel, the selection of agents 
administrating the allocative process is important and their circumstances of election 
[to the panel] should be publically disclosed (Leventhal, 1980). This transparency in 
processes allows for the views and character of the parties to be known. WHSQ only 
provides general details about the industry review panel in its policy document, and 
indicates the panel comprises a senior departmental officer and two ‘industry 
experts’. The duty holder’s EU is reviewed by unnamed ‘industry experts’ providing 
ongoing feedback throughout the preparation stage, intervening in the suggestions 
presented by duty holders until the EU is regarded as satisfactory for lodging with 
the regulator. The panel make decisions in the absence of formal, publically available 
assessment criteria. In contrast, the duty holder is publically named in the media and 
on the WHSQ website  
The second element of the accuracy rule relates to monitoring through the 
implementation and maintenance of accurate record keeping systems to store data 
and report. Record keeping documents cover the letters, evaluation sheets, case file 
notes and verification sheets and form the basis of evidence. The regulatory authority 
must closely monitor and audit the duty holder to ensure each one meets their 
milestone obligations during the monitoring and auditing stage of the EU process. 
Monitoring officers maintain a database of duty holders’ records with an expectation 
that duty holders also keep records in the event any discrepancies may occur. A 
single reference implying disregard towards one duty holder was reported by BOH01 
with the failure of the EUU to provide a discharge letter on the company’s first EU. 
Closure is a significant milestone in the EU process for the regulated. The absence of 
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an EU discharge letter opens the duty holder to potential legal action, in the absence 
of evidence of discharge of its EU. Sound record keeping reflects accountability, 
integrity and accuracy and acts as a deterrent to any violation in the process. From 
the perspective of the duty holder, the oversight in discharging the matter, in addition 
to the respect element (Bies & Moag, 1986), represents a violation of the accuracy 
rule (Leventhal, 1980).   
Documented in the policy guidelines (DEIR, 2008), the EU activities are to 
be ‘substantial’ and go ‘beyond mere compliance’. Neither of the statements provide 
clarity or definitional scope for what a duty holder should consider reasonable and 
fair when determining ‘substantial’ or ‘beyond mere compliance’ activities for the 
EU. The regulatory perspective on what is decided by the duty holder in the EU is ‘of 
no concern to the authority’ and the authority is not ‘privy to such decisions’. 
However, the policy document (DEIR, 2008) identifies ‘proportionality’, 
‘consistency’ and ‘transparency’ as three of the four key principles underpinning the 
WHSQ WH&S safety enforcement efforts (DEIR, 2008). These principles should be 
clearly defined and publically available as information to assist in measuring what 
are reasonable (monetary and content wise) activities in the EU. Addressing the 
uncertainty will also introduce some performance standards with the evaluation 
review panel, which should reduce the lengthy delays in developing suitable content 
for the EUs, thereby enhancing procedural fairness. 
Although the financial costs for the activities of an EU are included in the 
signed EU, the actual ‘benefits’ accrued from the investment, remain unknown. This 
is despite the WHSQ policy asserting that the duty holders must develop activities 
that ‘contain specific health and safety initiatives that will bring benefits to the 
workplace, industry and the broader community’. Furthermore, the policy requires 
‘serious organisational reforms at the workplace level through the implementation of 
a WHS management system and to deliver tangible benefits to workers, industry and 
the community (DEIR, 2008:2-4). Data provided by the regulatory administrators 
indicate that evaluations of the EU program have yet to be undertaken (apart from a 
single study by Johnstone & King, 2008). Moreover, at no stage during the EU 
process, or at discharge of the EU, is there an evaluation or review of its 
effectiveness that involves the duty holder or any other stakeholder.  This is a 
significant finding, with the program having run since 2003 and the first EU 
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published in 2006. At the time of this study, 81 EUs had been published, and 
between January 2013 and December 2014 a further 19 EUs had been published. The 
WHSQ website’s current listing does not include published EUs for 2015 (OFSWQ 
website, 2015). 
Duty holders concur that reviews and evaluations are not conducted on the 
EU process. One duty holder questioned the value of the process, observing that 
without any concrete evidence to substantiate the value of program, and assert 
benefits to industry or the ‘magnitude of change required in the community’, it 
places the integrity of the process and sanction in question because there are no 
demonstrable or measurable qualitative or quantifiable benefits (BOH01). In the 
absence of any clear evidence-based data to support the policy framework against the 
WHSQ policy statements, procedural elements have been violated by the regulator, 
namely the accuracy principle and the bias rule (Leventhal, 1980).  
Representation rule 
 The EU process supports the presence of various stakeholders in the EU 
process in order to maximise that range of perspectives, values, outlooks and 
concerns by those affected by the decision process. Duty holders could freely engage 
multiple stakeholders to assist in the organisation’s decision-making process. This 
included drawing on legal advisers, allowing lawyers to act on the entities behalf to 
devise the EU, consulting with independent consultants like auditors, safety 
specialists. Affected third parties are also represented, but their views and opinions 
are undisclosed to the duty holder and contribute no input to the EU. Some duty 
holders were aware affected third parties were involved in the process and agreed 
there was merit in hearing the parties’ views, especially if the ideas would contribute 
to improvements in the organisation or are worthwhile as contributing to industry or 
the community. Industry views are reflected in the voices of the expert industry 
panel. It could be suggested the panel’s perspective is biased by the nature of 
appointment of the members. The voices from the community remain silent.  Overall, 
perceptions of fairness are upheld for the representativeness rule. 
Correctability rule 
There were a number of reports involving the opportunity to modify the EU. 
The correctability rule was evident in the process with one non-profit organisation 
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provided with an exemption from community based activities, as the focus of the 
organisation directly benefitted the community (BOH04). Another duty holder 
challenged the decisions of the evaluation panel to allow the duty holder to 
incorporate some creative ideas into the EU (BOH03), while another cited the 
example to modify the activities of the EU when found to be no longer relevant to 
the organisation (BOH01). 
Additionally, the policy guidelines indicate a review of a rejected EU 
decision is available under the Judicial Review Act 1991.  However, the process 
provides no mechanism for a grievance or appeal process if in the end the EU offer 
has been based on coercion or bullying through the bilateral relationship or is 
excessive in what the regulator and the review panel expect of the duty holder.  
Overall, fairness perceptions are upheld for the correctability rule. 
Ethicality rule 
The study found no evidence of unethical conduct by the WHSQ and its 
official representatives. All duty holders openly acknowledged the role of the 
regulator and indicated at all times regulatory officials remained at arms-length to the 
duty holders. Fairness perceptions are upheld for the ethicality rule. 
Interactional justice 
In the course of duty holder’s interactions with WHSQ and its official 
representatives, the study suggests that duty holders experienced high levels of 
interactional fairness. Overwhelmingly duty holders in the study noted that the 
officers from WHSQ were respectful, the EUU was responsive to their needs with 
appropriate information made available in a timely manner. Duty holders valued the 
freedom to work independently and use available resources like the EU template to 
manage the drafting and preparation stage. Officials remained polite and worked 
professionally with duty holders at all times; duty holders reported honesty and 
truthfulness in their dealings with EUU staff. Clear boundaries of role responsibility 
were evident with the EUU staff and inspectors at all times. These findings support 
Bies and Moag’s (1986) interactional justice rules of fair interpersonal treatment and 
communication during the enactment of the EU process.  
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Summary 
  Figure 6.2 illustrates the perceptions of fairness across the three justice types 
for duty holders. Consistent with the WHSQ perspective on the EU, the sanction is 
regarded by duty holders as inequitable (Adams, 1963) and perceived as 
distributively unjust. The equality rule is violated, with the EU process found to be 
skewed in favour of well-resourced entities. Evidence of the needs rule (Deutsch, 
1975) was found in one community organisation. Significantly, voice (Folger 1977), 
process and decision control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978) and representativeness 
(Leventhal 1980) were supported across the data.  Examples of correctability were 
found across the preparation and monitoring and auditing stages. Violations of 
fairness were evident in the consistency rule, bias suppression and accuracy rule. 
Predominantly the disproportionate nature of the EU was a key fairness concern for 
duty holders. 
Figure 6.2 An integrative model of organisational justice –violations of justice - duty 
holders 
Source: Diagram by the author 
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THE VOICE OF THE AFFECTED THIRD PARTY 
The inclusion of the affected third party in the EU process signals the 
important ‘social standing’ the regulatory authority attributes to the affected third 
party, since they are directly and adversely impacted by the incident that leads to the 
EU. Including affected third parties in the process, the WHSQ is fostering relational 
elements with the injured employee and their next of kin for the longer term. It also 
signifies respect to them because the incident becomes the motivator for the 
workplace cultural change (Tyler & Lind, 1992).   
Procedural justice 
The EU policy guidelines include the participation of the injured worker and 
the next of kin (affected third parties) when a duty holder proposes an EU. Offering 
affected third parties voice opportunities (Folger, 1977) in the EU process, promotes 
perceptions of procedural fairness. The policy guidelines promote process control by 
making available the option for affected third parties to present their views on the EU 
and decision control, the option to agree or disagree to participate in the process 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1978). Affected third parties are under no obligation to 
participate (decision control), nor compelled to offer any input (process control).  
Despite being offered the opportunity to be involved in the process, an affected third 
party has no control over or influence in the decision outcome. Decision control is 
restricted voice, reduced to giving either a yes or no comment on the EU proposal.   
Of interest in this study is that few affected third parties participate in the EU 
process (REG02). Each affected third party respondent to the study had no 
knowledge of the EU or what the process entailed. Consequently evidence 
supporting Van den Bos et al. (1996) was revealed suggesting when participants have 
no expectations of voice arrangements but are offered voice, their fairness 
perceptions of the process were found to be low. This element was found to be 
particular relevant for one stakeholder group (ATP02). 
Representativeness rule 
The representative rule dictates the process should reflect the ‘basic concerns, 
values and outlook’ of the important groups affected by the decision (Leventhal, 
1980:30). Examining the rules of representativeness, process control and decision 
control, the results of this study strongly suggest that having voice in the procedure is 
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marginalised through a form of censorship. Both affected third parties noted that 
having been solicited by the WHSQ to participate in the process they provided input, 
and assumed their views and opinions were warranted and would be reflected in the 
final EU. Such an expectation is consistent with Avery and Quinones (2002). Both 
acknowledged that their views were not published. WHSQ places restrictions on the 
use of the information provided by the affected third party. Information from the 
affected third party is included in material submitted to the regulator for approval or 
rejection of the EU application, but the input forms no part of the actual EU 
agreement. Consistent with Leventhal’s (1980) representativeness rule, when a 
restriction is placed on the flow of information of a party in a procedure that solicits 
the information, it acts as a form of censorship and suppression of certain facts and 
views. When an individual has knowledge of the suppression, the violation of the 
representativeness rule will induce perceptions of unfairness.  
Two other impacts arise as a consequence of WHSQ limiting the voice of the 
affected third party. Being offered voice by WHSQ but being silent and excluded 
from the EU, leads to the frustration effect found in Folger (1977), with the 
consequent adverse reaction to the EU process found in ATP01 and ATP01A. Lind 
and Tyler (1988) argue that the frustration effect is associated with biased 
procedures, while Cohen (1985) suggests that the soliciting of voice by an authority 
contributes to the frustration effect because it is a form of enticement to have 
individuals accept the decision-maker’s self-serving decision.     
Using voice to solicit comments in this manner is regarded as a violation of 
procedural justice and reduces trust in the authority (Tyler, 1987; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler & Lind 1992; Avery & Quinones, 2002).  This is a significant factor for 
a regulatory authority working to serve affected third parties who may lose support 
and faith in the work of the regulatory body (ALRC, 2002; Yeung, 2004). 
Consistency rule 
The same process administered to both affected third parties resulted in 
different experiences for the respondents. One affected third party received 
notification of the EU and was aware of its publication in newspapers and was 
consulted by the regulator authority (ATP01). The second affected party (ATP02) 
was unaware the EU had been published and what was included in its content. The 
same affected third party was required to follow up with the authority regarding 
 Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 171 
progress of the EU. Inconsistency in treatment and the administration of the 
consistency rule was also evident in the reporting by the regulatory officials in how 
they administer the process. Regulatory officials indicated providing a copy of the 
EU to the affected third party is part of ‘quality assurance’ while the flow chart 
indicates the EU is not given to the affected third party. Clear disconnections exist 
resulting in inconsistency in the application of the EU, thereby reducing perceptions 
of fairness. 
Bias suppression 
 As reflected in the representativeness rule, offering voice without translating 
the contributions of the voice opportunities into the EU is a form of bias in the 
procedure and violates fairness perceptions. 
Correctability and accuracy rules 
Affected third parties are unable to modify, correct or appeal the EU. The 
study found no data to comment on the accuracy rule other than the information 
provided by the affected third party remains invisible in the process.  
Ethicality 
A significant insight from the contrasting voices of affected third parties is 
the impact that involvement in an EU process can have on the affected third parties. 
Variables such as the stage the affected third party is at in their recovery from the 
injury, the relationship with the workplace (management in particular), injury type 
and legal proceedings, cumulatively impact on the affected third party’s perceptions 
of fairness and one’s involvement in the EU process has the potential to re-traumatise 
the injured party. The administration of the EU process adheres to ethical standards 
however the study reveals the impact of offering voice to affected third parties has 
highlighted where the same process is offered to the affected third party, it can 
generate very different reactions. The different responses may be explained by one 
affected third party having closed on the legal and rehabilitation activities and moved 
on from the incident, while the second affected third party (ATP01) remained 
immersed in the process, embattled in the legal proceedings and employed in an 
unsupportive workplace. Involving affected third parties has the potential to 
adversely impact on affected third parties and requires further examination on how to 
morally and ethically deal with parties whose reactions are so intense.   
Figure 6.3 summarises the main areas of violations of a fair procedure. For 
affected third parties, process control and decision control are available with no 
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visible influence in how having a say is reflected in the decision-making process. 
While representativeness is promoted, censorship via one-way communication is 
evident resulting in a biased procedure and a violation of fairness. Inconsistency of 
treatment was found between the two affected third party respondents, suggesting the 
consistency rule has been violated. Affected third parties have no ability to change or 
modify an EU (correctability rule) and while interactional treatment and 
communication remained professional, explanations for decisions and consistency in 
information about the EU were found to vary between the two affected third parties. 
Hence a question mark is provided for justification and truthfulness. 
Figure 6.3 An integrated model of organisational justice – violations of fairness -
affected third party 
 
Source: Diagram by the author. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research set out to explore the question, How do stakeholders to an EU 
in the work health and safety context perceive the fairness of the EU process? Three 
viewpoints were provided. From the perspective of a regulatory authority, WHSQ 
administers an EU process designed to enact an enforcement sanction that is 
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distributively unjust to the regulated community. To secure the regulatee’s 
acceptance of the sanction, the regulator has established an organisational structure 
through the EUU, processes and a policy to maximise procedural and interactional 
fairness perceptions for duty holders.  
Duty holders were in agreement that the EU sanction is distributively unjust 
and inequitable, identifying concerns the process leads to disproportionate outcomes, 
measured not only in monetary terms but effort, time and emotional costs. The 
absence of clear parameters or a cap on the ‘proportionality’ of the sanction 
heightened the injustice. Procedural elements to maximise voice opportunities 
(process and decision control) were available throughout the process, increasing 
fairness perceptions, although a number of procedural rules were violated, namely 
consistency, bias and accuracy rules. Interactional rules were upheld.  
Affected third parties, while being offered the procedural element of voice 
(process control) and representation, had their voice marginalised by the process. The 
study findings reveal that fairness perceptions varied between the study respondents 
suggesting that even with the same process enacted, it can result in very different 
perceptions of fairness for this stakeholder group. 
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
In this section of the chapter the limitations of the thesis are considered. In 
addition to the comments here, other limitations of this study were addressed in 
Chapter four, research design.   
The first limitation of the study relates to the data sample size. The study 
involved three regulatory authority representatives, five duty holders and three 
affected third parties. Having a small sample size is not generalisable across the 
regulatory population community; however, this study was established as an 
exploratory inquiry into a poorly researched area. Despite its small sample, a random 
approach to data collection was applied, without prejudice to the inclusion of a duty 
holder or affected third party from between 2006 and January 2013. From the outset, 
the broadest possible sample was sought. The data reveal areas of consistency in 
responses to support generalisability to the regulatory community, especially WH&S.  
A further area of limitation in the sample, which occurred by default in the 
response rate, is the type of duty holders interested in participating in the study. Each 
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of the duty holders rely on tenders and contracts for all or a significant proportion of 
the firm’s income. The involvement in the study of procurement based entities has 
occurred serendipitously. Future research would benefit from a broader spectrum of 
business types and a cross section of small, medium and larger enterprises. This 
would ensure that the bias of this study sample of duty holders could be verified or 
falsified. 
The study adopted a cross sectional research design to examine EUs and the 
experiences and perspectives of three stakeholder groups. By their nature, cross 
sectional studies introduce limitations because they are time limited to the scope of 
the study, in contrast to longitudinal studies. It is noteworthy the study sample had a 
mix of respondents whose experience of the EU process spanned from 2007 until 
December 2010, some had completed the EU while two EUs were in the final stages 
of completion. Although it was a cross sectional study, the three year life span of an 
EU with its mix of respondents and organisation types, has diluted the cross sectional 
limitation of the study.  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
This section addresses the theoretical contributions of the study. A number of 
theoretical contributions have been identified. This study is the first time the 
organisational justice model has been developed (incorporating three justice 
dimensions) to examine multiple stakeholder groups in the WH&S domain in order 
to understand how the three parties perceive the fairness of the EU process.  It 
provides a structure for future researchers to test the model using multi-level analysis 
and its applicability and generalisability in other regulatory areas. 
As a framework, the model lends itself to incorporate other justice principles. 
In particular, regulatory studies have incorporated ‘restorative’ justice, based on 
criminology theory. A four factor model incorporating distributive, procedural, 
interactional and restorative justices would make an important theoretical 
contribution to justice studies. Other fairness rules can also be incorporated, for 
example Sheppard and Lewicki’s (1987) resources, timeliness and information 
criteria. 
The multi-dimensional organisational justice construct has been applied to an 
Australian regulatory environment. This is a unique theoretical contribution as the 
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three justice areas have emerged from American studies (Greenberg & Colquitt, 
2005). Studies in Australia tend to single out the procedural justice element (Thibaut 
& Walker, 1978; Tyler, 1988; Leventhal, 1980), especially in the regulatory domain, 
for example refer to Makkai & Braithwaite (1996); Murphy (2003); Murphy, Tyler 
and Curtis (2009) and Nehme (2010a), over the tripartite justice dimensions.   
This study took an interdisciplinary approach, combining psycho-social 
theory and regulatory theory. The use of the organisational justice model prevalent in 
management and business is distinguished from regulatory theory with a strong focus 
on legal doctrine and political theoretical focus. This study is unique in its focus on 
the application of the social-psychological theoretical constructs to the regulatory 
environment to evaluate fairness perceptions for a legally based sanction.  
The study has applied the organisational justice framework to test the fairness 
of an enforcement sanction that is gaining increased popularity with regulators. 
WH&S regulatory environment is an area that is under researched with the 
application of the organisational justice model proving a suitable framework to build 
a strong theoretical knowledge base in how to achieve obligation holder’s acceptance 
of and compliance with an unjust enforcement sanction. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICE 
WH&S legislation and national policy arrangements are now harmonised 
across Australia and offer EUs as an enforcement option. This study’s findings make 
a number of contributions to practice in the real world of WH&S regulation and 
regulation more generally. Firstly, the study findings reinforce the importance of 
establishing an organisational structure and mechanisms that will promote and 
maximise procedural and interactional justice in the face of a harsh and unjust 
enforcement sanction. To ensure acceptability and compliance with the conditions of 
the sanction, perceptions of fairness are critical to those directly impacted by the 
sanction. 
From the perspective of best practice regulation, the Australian government 
has noted regulation should be ‘imposed only when it can be shown to offer an 
overall net benefit’ (DPMC, 2014: 2). Policy makers should consult in a ‘genuine 
and timely way with affected businesses, community organisations and individuals’ 
and the ‘cost burden of new regulation should be fully offset by reductions in 
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existing regulatory burdens’ (DPMC, 2014: 2).  This empirical study suggests more 
data should be provided by a regulator that substantiates the quantifiable and 
qualitative benefits accrued to the business, industry and the community from an EU. 
Over 100 EUs have been undertaken in Queensland since the sanction was 
introduced; a strong sample of different size businesses and a range of industry 
sectors and various community recipients receiving funds through the program. 
Having been in operation since 2006, WHSQ has sufficient published data to 
commence evaluating the tangible benefits from implementing the EU. This study 
provides some preliminary focus for undertaking future studies, especially given the 
duty holders acknowledgement of the significant burden an EU carries for a business 
and the reactions to the sanction.  
While acknowledged as an inequitable sanction, regulators should introduce a 
degree of proportionately into the cost expectation of the EU for a duty holder. 
Quantification of the actual cost of an EU should be undertaken, beyond the value 
documented in the approved EU. Regulators have access to cost benefit calculators to 
measure the regulatory impact of the net benefit and cost burden of a policy. A 
regulator should be able to calculate estimated costs, both direct and hidden, of an 
EU so a realistic and transparent commitment is available to a duty holder. It is 
important an EU is proportional to the seriousness of the incident, taking account of 
the prosecution penalty and provide the information to a duty holder during the 
preparation stage. Some cap on the EU should be considered, rather than open ended 
and subject to overly burdensome activities influenced in their development by the 
review panel.  
Surveys and evaluations should be introduced at different stages of the EU 
process to gauge all stakeholders’ reactions and responses to the undertaking. 
Feedback reporting is commonplace for any program or project especially involving 
government activities and provides the basis for evidence and to build a business 
case in support of the sanction. WHSQ would acquire significant data to evaluate the 
EU and contribute to changes accordingly. Having relevant and current evidence 
adds weight to WHSQ voice in a discretionary decision-making process. 
Furthermore, evaluating the benefits accrued to industry and the community will 
enhance the credibility of the regulator and support its assertion the EU brings 
tangible benefits to the workplace, industry and the community. 
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The interviews with the affected third parties revealed two contrasting 
experiences and suggest the EU process needs to be reviewed, with changes to how 
the process can accommodate the solicited voice of this stakeholder group. While 
WHSQ offer voice to affected third parties, it needs consideration as to the value of 
unilateral voice, or to look at examining ways to incorporate their voice and, if their 
views are solicited and their ideas have merit, to look at how the contributions can be 
used in a meaningful way in the EU.  Alternatively, given few take up the option of 
voice, WHSQ, should countenance the option to set aside voice.  As the process 
currently operates there is limited follow-through provided by the regulator once 
voice is solicited. Finally some consideration be given to the effect the emotional re-
triggering associated with the pain and suffering an affected third party may 
experience, when provided voice opportunity. 
This study cannot overlook how regulatory officers working with affected third 
parties are impacted psychologically. They need to work sensitively and 
emphatically with individuals and families devastated by a workplace incident. In 
designing a justice model, the implications for the administrators need to take 
account of the psychological impact the process may have on staff working with duty 
holders and affected third parties daily. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Unlike many areas of regulatory enforcement, a workplace related injury 
reaches across the lives of many people, the injured party, their next of kin and 
extended families, into the community and society. Where the impact is so great, and 
the costs are disproportionately borne by the injured party and their families and the 
community (Safe Work Australia, 2012a), investigating the impact of an EU 
becomes increasingly important. There is a significant need to investigate the range 
of impacts on an affected third party, industry and the community in greater detail. 
This study is exploratory with emerging areas of study identified. 
This thesis provided a tripartite perspective of the perceptions of fairness of 
the EU through the voices of the regulatory officials, duty holders and affected third 
parties. Extending the research into the similarities and dissimilarities of perspectives 
of an employer and injured worker from the same organisation, especially during and 
post EU implementation, would provide valuable comparisons on the perceptions of 
justice and how injured workers perceive the change in the workplace.  
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EUs would benefit from including both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to research.  Opportunities for conducting mixed methods in EU research 
incorporating surveys and interviews along with documentary analysis would extend 
our knowledge of the sanction and its effectiveness. A broader cross section of small, 
medium and large enterprises would be a major contribution to this field of inquiry. 
An ongoing concern is the delay in evaluation of the EU as a sanction, 
especially as it is now commonplace across the Australian regulatory environment as 
part of a regulator’s toolbox of enforcement strategies. Benchmarking in the 
regulatory environment requires a regulatory impact statement and quantifiable 
calculations of the net benefit of regulation when designing policy (DPMC, 2014). 
Understanding the net benefit of the EU will contribute to the evidence-base of the 
sanction. In addition, this can inform prosecution research and contribute to the 
effectiveness of an EU.  
The current organisational justice model lends itself to the inclusion of 
restorative justice alongside distributive, procedural and interactional justice to form 
a foundational integrative model of justice in WH&S. Value would be gained from 
including another form of justice in the model and testing it. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out the voices of the three stakeholders in the EU process. 
It has identified elements of fairness and unfairness in the EU process, using a model 
developed for the thesis which incorporates the elements of distributive, procedural 
and interactional justice. The limitations of the study were acknowledged and the 
contributions to theory and practice explained. Finally, suggestions for further 
research were elaborated.  
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Appendix 1 Workplace Health and Safety Undertaking template 
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Appendix 2 Letter to Injured Party 
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Appendix 3A Request for WHSQ participation  
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Appendix 3B Request for WHSQ participation- response 
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Appendix 4A Flyer promoting study participation - Business 
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Appendix 4B Flyer promoting study participation - Regulator 
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Appendix 4C Flyer promoting study participation – Third party 
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Appendix 5 Expression of Interest form 
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Appendix 6 Consent form 
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Appendix 7 DEIR Information for applicants 2008 
 
Instructions can be found on archived webpage at: 
http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/fair-and-safe-work/prosecutions-and-enforceable-
undertakings  
 Appendices 202 
Appendix 8 Data coding extract 
Code/category Sub-code Description/memo  
Enforceable 
Undertakings Unit 
(EUU) 
Advisory service 
Educative 
Non adversarial 
Non coercive 
Administrative unit working 
with obligation holders to 
develop an undertaking /affected 
third parties 
It’s not an adversarial process is what 
you need to remember 
 Timeliness  The timeliness of responses to 
duty holder 
Delays in signoff  BOH01 
It went on and on – frustration change 
of staff - no reality of business needing 
to get on with things BOH05) 
 Feedback Information provided to 
regulated entities to facilitate 
drafting of EU 
 
 Involvement of injured worker  Opportunity for the injured 
worker to  input to EU 
Duty holders perspectives 
“Yes, probably after the trauma part of 
things has probably past’ BOH02 
 Changeover of staff WHSQ staff changeover during 
the EU process 
Changeover of staff confusing for 
stakeholder BOH05 
Standard process irrelevant who 
administers it REG 
Evaluation Panel 
(Expert Industry 
Panel) 
Feedback to regulated entities  Role and influence in decision-
making process 
Lot of back/forwards – lengthy process 
BOH05 
Panel asked questions, only meet 
certain times in the year BOH05
Regulator Decision-maker Role of the regulator – decision-
maker 
Clear role - EU acceptance or 
rejection of EU REG 
Knowledge and skills 
related to EU 
Sources of information Where did stakeholders obtain 
their information about an 
EU/did they know about EU 
 Solicitor/lawyer In-house, contracted (external)  
lawyer 
 Board Board members knowledge 
 Academic or discipline 
training/workplace training 
Functional role in organisation 
 WHSQ website  WHSQ policy documents and 
published EUs – historical data 
 WHSQ – Inspectorate, EUU  
 Industry bodies (HIA), local 
government 
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 Associates and friends Business/trades/family/friends 
Motivation for EU Prosecution The factors that shape duty 
holders decision to undertake an 
EU 
 Clean record Conviction free/not guilty 
 Reputation 
 
Organisations reputation 
amongst industry 
 Moral obligation Corporate responsible citizen – 
safety culture to serve workers 
and others 
 Tendering process and 
commercial reality 
Impact on commercial viability 
– criminality of the regulated 
entity– impacting on tenders and 
ongoing work 
 Loss of public liability insurance Influence on future insurance 
options 
 Investment in own organisation  Funds being re-invested in 
organisation to improve WHS 
standards and performance 
 Policy and legislation  EU as an enforcement option –
legislative flexibility to provide 
option 
 Self interest 
Seeking acknowledgement of 
harm and injury 
Factors shaping the injured 
worker’s decision to participate 
in an EU? 
Publication of EU Sources of information Website 
Media coverage  radio 
newspapers 
Networks and industry –trade 
associations 
Publication and reaction to 
publication of incident 
(disclosure) 
 
Stakeholders involved 
in EU decision 
(excludes regulatory 
stakeholders ) 
Board members Influential parties involved in 
decision to apply for EU 
 Lawyers – internal and externally 
employed 
 
 Company directors  
 International -executive 
management/subsidiary 
companies 
Wider reach of EU impact on 
subsidiary companies and parent 
company 
 Workcover Authority 
Workers compensation 
/settlement 
representatives 
Role of other authorities 
Role clarity -EUU and workers 
compensation  
 Safety expert/industry association  
 Injured worker and family Affected third party 
 Industry reaction  Attitude to EUs 
Obligation holders 
‐ cultural change 
and behaviour 
Management attitude to the event 
 
How did duty holders respond to 
the incident  
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Rectification of problem areas 
Immediate decision to undertake 
EU 
 Management 
attitude/treatment/support for 
injured worker 
Duty holders treatment and 
support for injured worker and 
family at time of event 
Enforceable 
Undertakings 
Outcome  
Financial  commitment  
($ value arrived at) 
 
 
How did a regulated entity 
decide on the level of 
commitment for the EU 
 Process control –control over the 
content set out in EU by regulated 
entity 
Regulated entities control over 
content submitted to Regulator – 
ownership 
 Contributions to the 
organisation’s workplace, industry 
and community 
Regulated entities investment 
The value of the EU in relation 
to organisational safety cultural 
change, community benefits 
 Proportionally The content of EU relevant to 
the investment of $, time, effort 
and energy and consequence of 
EU 
 Knowledge and understanding of 
process 
Factors raised by injured worker 
suggesting misunderstanding of 
process 
Attitudes to process and content 
 Perspectives of injured worker to 
EU and duty holder 
Injured worker attitude and 
reflections on the final EU 
Positive responses  
 Re-traumatising impact on the 
injured worker 
 
Negative emotional reactions to 
the EU and process – injured 
worker and family 
 Vicarious trauma – regulated 
entities employees  
Impact on regulated entity 
Working with traumatic event 
and its impact on staff assisting 
the affected worker and family 
 
 Increased stress and workload 
 
 
EU impact on the personal well-
being of employees responsible 
for drafting and implementation 
of EU 
Viability of EUs Company size 
Prevailing economic climate on 
business decisions to apply for EU
Reasons for not doing an EU 
(not mentioned elsewhere) 
Monitoring and 
compliance 
Monitoring and compliance  
Audits conducted 
Assessment of progress against 
milestones 
WHSQ/EUU responsibilities for 
monitoring and compliance  
Approaches used to 
audit/monitor & 
Communicate with parties 
 Discharge of EU 
 Regulated entities 
 Injured workers 
Closure on the EU –importance 
of closure and advising 
stakeholders 
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Evaluation of EU Effectiveness of the EU 
Internal/external evaluations 
conducted 
What system level reviews have 
been undertaken into the 
effectiveness or benefits of the 
EU  
Benefit of EUs Facilitates change through 
education at different levels 
Transformation of organisations 
and their culture 
 Exposure in wider industry 
associations about importance of 
safety 
Education and change 
 Safer community and enhanced 
knowledge of safety culture 
EUs bring about a societal safety 
culture  
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Appendix 9 Ethical clearance approval letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
